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Abstract 
This report aims to conceptualise universality in social protection and propose an actionable approach 
to measure it in a systematic and comprehensive way in the European Union. We propose to define the 
universality of a given Welfare State along three dimensions: the range of social needs addressed the 
degree to which the relevant population is covered, and the extent to which the needs are adequately 
covered in each case. We argue that these three dimensions can be used to measure the universality 
of European social systems. We discuss how this measurement could be implemented and present an 
illustrative operationalisation through a system of indicators for health,  unemployment benef its , 
sickness benefits, old-age pensions, social assistance, housing, and education. 
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Executive summary 
In a context of growing uncertainty and evolving societal risks, the pros and cons of universal 
social protection have become a highly topical issue from both a scientific and a policy perspective.  
At EU level, the profound and unequal social impact of the covid-19 crisis calls for stronger, fairer and 
more resilient social protection systems. The European Pillar of Social Rights and one  of its f irst 
flagship actions, the Council recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self -
employed, can be seen as a starting point to further advance towards universality of social protection . 
The aim of this report is to contribute to this endeavour by conceptualis ing universality in socia l 
protection and propose an actionable approach to measure it in a systematic and comprehensive  way 
in the European Union. 
 
Defining universal social protection through social needs, coverage and adequacy 
The necessary starting point to conceptualise universal social protection is a delimitation of its  scope. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we have chosen to focus on public social protection, leaving out the 
alternative mechanisms of addressing social protection needs , mostly through the family or the 
market.  
Further to this, we consider two alternative approaches to determine which areas of social p rotection 
are good candidates to become universal. The first approach is based on people’s preferences, and the 
second on criteria underpinned by a Theory of Needs. Remarkably, both approaches lead to  s imilar 
conclusions, and thus we take as a basis for our conceptual exercise the areas of health, education, 
and income maintenance when in need whether due to unemployment, maternity/paternity, 
old age or disability, with the possible addition of housing. 
On this basis, a review of the literature on universality shows a significant consensus on the elements 
that need to be taken into consideration when defining universality for a given social p rogramme or 
Welfare State. These are the range of social needs addressed, the degree o f coverage o f the 
relevant population and the extent to which the needs are adequately covered in each case.  
 
Approaches to measure universality of social protection: a difficult but feasible task 
Coverage and adequacy are therefore the key dimensions to assess the universality of 
social protection for a given need. While coverage is a relatively straightforward metric which can 
be measured by the percentage of people (or demographic group, depending on the nature of the 
programme) protected by the programme, the conceptualisation and measurement of adequacy will be 
different depending on the nature and characteristics of each programme and the needs addressed. 
We find that adequacy is generally easier to measure in the case of monetary transfers than in  the 
case of services. The measurement of universal social protection should nevertheless cover a ll public 
social programmes, and not only those relying on monetary transfers. 
There are very few attempts to develop indicators of universality of social protection . The 
reason for this is the significant conceptual and methodological hurdles to be overcome: f irst,  the 
difficulty to conceptualise universality due to the lack of agreement about the core  elements of the 
concept; second, the limited availability of statistical information; and third, the qualitative nature of 
some of the information required.  
There are, however, several attempts in the scientific literature to measure the intensity of soc ia l 
protection. The decommodification index by Esping-Andersen (1990) and the Generos ity Index by 
Scruggs and Alan (2006) are particularly valuable, but their limited scope makes them inadequate to  
measure universality of social protection. Other useful contributions include Brady and Bostic’s (2015) 
simple indicator resulting from their definition of universality as “homogeneity across the population in 
benefits, coverage, and eligibility”. Jacques and Noël’s (2018) approach is  based on looking at the 
social benefits (cash transfers) that are means or income tested, and a measure of the proportion of 
private spending on social protection in relation to total expenditure (public and private). 
At the same time, the OECD, the WHO and the ILO have made various contributions which taken 
together provide a good basis for further work. At EU level, the European Pillar of Social Rights, 
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and particularly the Council recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self -
employed and its monitoring framework, represent an important although incomplete starting point to 
continue advancing towards conceptualising and measuring universality of social protection in the EU.  
The pros and cons of universalism as a policy principle: take-up, impact on poverty and incentives to  
work 
In this paper we mostly discuss universality as way of describing and characterising social protection 
systems (the extent to which they adequately cover the social needs of all the relevant populations) . 
But universality can also be understood as a principle for guiding the design of social 
protection systems, with two key premises. The first one is the idea that every person should 
have guaranteed access to certain services or goods regardless of his or her labour market or 
financial situation. The second is the idea that everybody should be protected from certa in 
risks . In this respect, universality can be understood as a matter of values and beliefs, an asp iration. 
To avoid confusion, we will use the term universalism rather than universality when speaking about 
this aspirational policy concept. 
The debate about universalism comprises many side issues: un iversalism has, for example, 
implications for take-up, for poverty reduction and for work incentives. On the one hand,  the 
existence of important non-take-up rates, together with the h igh managing cost of many soc ial 
programmes, are arguments in favour of universalism. On the other, there is no consensus regarding 
the role played by universalism in the fight against poverty and inequality , and some people 
have expressed concerns about the possible role of universal programmes in disincentivising access to  
employment.  
 
A starting point for the development of a system of indicators to measure un iversality in soc ia l 
protection  
In line with the operational concept of universality in social protection that we propose in  th is  paper,  
our approach to construct an index of universality in social p rotection is based on two essentia l 
elements: adequacy and coverage. These two elements are to be applied separately to  each of the 
programmes in the social protection system. 
As a rule, the higher the share of the population protected, the higher the degree of 
universality of the programme. There are however exceptions to this rule, particularly for socia l 
programmes targeted to specific groups (parents, people over or under a threshold rate, peop le with 
especial needs). In these cases, the maximum coverage rate can be limited to the spec if ic targeted 
demographic group. 
Adequacy is a much more subtle aspect of any given programme, due to its more normative 
and qualitative nature. In order to develop a comparable measure of adequacy across programmes 
we propose a general two-step approach for standardising measures of adequacy: first, to define  the  
level (of income, health, education) that each social programme trie s to  p rotect,  and then to use 
measures of actual levels achieved for defining a standard 0-100 measure of adequacy. 
The way adequacy and coverage interplay with each other supplies relevant information about the 
nature of universality of a given Welfare State or specific social protection branch. Fully universal 
Welfare States or branches combine high levels of coverage and adequacy, while residual ones would 
have a low level of coverage as well as low adequacy. Segmented universal Welfare States or 
branches would be characterised by having social programmes with a high level of adequacy, but only 
benefiting a small share of the population. Finally, systems where social programmes reach most of 
the population with a low level of adequacy would have only what we call testimonial universality. 
This report aims to contribute to the establishment of a solid basis for the systematic and 
comprehensive measurement of the degree of universality of soc ia l programmes and/or Welfare 
States in Europe. 
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this report is to reflect on the meaning and measurement of the concept of universality in  
social protection. A better understanding of the extent to which European c itizens are covered by 
existing programmes of protection against old and new social risks, such as lack of education, sickness, 
lack of employment or lack of resources in old age, has become a highly topical scientif ic and policy 
issue in the current context. Moreover, the Covid-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of having an 
extensive system of social protection, as well as the existence of certain gaps in the system,  even in  
the most developed Welfare States. 
The question of how effective the Welfare State is important in itself given that a s izeable part of  
economic output - even if with large differences among Member States - is channe lled through the 
public system into social policies. In addition to this, the context of growing uncertainty that 
characterises the world we live in has turned this question into a pressing matter of concern. 
Globalisation has made truer than ever the Latin proverb Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto 
(1) (“I am a man, and nothing human is alien to me”), as global uncertainties are now added to the local 
and national uncertainties and risks. The current coronavirus pandemic and its worldwide public health 
and socioeconomic implications is an excellent example of this trend of increasing systemic  risks to 
globalization.  
Together with globalisation, the process of technological change experienced in the last few decades , 
characterised by the deployment of advanced new digital technologies, has added further uncertainty 
to our future, piling up new risks on top of old ones (González Vázquez et al., 2019). Tax and benefits 
systems are a key area for policy interventions to mitigate the soc ia l costs of the labour market 
adjustments due to technological progress (Goos et al. 2019). Furthermore, some geopolitical risks 
have an important destabilisation potential. This accumulation of changes makes the  notion of Risk 
Society (Beck, 1992) more relevant today than three decades ago, when it was proposed. 
In this context of growing societal risks - or at least growing feeling of risk or, simply put, uncertainty – 
further scientific research about universality in social protection becomes particularly important for 
several reasons.  
● First, because the contingencies covered by social protection  are  changing (Muñoz de 
Bustillo, 2019) and it is important to know whether social protection can also cover these 
new risks efficiently. 
● Second, because people that in the past were not directly in need of some forms of social 
protection might be now or in the near future, and this is something that universal soc ial 
protection systems can tackle automatically. 
● Third, because societal changes might also affect the poss ibi lity of  relying on othe r 
sources of social protection different from the public sector, mainly the family, the market 
and the community, potentially requiring a strengthening of the state  as the u ltimate 
source of protection (i.e., a guarantee of last resort) making it available to  people that 
previously relied on other forms of protection against risks.  
● Fourth, because the mere existence of the social protection system as a default option  
will reduce the psychological burden of uncertainty. 
This inquiry about universality of social protection is particularly pertinent from an EU perspective, at 
least for the following reasons: 
● First, because the objective of social progress, undoubtedly related to social protection (2), 
is firmly anchored in the EU Treaty (3), and steering a debate on options to advance  
                                     
(1)  Publius Terentius (circa 195-159 BC), Heauton Timorumenos (The Self-Tormentor) (163 BC). 
(2)  Social policy is intimate ly related to social progress, if only because it addresses some of its basic co mponents  s uch a s 
health and wellness, the coverage of basic human needs through income maintenance programs (unemployment benefits ,  
pensions, etc.), and access to knowledge through education. This perspective is clearly stated in the Declaration o n S ocial 
Progress and Development, proclaimed by the UN General Assembly resolution 2 5 4 2 (XXI V )  o f  1 1  Dece mber 1 9 69  
according to which: “Social progress and development shall aim equally at the progressive attainment of the following main 
goals: (a) The provision of comprehensive social security schemes and social welfare services (…), (b) The protection of th e  
rights of the  mother and child (…); (c) The protection of the rights and the assuring of the welfare  of children, the aged and 
the  disabled (…); (d) The education of youth(…); etc.”  (art 11). 
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towards universality of the Welfare States contributes to the European Commiss ion’s 
efforts as part of its treaty obligation to support and complement Member States' policies 
in this area (article 153 TFEU). 
● Second, because this type of analysis can potentially contribute to further develop ing 
recent EU initiatives, in particular the European Pillar of Social Rights and its 
implementation and monitoring through the European Semester of  economic po licy 
coordination, which can represent a step forward in reinforcing the social d imension of 
Europe. 
● Third, because the current COVID crisis and its deep and unequal socio-economic impact 
confirms that protecting everyone and paving the way for a fair recovery will remain key 
priorities for the Union in the years to come, and the debate about universality of soc ia l 
protection complements ongoing and forthcoming initiatives. 
● Last, because universalism of social protection can contribute to a better functioning of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as it can reduce the disparities in employment 
and social performance across Member States and, at the same time,  can be a way to  
avoid, or at least reduce, the potential risk of a "race to the bottom" in socia l protection  
when a single market coexists with quite different systems of social protection. In 
addition to this, it can be argued that if the single market brings benefits through 
economic activity, then it makes sense that the (social) risks related to its construction 
should also be shared,  possibly by-passing national administrations. 
The aspirational notion of universalism of social protection, closely linked to the descriptive concept of 
universality of social protection that we discuss in this paper, is relevant from the perspective of social 
rights too. If these are, as argued by Marshall (1950), the continuation of previous advances in rights 
(4) then it could make sense to think of social rights also in terms of universalism, just like c ivil and 
political rights need to be universal – even if after a long period of transition - in order to be 
considered rights at all. The truth is that, even in the Western world, social rights are in  general far 
from being universal, especially compared to civil and political rights.  
One approximation to visualise this large difference is to compare the consistently high level of  c ivi l 
and political rights reached in selected Western countries, as measured by the EIU Democratic Index (5), 
with the very diverse levels of social expenditure in the same countries (Figure 1). Although as we will 
see in this report social expenditure is an unsatisfactory proxy of universality of social protection,  th is  
illustrates he stark difference between the high consistency in the civil and political rights of Western  
democracies (coefficient of variation of 0.088 for the EIU Democratic Index) and the wide differences 
in social protection systems (coefficient of variation of 0.21 for social expenditure in the same group  
of countries). This example also illustrates the lack of an agreed indicator of universality of  social 
protection, which forced us to use an aggregate index measuring the allocation of resources , and not 
the coverage of needs, to show the dispersion of the level social protection in high-income countries.  
As mentioned above, social rights can be considered as a third wave of rights, chrono logically more 
modern that the other two waves (6). However, the debate on social rights , considered as part of  
human rights, is far from new. Indeed, social and economic rights were part of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in  Paris on 
10 December 1948. In its article 22 the UDHR stated that:  
“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through 
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of 
                                                                                                            
(3)  According to art. 3 ““ […] The Union shall] work for the sustainable  development of Europe based o n b alanced  econ omic 
growth and price  stability, a highly competitive  social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and 
a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. […] It shall comb at s ocia l e xclu sion a nd 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice  and protection, equality between women and  men,  s olid arity  b etween 
generations and protection of the rights of the child . It shall promote economic, s o cial a n d te rrito rial co h esion,  a nd 
solidarity among Member States.” 
(4)  Civil rights (rights required for personal freedom) in the 18th century and political rights (the right to e lect and be elect e d)  
in the  19th – 20th century. 
(5)  The EIU Our Democracy Index is based on five categories: e lectoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning o f  
government; political participation; and political culture , and a total of 60 indicators, and a maximum v alu e of  1 0 ,  (EI U,  
2020) 
(6)  It is out of the scope of this paper to discuss in detail Marshalĺ s theory of citizenship. For details s ee  M os es (2 0 19 )  or 
Turner (1990) or Lister (2005) 
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each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his  dignity  and the free 
development of his personality”.  
Figure 1. Democratic index and Social expenditure (public and mandatory) 
 
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from OECD Social expenditure database, EIU Democracy Index, 2018  
Furthermore, art. 25 argued that:  
“(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of h imself  
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, o ld age or o ther 
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to  
special care and assistance”. 
And article 26 stated that  
“Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education 
shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis  
of merit”. 
As we can see, articles 22, 25 and 26 of the UDHR list the main constitutive elements of modern 
Welfare States (7). Seven decades after the proclamation of the UDHR the EU is still far, in some areas 
(long term care or social assistance) more than in others (e.g. health or education), to accomplish the 
goal set by the UDHR and subsequent legal texts. However major progress has been achieved:  they 
have been transposed into many Constitutions and legal documents, including the EU acquis. They also 
represent a crucial underpinning for the European Pillar of Socia l Rights and the European Social 
Charter. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have also adopted the perspective of universal 
coverage in areas such as health (goal 3.8), primary and secondary education (goal 4.1) ,  or social 
assistance (goal 1.3) (8).  
                                     
(7)  Other articles, such as art. 24 leading with the right to work, or article  26, regarding th e  rig h t to  e ducatio n a re  oth er 
examples of activities related to the Welfare State  that are also considered to be universal human rights.  
(8)  The recent re launching of the debate about economic and social rights challenges the premise that th e se rig hts ,  o ften 
considered as the rights of the poor, are  not legally enforceable (Roman et al., 2010), both b y  s ocia l mo vements  th at 
question the traditional divide between civil and political rights on one side, and social and economic rights o n th e  o ther,  
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Against this background the aim of this report is twofold: 
● Firstly, to discuss the different elements behind the concept of un iversality in soc ial 
protection, to deconstruct its meaning - or its meanings, as universality is  a polysemic 
word.  
● Secondly, to investigate the viability of operationalising the concept in order to  measure 
to what extent a given social programme (or hypothetically a whole Welfare State) can be 
considered more or less universal.  
With this twofold intention, the report is structured as follows. Chapter two will address the question of 
what we mean by universality in social protection. With that aim we will first d iscuss what ( if  any) 
should be the focus of universality. After presenting the different approaches that can be followed to 
deal with this question, the rest of the chapter will discuss the criteria that can be  used in  order to  
define a given social programme as “universal”. With this background, chapter three will  review the  
existing indicators of universality of social protection, focusing on their characteristics and capacity to  
fully capture the idea of universality as defined in the previous chapter. This chapter includes a brief  
account of the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Chapter four will adopt a wider 
policy perspective and review the debate about the efficiency of universal systems of social protection 
vis a vis targeted social systems in meeting social needs, along with other issues related to un iversal 
social programmes such as the question of incentives and take-up rates. Based on the information 
presented in chapters two and three, chapter five, also intended as the report’s conclusions, discusses 
the feasibility of building an index of universality of public social protection, UPSI and proposes a set of 
guidelines that in our opinion should be followed when developing such an indicator.  
This report deals with the concept and measurement of universality in social protection. Thu s,  be fore  
starting, it might be convenient to state what we mean by social protection for the purpose  of our 
analysis. In general, social protection policy can be defined as the set of public policies that a ims at 
protecting people from social risks such as poverty in old age (pensions), lack (or reduction) of income  
due to unemployment or inactivity (unemployment benefits and social assistance, parenthood), health 
issues (sickness and disability) and lack of suitable housing. These are, in  fact,  the types of socia l 
expenditures included in the definition of social expenditure of Eurostat (European System of 
integrated Social Protection Statistics, ESSPROS). Education is statistically not considered as part of  
social policy, probably due to its direct impact on productivity and its  consideration  by standard 
economic analysis as an investment in human capital. Nevertheless, education can also be considered 
as part of social protection and expenditure, as it acts as protection against the risk of ignorance and 
unemployment, and it promotes an active participation in society. This interpretation is buttressed by 
the important role played by education in social levelling and social mobility.  
As implicit in the above definition, in these pages we will focus on public social protection, leaving out 
of the analysis alternative mechanisms, mostly through family or the market,  of address ing soc ia l 
protection needs. This does not downplay the role p layed by these other mechanisms of socia l 
protection, as we are well aware that public policies are embedded in social protection systems where 
families, the market and the welfare state itself play different roles in addressing social p rotection 
needs, with different degrees of substitution and complementarities among them.  
Our choice of focusing on the universality of public social protection systems is  driven by policy 
considerations. The public programmes of social protection are under the direct control of democratic 
governments, and thus having a good understanding of their coverage and adequacy becomes critical 
for the policy debate. However, as we will see in chapter 3, some of the indicators of social protection  
consider the role played by private social protection mechanisms in their definition. Furthermore, at a 
later stage we can also consider the interaction between public social protection policies and p rivate 
social protection mechanisms. But that will not be addressed in this paper 
Finally, the increase in inequality experienced in high-income countries in the last decades has put the 
issue of inequality in the forefront of the socioeconomic debate. Still, this will not be the focus of these 
pages, although the relationship between universal social protection and inequality will emerge in 
different parts of the report. 
                                                                                                            
and by part of the academia that considers human rights as indivisible (Whelan, 2010). In the terminology of the Office  o f 
the  United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Economic, social and cultural rig h ts a re  th os e h uman rig hts  
re lating to the workplace, social security, family life , participation in cultural life , and access to housing, food, water, health  
care  and education 
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2 The meaning of universality in social protection 
To avoid confusion, it is important to start by differentiating the concepts of “universality” and 
“universalism”. Universality, which is the main focus of this paper, is a denotative concept that aims to  
describe the extent to which a social system or programme covers the entire relevant population in an 
adequate manner. Universalism, a closely related but different concept, refers to a political aspiration 
or ideal, according to which social systems or programmes should be universal (i.e., should cover the 
entire relevant population in an adequate manner). Universality is a way of describing or characterising 
social systems, whereas universalism is a principle for the design of social systems. In the specialised 
literature, sometimes the two words are used interchangeably, but we will try to avoid that because we 
believe it can be misleading. But although the focus of this paper is universality as a concept and as 
something to be measured and monitored, it is impossible to avoid any reference to the closely related 
political concept of universalism. After all, the implicit reason behind any attempt to  def ine and 
measure universality is to serve as support for the design of universalist social policy (or to support the 
redesign of existing social policies in a more universalist manner). In any case, in this paper 
universalism refers to the political aspiration and universality refers to the descriptive concept and 
related measures. 
As argued by Stéfansson (2015), “universalism is a polysemic concept", whose “precise meaning varies 
from one academic discipline to the next (9), between theoretical frameworks and subjects” (p .45),  
referring to ideals, to social arrangements or administrative practices dependin g on the case . Th is  
ambiguity makes the use of the concept especially difficult and complex (Kildal and Kuhnle, 2005) , as 
it might mean different things for different people. This position is found in many other essays on the 
idea of universalism such as Prince (2014), for whom: “There is no single category of what constitutes 
universality, no constant model of programme design features across welfare regimes or across time 
periods” (p. 349). 
To make the concept of universality in social protection empirica lly applicable, i.e. in order to 
operationalise it, we need to answer the following questions. First of all, we have to  de lve in to the 
political concept of universalism (and the relevant literature) to identify what areas of social protection 
should be universal, and why. It is important to note that such an identification of relevant areas is  a 
political choice. After identifying the areas of social policy that could be conside red candidates for 
universalism social protection, the rest of the chapter focuses on what attributes of the associated 
social programmes need to be taken into account for conceptualising or measuring their degree of 
universality: (1) Who is entitled to social protection (2) What level of protection is provided and (3) For 
how long? 
2.1 What areas of social protection can be universal? 
We propose two possible approaches to the question of what the object of universal social protection  
should be. The first one is a pragmatic and democratic approach based on people’s opinions about who 
should be responsible for the provision of a given good or service: if most people consider that the 
government is the agent that should provide a given good or service, then we can conclude that such 
good or service should at least be considered as a candidate to be provided universally. An alternative 
way of dealing with the question is disentangling, with the help of a Theory of Human Needs, which are 
the needs whose coverage is a precondition for human development and dignity, and should therefore 
be guarantee by default by universal social protection. 
The argument of Anttonen and Sipilä (2014) when they say that “Universalism presumes that there is  
a common opinion that the state should take some responsibility for taking care of some important 
social needs” (p.12), can be interpreted as a justification of our first approach, in the sense that such a 
“common opinion” would be the justification for choosing the areas of social protection with universal 
coverage (10). 
                                     
(9)  For example, according to Kildal and Kuhnle , 2004: “In moral philosophy the concept denotes d iff erent mo ra l th eories  
arguing for princip les of universal validity, independent of particular traditions, cultures or re lations. In sociology, 
universalism is primarily attached to Talcott Parsons and the universalising of citizens’ re latio nship s d uring  the  1 9 th  
century, replacing particular group-memberships. In the area of politics, the principle of universalism was in itially expressed 
in the  18th century idea of human rights” (p . 307). 
(10)  This approach is also re lated to what Bradshaw (1972), in his taxonomy of social needs, defined a s “ Exp ressed N eed”,  
understood in terms of the need of those people who demand a service. According to Bradshaw an Expressed N eed is ,  a  
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Figure 2a-d reproduces the answers given in a large number of European countries and territories (plus 
the United States and Japan, included for comparison) to the question: “Is government’s responsibility 
to provide for...?”, listing the items of: health, living standard for the old (i.e. old age p ensions),  living 
standard for unemployed (i.e. unemployment benefits, UB) and decent housing. Together,  these 
categories represent 78% of all EU social protection expenditure. The figures reproduce the percentage 
of people that consider that each of the mentioned items “definitely should be” the government’s 
responsibility. 
A glance at the figures allows two conclusions. Firstly, a clear majority of people in  most countrie s 
considers that health care and pensions for the old are the government’s responsibility. This is in  line 
with public opinion research that concludes that there is generally “much greater support of 
comprehensive welfare state programmes (…) compared with that of targeted programmes” (Wendt et 
al, 2011, p. 2). In contrast, looking at the unweighted average of the European countries included in the 
sample, the shares of people regarding the rest of the services as a government responsibility are 
much lower: 27% in the case of unemployment benefits, and 32% regarding decent housing. It should 
be noted that there is a clear lack of correspondence between the share of social expenditure allocated 
to housing in the EU (0.5% of GDP in 2017) and the role given to government in addressing the  issue 
of housing by the people surveyed. For comparison, in 2017, EU28 public expenditure in o ld age  and 
survivors was 12.3% of GDP, 7.9% in health, and 1.2% in unemployment (Eurostat, Social p rotection 
expenditure) (11).  
The results change dramatically when, in addition to those considering that the provision of the above-
mentioned services is definitely the government´s responsibility, we also consider those saying that it 
is probably so. In this case, the European average rises to 97% in the case of health, 96% in  
the case of pensions, 80% in the case of housing, and 73%, in the case of UB. Unfortunately, 
the answer “probably” can mean many different things and cannot be taken as an endorsement of the 
role of government in the different areas of social protection (12). In any case, it is worth noticing that 
the share of those clearly rejecting (answering definitely no) the Welfare State ro le in the d ifferent 
areas is marginal for health and pensions: 1.5% for health (Spain) and 2.1% for pensions (Lithuania),  
and relatively low, although higher, for unemployment and housing: 8.7% for the former (Czechia) and 
13.5% for the latter (Lithuania).  
A second conclusion we can draw from figures 2a-d, is that there is a large variability across countrie s 
in the support for different social programmes, especially regarding who should be responsib le for 
providing living standards for the unemployed and housing, with a coefficient of variation of 0.404 and 
0.529 respectively (Table 1). Just to give an example, while 96% of the Spanish population considers 
that the government is responsible (definitely or probably) for providing protection for the unemployed, 
in the Czech Republic less than half of the population believe so. 
Even in a reasonably homogenous (relative to the rest of the world) area such as the EU,  this  f irst 
approach based on people’s perceptions and preferences as guidelines of what should be dealt with 
under the principle of universal protection would lead to quite different results from country to country, 
or even within a given country, from one region to other (13).  
 
                                                                                                            
Fee l Need (“when assessing need for a service, the population is asked whether they feel they need it”) turned into act io n,  
i.e . transformed into a demand for the service   
(11)  The re lation between public opinion and the level of development of social policy and the type of Welfare State h as  been 
analysed, among others, by Brooks and Mazda (2009). These authors, based on analysis of cross-country a nd o ver- time  
patterns in 15 high-income countries in the late 1980s and the 1990s conclude that “the preferences of citizens profoundly 
influence the welfare policies of their governments and the behaviour of politicians in office”. Nevertheless, this result h as  
been challenged by Kenworthly (2009), based on to the impossibility to determine the direction of causality ,  f ro m p ublic 
opinion to policy, as argued by Brooks and Mazda, or vice  versa. In fact, according to K enworth,  “ B ro oks  a nd M anza ’s 
evidence offers little  support for an inference that public opinion has been a key determinant of variation in socia l p olicy  
generosity. Across countries the two are strongly correlated, but the causal directio n is  u ncle ar.  Th  da ta s ugges t n o 
association between the two over time within countries” (p. 738). Thus, the issue is far from solved.  
(12)  A similar caveat must be made regarding the meaning of “government´s responsibility” , as it might mean different th ings  
to different people : regulation, provision, production, e tc.  
(13) This would be the case, for example , of government’s responsibility regarding living standard for the old. According to  th e  
ISSP, 74% of people in the Belgian region of Flanders consider that pensions are  definite ly government’s  re spons ibility ,  
compared to 65% in Brussels-Capital and 54% in Wallonia.   
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Figure 2. Share of population considering that it is definitely the government´s responsibility to provide for: 
health, pensions, unemployment benefits and decent housing, 2016  
2a) health care for sick 
 
2b) living standard for the old 
 
2c) living standard for unemployed 
 
 
 
89 87 85 83 79 76 75 74 73 73 69 69 66 65 65 62 59 57
34
60 50
31
0
20
40
60
80
100
83 81 80 77 75 71 69 68 66 61 60 60 59 58 55 55 54 53
32
64
49
33
0
20
40
60
80
100
61 52 49
33 33 32 27 27 27 26 25 22 20 16 16 16 14 11 7
27
16 15
0
20
40
60
80
100
 
12 
 
2d) decent housing 
 
Source : Authors´ analysis of International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2016. 
Table 1. Coefficient of variation of the responsibility of the government regarding different situations  
 
Definitely Probably Total  
Pensions 0.194325 0.314309 0.023948 
Health 0.194325 0.314309 0.023948 
Housing 0.404671 0.158364 0.108519 
Unemployment protection  0.529438 0.187600 0.162256 
Source : Authors’ analysis of ISSP2016  
In any case, a survey conducted in April 2020 by the European University Institute (EUI)  and YouGov,  
analysed by Hemerijck and Huguenot-Noel (2020), contributes to shading light on citizens ’ attitudes 
towards social protection, and confirms that it is quite an important p rio rity for Europeans , who 
according to the survey tend to basically care about similar things: having a secure and adequate 
pension in old age, having access to quality health care, and (to a lesser extent) having a good work -
life balance.  
An alternative way of dealing with the question of which categories of social p rotection could be 
considered as candidates for universal coverage is identifying, with the help of a Theory o f Human 
Needs, if there is such a thing as universal needs, whose satisfaction would be a requirement of any 
civilised society. From this perspective, the identified universal needs would be used as guidelines for 
social policy. 
The problem with this approach is the lack of agreement on what human needs are. This disagreement 
goes as far as questioning the utility of the concept of need itself . Th is is  the case among many 
mainstream economists, for whom needs are indistinguishable from wants. To give an example,  if we 
search in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, with more than 3,000 chapters written by leading 
experts in the field and 14896 pages, none is dealing with “needs” nor any “Theory of Needs”. There 
are chapters devoted to the analysis of “wants” (Douglas, 1987),  or “Uti lity”, understood as “the 
capacity of a good or service to satisfy a want, of whatever kind” (Black, 2008). In contrast, in  other 
disciplines of social sciences the concept of need is well established and used. A good i llustration  of 
this is the monograph Understanding Human Need, of Hartley Dean (2010), which includes a short 
glossary of terms with up to 28 different definitions/types of needs in Social Sciences.  
It is far beyond the aim of these pages to present a survey of the literature on human needs. 
Fortunately, this is not necessary for our purpose of using a Theory of Human Needs as a yardstick to  
61 57 54 41 38 34 34 33 32 32 30 27 24 24 23 20 19 17 12
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define those areas of social policy candidate for universal protection. Looking at a small selection  of 
the existing enquiries about human needs suffices to see a certain level of agreement  in  relation to  
what human needs are, regardless of their orientation and starting po int. Table 2 p resents four 
different well-known approaches to the definition of human needs whose application  would lead to  
similar conclusions in terms of the areas of social protection that should be considered candidate for 
universal protection.  
As we can see, from the well-known hierarchy of needs of Maslow (1943) and Sen´s perspective of 
capabilities, to the theory of human needs of Doyal and Gough (1991), most theories of need share  
the idea that there are some basic needs that are required for physical reproduction and to be able to  
function as human beings. 
In this respect, the Theory of Human Needs of Doyal and Gough (1991), further developed by Gough 
(2003, also 2017) is probably the one that states more clearly the existence of in termediate needs 
that have to be covered in order to be able to enjoy autonomy. They range from those required to  be 
physically healthy (access to nutritional food and clean water; protective housing ; a non-hazardous 
work and physical environment; or appropriate health care including access to safe birth contro l and 
child-bearing) to those needed in order to enjoy autonomy in life (a secure ch ildhood;  s ignificant 
primary relationships; physical security; economic security and appropriate education). This 
differentiation between physical health and autonomy as d iffe rent e lements of basic  needs is  
somewhat related to the distinction between thin and thick needs proposed by Dean (2015), where the 
former are related to the mere survival and the latter are required for a true personal fulfilment. 
If we look at Doyal and Gough’s list through the eyes of social protection we can identify candidates 
for universal protection from the perspective of human needs, in the sense of being too important to  
leave their coverage to the uncertainties and fluctuations of the market. These are health, education,  
access to non-market income in case of illness, unemployment, old age or lack of other income, and 
probably housing. 
In fact, as argued by Dean (2015), “Doyal and Gough’s list of intermediate needs or needs satisf ie rs 
can be, and sometimes are, read as if they were a list of socia l rights” (p.20 ). Moreover, th is lis t 
resemblances the “Eight Primary Causes of Need” of the Beveridge Report (Beveridge, 1942) , among 
which we find unemployment, disability, loss of livelihood, retirement and the “need for un iversal 
comprehensive medical treatment and rehabilitation” (par. 311, p. 124). 
In this regard, many, if not all, of the items indicated above haven been considered as elements worthy 
of basic social protection in the policy realm. For example, the R202 - Social Protection Floors 
Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) includes (at least) the 
following basic social security guarantees (14): 
(a) access to a nationally defined set of goods and services, constituting essential health 
care, including maternity care, that meets the criteria of availability, access ibi lity,  
acceptability and quality; 
(b) basic income security for children, at least at a nationally defined min imum level,  
providing access to nutrition, education, care and any other necessary goods and 
services; 
(c) basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons in  
active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, in particular in cases of sickness, 
unemployment, maternity, and disability; and 
(d) basic income security, at least at a nationally defined min imum level,  for o lder 
persons. 
 
 
 
                                     
(14)  R202 - Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202), paragraph 5, section II National Social protection Floors.  
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Table 2. A selection of Theories of Human Needs 
Author Year Characteristics 
H. Dean  
 
 
2015 
Classification 
Top-down:   
Needs that have 
been judged to be 
inherent to the 
human person 
Bottom-up:  
Needs articulated 
through the demands 
people make 
Thin: 
Related to 
the mere 
survival  
Thick: 
Required for a 
true personal 
fulfilment  
L. Doyal and 
I. Gough 
 
I.Gough 
1991 
2003 
Theory of human needs 
Basic needs 
Universal in the sense that 
their absence produces 
harm to people regardless 
the cultural of social 
context.  
Intermediate needs (to be covered differently 
according to the social and cultural context): 
 Nutritional food and clean water * 
 Protective housing* 
 A non-hazardous work environment* 
 A non-hazardous physical environnement* 
 Safe birth control and childbearing* 
 Appropriate health care* 
 A secure childhood** 
 Significant primary relationships** 
 Physical security** 
 Economic security** 
 Appropriate education** 
Physical 
health 
(*) 
Autonomy 
(**) 
A. Sen  
1980/1984 
1985/1988 
Needs understood in terms of the capabilities that allow peoples´ functioning 
(states of ‘being and doing’, such as being well-nourished, having shelter, etc.)  
A.H. Maslow 1943 
Hierarchy of needs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Authors’ e laboration based on quoted references  
In this section, we have explored two perspectives to identify areas for universal socia l protection:  a 
first approach based on people´s beliefs and preferences regarding the areas of social protection  of 
government responsibility, and a second based on a Theory of Needs as criteria for the involvement of 
the public sector in the provision of certain social needs. Both approaches converge in the identification 
of the main candidate areas for universal social protection: health, education, and income maintenance 
when in need whether due to unemployment, maternity/paternity,  old  age or disability, with the 
possible addition of housing. The two approaches thus endorse the broad scope of the European Pillar 
of Social Rights as well as, in particular, the scope of the Council Recommendation on access to soc ia l 
protection for workers and the self-employed. 
2.2 Who should be covered?  
The question of eligibility for social protection is surely the key element when considering a social 
protection programme as universal. The etymology of universal, from de Latin universalis, “belonging 
to all”, or universus, “all together, whole, entire”, is clear in this respect. A universal social 
programme (or system) can be then defined as one that covers the whole relevant 
Physiological 
Safety 
Love/belonging 
Esteem 
Self- 
actualization 
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population. Otherwise we would be talking of selective or targeted socia l programmes,  or social 
insurance where eligibility is subject to meeting certain conditions, be it lack of income subject to a test 
of means or income or a minimum history of social contributions. 
However, this divide between universal and selective programmes is, in reality, much more blurred. For 
instance, some de jure non-universal programmes, such as retirement pensions that require p revious 
contributions to the pensions system during a minimum of years of working life,  might become de 
facto universal when due to high labour force participation rates most people qualify for retirement 
pensions upon retirement. This is even more evident when non-contributory pensions complement 
contributory pension systems for those with a short or no working life and without other sources of 
income in old age. In this case, we could think of a universal pension system segmented in two 
(contributory and non-contributory), or even three layers (contributory, survivors (15) and non-
contributory). Although some authors, such as Sainsbury (1996) have characterised these type of 
programmes as “pseudo-universal”, others (Esping-Andersen, 1990, or Banting, 1987) consider the 
Bismarkian traditional approach to social protection through compulsory public social insurance as a 
second category of universality. 
This poses the question of whether universality should be def ined in  terms of e lig ibi lity c riteria 
(everybody is eligible) or in terms of practical criteria (almost everybody meets the eligibility crite ria) . 
In this regard, as we will have occasion to see as we move along these pages, “universalism is  not an 
either/or phenomenon but a matter of degree; programmes are more or less universal” (Kautto, 2015,  
p. 145). 
Although so far we have been referring to the entire population when def in ing the coverage of a 
programme, obviously universal programmes can focus on specific subgroups of the population , such 
as families with children or old people, and be limited in scope without failing to be universal. A simple 
way to address this issue is by referring to “universal risks” vs “specific risks” faced by specific groups 
or subgroups of the population. For example, parental leave can be universal if all parents, regardless 
of their specific circumstances (single or couple, high income or low income, etc.) are e lig ible for the 
leave, even if nonparents (or parents of grown-ups) are excluded from the programme. This 
circumstance does not make the programme less universal. 
Using the same logic, social assistance programmes based on income transfers to  those  at risk of 
extreme poverty in EU countries (16) (Crepaldi et al., 2017) can be universal in terms of reaching all the 
population meeting certain requisites, even if there are not Universal Basic Income  schemes in the 
sense that they are not addressed to all the population. 
Linked to this is the issue of how we define “entire population”, as this can be done in terms of de facto 
residence, in terms of legal residence, or in terms of nationality. In this regard, it is important to  note 
that often social protection is limited to legal residents. The exclusion of undocumented migrants and 
temporary residents from social protection is generally not considered to be a breach of universality. In 
the spirit of the famous quote of Milton Friedman ("you can't have free immigration and a welfare 
state"), this exclusion is often based on the belief that free access to social protection by everybody,  
regardless of their residential status, could act as an immigration magnet and result in unsustainable 
levels of social expenditure. This results in a severe restriction of social se rvices to  undocumented 
immigrants and temporary residents (17). Although it is out of the scope of this paper to discuss the so  
called “welfare magnet” hypothesis in detail, it is important to note that, so far, the empirical literature 
on the relationship between welfare provision and immigration suggests that the decision to migrate is 
not made on the basis of the generosity of social protection in the guest countries (Giuleti, 2014) but 
rather on the expectation of better employment opportunities (and life chances in general). In any case, 
the lack of solid evidence behind the hypothesis has not weakened the belief in its  ex istence, o r its  
ubiquity in the debates regarding immigration.   
                                     
(15)  According to the  OCDE (2018), in the OECD countries there is one survivor pensions  re cip ient f o r e very  f iv e  o ld -age 
pensioners, 85% of them widowed survivor pension recipients. 
(16)  Such as the Belgium Revenu d'intégration/Leefloon, the Danish Kontanthjælp , the Finnish Toimeentulotuki o r th e  F re nch 
Revenu de Solidarité  Active , RSA. 
(17)  Using public health provision as example, according to the Platform for International Co o pera tion o n U ndocumen ted 
Migrants, PICUM (2015): “Nearly all European Union member states restrict access to health care  s erv ices  to  d iff erent 
degrees for undocumented migrants” (p . 11). This situation leads to the underutiliza tio n o f  hea lth ca re  s ervice s b y  
undocumented migrants (Winters et al., 2018). 
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A related, but different question is whether social protection is limited to citizens or extended to include 
also legal residents (Palme, 1999). Generally speaking, the concept of residence p revails,  a lthough 
often a requisite of “habitual” residence is added to the residence requirement (18).  
The ISSP of 2013, by asking in 35 high income countries whether legal immigrants should have  the 
same rights than locals, allows us to check to what extent the population would be willing to support 
this type of arrangements. Figure 3 reproduces the percentage of population d isagreeing or totally 
disagreeing with the statement: “legal immigrants should have the same rights as nationals”. Although 
in most countries those disagreeing are far from being a majority, a relatively large minority of citizens 
disagree with extending the rights of legal immigrants. This group is especially h igh in Switzerland,  
United States, and the United Kingdom, but also in countries such as Denmark or Finland. 
A companion requisite to the eligibility criterion is that entitlements must be a matter of rights and not 
subject to discretion. In this regard, universality de facto should not be hindered by the administrative 
process, due to its intricacies or to the existence of a bias against certain groups of population. It is  
often in this aspect - the process of applying and receiving benefits - where the legal re cognition of 
social rights to foreign legal residents does not translate into an effective recognition of such rights , 
whether for language or administrative barriers or for plain discrimination. In this regard, an ILO/OECD 
paper presented at the 1st Meeting of the G20 Employment Working Group that took place in  Buenos 
Aires the 20-22 of February of 2018 (OECD, 2018) warns that “in practice (…) migrant workers may 
have to face unfair treatment due notably to administrative barriers (e.g., long waiting periods, 
difficulty to observe eligibility criteria abroad, incompatibility of social security systems)” (p.12). 
Figure 3. Share of citizens disagreeing with legal immigrants having the same rights  
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from ISSP 2013. 
                                     
(18)  In 2014 the European Commission published a guide on application of ‘Habitual Residence Test' for socia l s ecurity .  Th e 
guide recalls the specific crite ria to be taken into account to determine a person's p lace of 'habitual re s idence '  s uch  as :  
family status and family ties, duration and continuity of presence in the Member State concerned, employment situation (in 
particular the  p lace where such activity is habitually pursued, the stability of the activity, and duration of the work contract), 
exercise  of a non-remunerated activity, in the case of students, the source of their income, how p ermanent a  p erson's  
housing situation is,  the Member State where the person pays taxes, reasons for the move the person's intentions  b ased 
on all the  circumstances and supported by factual evidence. In the Republic of Ire land , for exa mple, th e  D epartmen t of  
Employment Affairs and Social Protection considers 5 factors in order to decide whether a p ers on f ulf ils  th e  h abitu al 
residence condition, HRC: (1) His/her ‘main centre  of interest’, based on things like : (a) whether he/she owns or lease a home 
here , (b) where his/her  close family members live , (c)  whether he/she belongs to social or professional associations h ere ,  
(d) any other evidence or activities indicating a settled residence in Ireland, (2) Th e le ngth a nd co ntin uity  o f h is /h er 
residence in Ireland and in any other country (4) the length and purpose of any absences from Ire land, (4) the nature  an d 
pattern of his/her employment and (5)His/her future intention to live  in the Republic of Ire land for the foreseeable future.  
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The EU has in place a legislative framework (19) for third country nationals  that provides for equal 
treatment with EU nationals in the area of social security rights. In the case of long-term residents,  
equal treatment is also applied to social assistance. Member States can, however, limit some of the 
benefits for short stays and for certain categories of migrant workers, such as for example seasonal 
workers. Member States can also exclude temporary workers from social assistance. 
2.3 Adequacy of benefits and the question of homogeneity. 
Another important element to consider when discussing universality of social protection is the question 
of adequacy. In this regard, many of the contributions to the debate regarding universality,  e.g . Goul 
Andersen (2012), Anttonen and Sipilä (2014), include as one of the elements behind the notion of 
universality that the received benefits or provisions should be enough as to make a difference 
in terms of the perceived risk. This is important both for programmes in kind, such as health,  and 
for monetary transfers, such as pensions or unemployment benefits.  
If in-kind benefits are set at an excessively low level due to the poor quality of the services provided or 
to the relatively short catalogue of contingencies covered or if the amount of the monetary social 
transfers perceived is small, then such programmes could be considered universal de forma, but not de 
facto. This is because many citizens, mostly high-income, would resort to othe r private  options to  
address their needs. This would not only empty the programme itself, but could also undermine the 
loyalty and support of the middle class for such programmes, as they would be financing them through 
general or earmarked taxation, while at the same time resorting to alternative private provision in case 
of need due to the low quality or quantity of the benefit. As argued by Anttonen and Sipilä (2014): “for 
universalism to be supported by a majority of citizen, at least in rich countries universal services and 
benefits have to exceed the minimum in meeting the needs” (p. 15). 
This requirement increases the complexity of defining universality, as it becomes not only a matte r of  
identifying the share of people protected (as seen in the previous section), but also a question of the 
degree or quality of the protection provided. And to do that, a threshold of sufficiency or adequacy has 
to be defined. There are at least two possible ways of dealing with this issue, as we can see in Table 3 
using as example monetary social protection. 
Table 3. Alternative ways of dealing with the issue of adequacy in the case of social transfers 
Amount (criteria) Implications 
Absolute: n € 
Same amount of benefits for each person 
(constant in real terms) 
Relative  
% of median income of 
the population 
Same amount of benefit for each person 
(changing as median income change) 
% of previous income of 
the individual 
Different among individuals depending of their 
previous income (usually subject to  a minimum 
and a maximum value) 
Source : Authors’ own elaboration 
The first one is to define a threshold of income considered necessary to meet the contingency 
that the benefits try to address. This can be done  by adopting an absolute pe rspective (for 
                                     
(19)  Family reunification Directive (2003/86/EC): regulating admission and residence of family  me mbers  o f th ird - country  
nationals (sponsors) legally residing in Member States; Long-Term Residents Directive (200 3/ 10 9/ EC) :  a llo wing th ird -
country nationals who have legally and continuously resided in a Member State for 5 years to obtain a n "EU  lo ng - term 
resident" status and associated rights; EU Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC): regulating admission and residence o f  h ighly  
skilled third-country workers, and their families; The Single  Permit Directive  (2011/98/EU): establishing EU rules for a single 
application/permit and equal treatment provisions for third -country workers. It is a "framework" or "horizontal" Directive that 
covers third-country workers also admitted to a Member State according to national migration la w;  S eas onal Wo rke rs 
Directive  (2014/36/EU): regulating admission and stay of third-country nationals admitted temporarily to carry out seasonal 
work; Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive (2014/66/EU); Students and Researchers Directive (2016/801) :  co v ering th e  
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the  purposes of research, s tu dies,  tra in ing,  v o lunta ry  
service , pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (recast of Directives 2004/114/EC on students a nd 
2005/71/EC on researchers). 
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instance, based on a theory of need), or by linking the threshold to the average or median income of 
the country, in which case the threshold would be defined in relative terms. In the latter case, there are 
two further alternatives. The first one is to use the median income that would lead to the use of the 
same income threshold for all the population. The second, to use as point of  reference the market 
income of the beneficiary before becoming a recipient of social protection. In the first two cases,  the 
result would be a flat benefit roughly similar among those receiving the benefit (roughly, as it might 
take into consideration elements such as the number of members of the family unit, special needs in  
case of disability, etc.), while in the later, the benefit would be, at least partially, tailored to the size o f 
the market income it intends to substitute.  
In the case of service provision, such as health, or education, the question can be one of quality or one 
of catalogue of provisions: what is included and what is excluded. To give an example, while 
households finance a large share of dental care expenditure in Spain or Latvia (98% and 93% 
respectively), out-of-pocket-expenditure in dental services is much lower in  Germany, 25% or the 
Netherlands, 22% (OECD, 2019). The same is valid for the quality of  the se rvi ces p rovided . Using 
health provision again as an example, waiting lists for surgery or the quality of hospitals’ services are 
some of the issues that have to be assessed when addressing the question of adequacy of benefits.  
One of the elements that are often considered central to universal social programmes is the existence 
of homogeneous, undifferentiated benefits , in terms of a ll people having access to  similar 
benefits. This is clear in Beveridge (1942), when he argued in favour of the “provisions of a flat rate of 
insurance benefit, irrespective of the amount of earnings which have been in terrupted” (p. 121) . 
Obviously, the idea of flat minimum benefits defended by Beveridge is related to his recognition of the 
important place that voluntary insurance had in the overall architecture  of social p rotection. Flat 
benefits do not mean equal income for all, but equal public benefits for all, aimed at guaranteeing a 
minimum income for all, leaving the rest for private social provision, whether through the  marke t or 
the family. 
In this regard, uniformity of benefits is by no means equivalent to uniformity of social protection. In  a 
flat benefit system, inequality is the product of the different resources available for p rivate soc ia l 
protection. In contrast, in non-homogeneous universal social systems inequality is usually re lated to  
previously existing labour market inequalities translated into inequalities in social contributions at a 
first stage, and to inequalities in benefits at a later stage. In any case, the existence of minimum and 
maximum benefits in most universal (non-homogeneous) social protection programmes acts as a cap 
to inequality, so in the end they often turn out to be more equitable than combined public (flat)/private 
programmes of social protection. These heterogeneous provisions operate mostly in cash programmes, 
as universal in-kind programmes, notably health, are truly universal in terms of homogeneous service 
provision to all citizens. 
The debate on universality of social programmes has been enriched lately by the d iscuss ion about 
other sources of diversity, i.e., not related to income differences and the d ifferent meanings of 
“adequacy” of social programmes. In this regard, there are discussions about the  need to in troduce  
differences in terms of gender, age, or disability, and perhaps also ethnicity, to address differences in  
needs of different demographic groups, and how “some forms of accommodation to diversity conflic t 
with notions of universalism” (Häiko and Hvinden, 2012, 85) understood in terms of similarity.  
A particular problem for the measurement of adequacy is when different groups of population  have 
different social protection needs. In this case, a social protection program adequately meeting the 
needs of a given group of people could be considered less than adequate for another group. The need 
to tailor some social protection programmes to the different needs of its potential users is evident in  
areas such as special education (for children with special needs), but is also p resent  in  many other 
areas in more disguised manners. Just to give an example, cardiovascular disease is the leading cause 
of morbidity and mortality in women worldwide, with disparities in diagnosis, treatment and prognosis 
between men and women that are related to basic biological differences but also to “complex 
interactions of cultural and socioeconomic problems” (Sciomer et al., 2018) often leading to “important 
sex-based differences in many aspects of care for coronary artery disease” (Mark,  2000) . From th is 
perspective, the idea of homogeneous provision as a defining element of universality would run 
against the principle of adequate provision (in terms of relevance). 
Before concluding our analysis of the role of adequacy and coverage in defining universality in  social 
protection it is important to acknowledge that a full evaluation of a given social p rotection system 
could also profit from knowing who is excluded from it. As shown in section 2.2,  a core e lement of 
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universality is the extent to which a given social programme reaches the population potentially 
affected by the social risk the program aims at addressing. This explains the role played by coverage 
rates in the measurement of universality. This section has shown that adequacy also plays a key ro le 
in defining universality. However, coverage rates and adequacy are not enough to make a full 
evaluation of social protection systems. If those excluded from socia l protection were  random, 
coverage rates and adequacy would give us a reasonably good idea of the social protection system of 
the country under analysis. But if exclusion is not random, and it rarely is, then a full evaluation of the 
Welfare State would require knowing who are excluded and their characteristics  as a group . In  th is  
regard, the Welfare State is often criticised for being gender biased, with programs ta ilored to the 
needs of men (Esping-Andersen, 2009, Sainsbury, 1999).  
The Welfare State was developed during the time of the breadwinner family model, in  which women 
played a secondary role in terms of market income but a primary role in terms of household production 
and as providers of care to children and old dependents. These led to an important and unfair bias:  
having a low level of attachment to the labour market, women were excluded from important Welfare 
State programmes such as pensions, while qualifying to others only through their husband’s rights. In  
contrast, as care providers they were responsible for many activities that otherwise would have had to 
be performed by the Welfare State or the market. The progressive incorporation of women to  the 
labour market has reduced the first gap, although only partially as women still face a sizable activity 
rate, wage and part-time employment gap, leading to a social benefits gap. 
It is in this regard that the assessment of the coverage and adequacy angles could profit from the use  
of other complementary indicators focusing on the specific characteristics (if any) of  the population 
excluded from social protection.  
2.4 Duration of benefits  
Ideally, benefits should last for as long as they are necessary. In  the case of soc ia l programmes 
targeted to specific groups of population such as children or family allowances or old age pensions, the 
duration is fixed by the life cycle itself: children growing old, old people passing away. The same is  
valid for health, although in this case the question of duration of benefits can end up mixed with the 
issue of adequacy, as there might be restrictions in terms of the right to experimental or novel and 
very expensive therapies. In other cases, such as unemployment benef its (UB),  the  ex istence of 
limitations in the duration of the benefits is justified by the potential risk of a long duration affecting 
the intensity of the job search. In this regard, it is interesting to note than the criterion for being eligible 
for the programme for as long as the need lasts, “not only for old age and sickness or d isability, but 
also for unemployment”, was present in the Beveridge Report. However this criterion was not endorsed 
in the 1944 government White Paper produced in response to the report, which proposed a maximum 
of 30 weeks in order to avoid the abuse of the system (Brown, 1990).  
The potential negative implications of some social protection systems - notably unemployment 
benefits and social assistance through different types of income support programmes - for individuals 
of working age and fully able to work has always been a major concern regarding social p rotection 
(see chapter 4 for more details). Such concern has often materialized in the introduction of time limits  
for the duration of the programmes. The limits to the duration of UB or the limitation of access to 
income support (20) are examples of how this consideration is reflected in the design of social 
programmes.  
This concern can be addressed through other requirements such as the disposition to accept suitable 
jobs or engage in active job search or training, which can also have implications in terms of coverage. 
In a way, time limits and eligibility requirements such as those mentioned above share the same aim, 
namely, to reduce disincentives to work related with income support programmes. This type of 
requirements, along with others focused on making work pay (such as wage subsid ies to  low -wage 
workers), can lead to a reduction of coverage rates. However, they can be justified if work is considered 
a better social alternative (also in terms of human dignity) than living on public  assistance, and if 
social assistance can exert a negative impact on the incentive to work. 
                                     
(20)  Such as the general limit (although with exceptions) to five years of the US TANF -Temporary  Aid  to  N eedy  Fa milies -  
(previously Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC) approved by the Clinton Administration in 1996 as part o f  th e  
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)For a description and evaluation of th e  re f orm 
see , e .g. Blank (2002) and Moffit (2008). 
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In any case, the existence of limits to the duration of the benefit, when they lead to a reduction in  the 
number of beneficiaries due to the extinction of their access, would result in a reduction in the number 
of beneficiaries, affecting therefore coverage rates and thus universality. In this  regard , the lack of 
time limits, or at least of time limits with practical implications, can be interpreted as a corollary of the 
requisite of universal coverage. 
2.5 Wrapping up: defining universality in social protection 
Building on the discussion in the previous sections of the different elements that should be taken in to 
consideration when characterising a social protection programme as universal, it is now time to present 
a proposal regarding the meaning of universality of social protection suitable for operationalisation . 
Before proceeding with this aim, it is important to acknowledge that, as argued by Stéfansson (2015) , 
“universalism is an essentially contestable and eminently contested concept” (p.65). Th is re cognition 
leads the author to propose to “come to terms with the diverse meanings attributed to  it” (p.65). 
Unfortunately, that option is not open to us, and in any case (as we have repeatedly argued) in  th is  
report we focus on the descriptive term of universality (and its measurement) rather than on the 
political term of universalism (as a principle for policy design), even though they are so closely linked 
that sometimes it is impossible to keep them neatly separated.  
A review of the literature on universality shows that authors often coincide in the elements taken in to 
account when discussing what universality is. Following Gould Andersen (2012), Table 4 reproduces the 
defining elements of universality according to several of the authors who have reflected more about 
the issue. The four references included in the table present different readings of what universality is , 
although with many common elements.  
It is easy to see that there is a relatively high degree of overlap among the f irst three approaches 
listed in the table. For example, Kangas and Palme´s (2005) criteria of coverage overlaps with items 
5-7 of Anttonen’s list. In turn, Gould Andersen’s criteria 1 to 4 are similar to Anttonen ’s  items 1 to  3 
and 5-6. Also, the item of Generosity of Kangas and Palme (2005) is related to  the requirement of 
adequacy of Gould Andersen’s list (21). An outlier, and a notable exception to th is agreement on the 
core elements of universality, is what Anttonen, Haikio  and Stefánsson (2015) denominate  the  
procedural definition of universality, which is related to the original British concept of universality 
(Anttonen and Siplilä, 2015). This is a much narrower definition of universality compared to the other 
proposals, which would be in line with the “consequentialist” perspective that implies judging the 
system more by its results in terms of social integration  than by the  administrative p rocedures 
governing social policy. But beyond some small differences, we can conclude that all these p roposals 
share the same flavour: the words might be different, but the tune is very much the same. The authors 
also share the idea, already mentioned in these pages, that universality is a question of degree,  not a 
binary classification: different social programmes, or Welfare States, can be more or less universal.  
Summing up, universality in social protection would be defined by 3 elements:  
1. the social needs addressed,  
2. the degree to which it covers the entire relevant population (in some cases, demographic 
groups),  
3. the degree to which it is adequate to the needs covered in each case.  
The first element would give us information about the scope (or ambition) of the Welfare State , and 
the other two about its universality. Although different in nature, the f irst element  is a necessary 
starting point as it defines what is to be provided, universally or otherwise. 
 
 
 
                                     
(21)  As highlighted by Andersen (2012), this last e lement is very important as it would exclude from u niv ersalis m f la t - ra te  
benefits allocated to the whole population (the core of universality in the British tradition)  b ut a t s u ch a  lo w le ve l o f  
adequacy that would make the benefit irre levant to most of the population.   
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Table 4. Elements of universal social protection 
Author Criteria used 
Anttonen (2002) 
1) Rights to benefits or services. 
2) Tax financed. 
3) Uniform throughout the country. 
4) Defined by compulsory legislation. 
5) Designed for the entire population. 
6) Equal access. 
7) Used by most people. 
Kangas & Palme (2005) 
1) Coverage 
2) Generosity 
Gould Andersen (1997) 
(1999) 
1) Eligibility and entitlements are clearly defined rights, not a matter of 
discretion 
2) Rules apply to all citizens/residents who could be relevant 
beneficiaries 
3) Benefits (or services) are financed by general taxes rather than by 
social contributions 
4) Benefits are ideal-typically the same for all citizens; at least, nobody 
are excluded by means-testing, even though extra means-tested 
benefits are possible within the universal frame 
5) Benefits are adequate  
Anttonen, Haikio and 
Stefánsson (2015) 
1) Procedural definition: such distribution of social goods where 
everybody receives the same flat-rate cash-benefit regardless of their 
income, or the same service. 
2) Consequentialist definition:  related to the outcome of soc ial policy 
(“the egalitarian and integrative outcome that policy is intended to 
achive”, Anttonen and Siplilä, 2015, p. 29) 
Source: Gould Andersen (2012, p. 6) and Anttonen, Haikio and Stefánsson (2015) 
Figure 4 represents the three proposed dimensions to consider when characteris ing the degree of 
universality of a given social protection system. This figure is inspired on a proposal developed by the 
WHO (2010) for discussing universal health coverage. The figure  has three axes. The x -wide ax is 
represents the share of population covered, where a fully universal system would be located at the 
100% level. The x-depth axis represents, in turn, the range of needs covered. Last, the y-axis 
represents the adequacy of the provision. In this regard, the distance from the level reached by a given 
social programme and the 100% level can be interpreted as the part of the “need” addressed by the 
social programme not covered by it that is provided through other means (the market, the family or 
other community mechanisms), or simply not fulfilled. The figure illustrates three different degrees of 
universality. They can be interpreted as referring to specif ic  social p rogrammes, o r as a kind of 
average, representing a given Welfare State (22).   
                                     
(22)  Although this last option is far from being straightforward. The problems re lated to the  a gg regation  of  th e  d iff erent 
measures of universality of the different social protection programmes are addressed in chapter 5.  
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Figure 4. Different configurations of universality  
 
 
 
Source : Authors’ e laboration based on WHO (2010) 
In case A, we have a relatively high coverage, but a low range of needs covered and low adequacy of 
the provisions. Case B exemplifies universality in terms of population  cove red and range of needs 
addressed but at the cost of very low adequacy of the services/transfers provided. Last, C represents a 
A 
B 
C 
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case of a high level of adequacy of the services provided and the range of needs addressed, but with a 
relatively low share of the population covered.  
Of the three elements defining the universality of a social system, one is  qualitative (the  range of 
needs covered, essentially a list of areas) and two are quantitative (the coverage and adequacy of the  
programmes in each area). For the two quantitative dimensions of universality, table 5 summarises 
the metric and elements that could be used when evaluating the different indicators 
proposed to measure the degree of universality of a given Welfare State or social 
programme. 
The first quantitative element, coverage, could be measured by the percentage of people (or 
demographic group, depending on the nature of the programme) protected by the programme. For the  
second quantitative element, adequacy of the transfer or service, each programme would have its own 
criterion of adequacy depending on its nature. For example, in the case of health, the adequacy could 
be measured in terms of the catalogue of services provided, the quality of the service (e.g. waiting list, 
morbidity rates, etc), or the degree of out-of-pocket expenditure and the need to resort to the market,  
in the case of unemployment benefits the replacement rate, etc.  
Together with the metric, table 5 includes a column with an account of the elements that are behind 
the degree of coverage or adequacy, mainly to show that many of the items listed in the table among 
the requisites for universality are elements that operate behind the coverage rate or degree of 
adequacy.  
Table 5. Summary and metrics proposed for the measurement of universality in social protection 
 Metric Elements behind the degree of coverage 
Coverage 0-100% 
Equality of access, addressed to the whole population (or 
demogroup), consideration of the benefit/service as an 
enforceable right and not as a matter of  discretion , type  of 
financing (taxes vs social contributions), duration of the benefit.  
 
Adequacy Low to High 
Type of Welfare State:  universal vs residual. Aimed to 
adequately address a given need/risk of the population vs 
considered only as a basic intervention of last resort. 
Source : Authors’ own elaboration 
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3 Measuring universality in social protection. A review 
The aim of this chapter is to present an account of the different proposals that have been developed , 
mostly at EU level, to measure the degree of universality of social programmes or the whole system of 
social protection. Before starting our journey, it must be acknowledged that there are very few 
attempts to develop indicators aiming at measuring universality in social protection, either from an EU 
perspective, or from a national point of view.  
The limited availability of indicators of universality can be explained by a combination of factors , 
including: i) the polysemic nature of the idea of universality mentioned in the previous chapter;  i i )  the 
lack of agreement about the core elements in the concept; iii) the limited availability of  statistical 
information regarding social programmes compared with other areas such as the labour market or the 
measurement of production; and iv) the qualitative nature of some of the information required.  
We will first discuss proposals made by different scholars based on the literature on Welfare State 
models. The chapter then presents the approaches followed by the OECD, the WHO, the Global 
Coalition for the Social Protection Floor and the ILO. We also review two pragmatic academic proposals 
to operationalise the concept of universal social protection and conclude with a brief overview of EU 
initiatives, in particular the European Pillar of Social Rights. 
3.1 Proposals emanating from the literature of Welfare State models 
The first set of indicators of the universality of social programmes that we will review in this  chapte r 
are the result of the dissatisfaction of researchers with the use of indicators of relative social 
expenditure (social expenditure with respect to GDP) to measure  the level of soc ia l protection  in 
different countries. Although data on social expenditure and social expenditure effort (Social 
expenditure/GDP) is readily available for many countries and for a relatively long period of time  (e .g. 
through Eurostat or OECD social statistics), this type of expenditure indicators, although widely used,  
presents may drawbacks. Among them, we can mention that they do not provide information about 
how expenditure is distributed among the population, being at the same time opaque regarding the  
level of coverage of social programmes. In the words of Esping-Andersen (1990), expenditure 
indicators are “epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states” (p. 199) and so  of on ly 
secondary value when researching the nature of the different Welfare States. 
In order to overcome the limitations of the simple indicators of socia l expenditure, Gosta Esping-
Andersen (1990) developed the Index of Decommodification, aimed at gauging to  what extent 
citizens could maintain their income levels if affected by some of the risks usually covered by social 
policy: unemployment, retirement and sickness. The idea behind the concept is  that the h igher the 
decommodification index, the higher the decoupling of livelihood from income earned in the labour 
market. In the words of Esping-Andersen (1990): “De-commodification occurs when a service is  
rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without re liance on the 
market.” (pp.21-22) (23). The aim of Esping-Andersen’s work was to study the differences in  national 
arrangements of social protection, an effort which ended up producing the most widely used 
classification of welfare states: Liberal, Corporatist, and Socialdemocratic (Esping-Andersen,  1990) . 
However, the structure of the index, as we will see, allows its interpretation in terms of universality (24).  
Table 6 reproduces the main elements behind the construction of de decommodification index,  DI, as 
proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990). The first thing to be taken into consideration is  that the DI is  
limited to only 3 programmes of social policy: retirement pensions,  sick pay, and unemployment 
benefits. Although these three programmes add up to a sizeable  part of  social e xpenditure, and 
especially monetary social expenditure, the analysis leaves out other important social p rogrammes 
such as health or education. Looking at the variables considered in the construction of the DI, we  can 
see that in all cases they include variables regarding adequacy, duration (when relevant) and, later in  
the process of standardisation, the coverage rate. In all cases, the items that are used in the 
construction of the ID are discussed in chapter 2 when debating the requisites of universal social 
                                     
(23)  The concept of commodification and de-commodification has a long tradition in social sciences and has been used by other 
authors and in other contexts. The debate about different interpretations of the term, and its extension outside the realm of  
the  Welfare State can be found, for example, in Pintelon (2012) 
(24)  Decommodification is one of the axes used in the classification of Welfare States proposed by Esping-Anders en (1 9 90 ) ,  
together with the  level of stratification and welfare mix.  
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programmes. It is in this regard that the ID can be interpreted in terms of universality of social 
protection. The value of the ID of the three programmes analysed is added to produce the overall ID. 
Table 6. Construction of Esping-Andersen’s Decommodification Index, DI.  
 Variables 
Programmes 
Unemployment 
insurance 
Replacement rates 
Qualifying period 
Benefit duration 
Sick pay 
Replacement rates 
Qualifying period 
Benefit duration 
Old age pensions 
Minimum replacement rate 
Standard replacement rate 
Employee contribution to social security (%) 
 Qualifying period 
Country standardisation method 
1 (less generous) = if the value of a g iven ind icator is 
lower than one standard deviation below the mean 
2 = if the value of a given indicator is within one 
standard deviation of the mean 
3 (most generous) = if the value of a given ind icator is  
above one standard deviation of de mean 
Replacement rates are given double weight vis a vis  the 
other variables 
Sub-indexes are computed aggregating the ind icators 
and multiplying the result by the coverage rate of the 
programme. 
Overall value of the DI Sum of the values of the 3 programmes 
Maximum total value 
48 (16 per programme) => universal coverage and all 
indicators with value above one standard deviation of de 
mean 
Coverage  
18 countries = Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Untied States 
Data set The Social Citizenship Indicator Programme (SCIP) 
Source : Authors’ analysis from Esping-Andersen (1990) 
Figure 5 reproduces the overall Index of Decommodification, as estimated by Esping-Andersen (1990),  
with the corresponding typology of Welfare States. All in all, the combination of replacement rates -a 
proxy of adequacy-, and coverage rate -measured indirectly through indicators of the qualifying period 
and benefit duration- can be considered as a proxy of how universal the programme is  in te rms of 
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people benefited by it, allowing the interpretation of the DI as an indicator of universality. 
Nevertheless, the indicator is limited by its restriction to only three social programmes (25).  
Figure 5. Decommodification index of Esping-Andersen, 1980 
 
Source : Authors’ representation of Esping-Andersen (1990) data.  
The estimates of Esping-Andersen remained unchallenged and unreplicated until in 2006 the politica l 
scientists Lyle Scruggs and James Allan published an article revisiting, updating and revis ing Esping-
Andersen’s estimates. In Scruggs and Allan (2006), the authors used a new database, the Comparative 
Welfare Entitlements Dataset, CWED, and developed a new indicator, in the spirit of Esping-Andersen’s 
Decommodification Index, but with some changes in the variables and the methodology,  that the 
authors call Generosity Index, GI. As the DI, the GI analyses three social programmes: Unemployment, 
Sick pay and Pensions. Unemployment insurance covers national insurance provisions earned without 
income testing. Sick pay insurance covers benefits paid in the event of short-term non-occupational 
illness or injury. This includes provisions for mandatory private (employer-paid) benefits in addition to  
public insurance. Public pensions considered in the CWED2 dataset include only mandatory public  
programmes (Scruggs, 2014, p.4).  
It is important to highlight that in both indices, the replacement, eligibility and duration of benefits are 
calculated for a standard or notional case: in the case of GI, a production worker in manufacturing who 
is 40 years old and has been working for the 20 years preceding the loss of income or the benef it 
period. The GI also considers two different household contexts: (a) Single:  earnings equal to 100% 
average earnings, living alone, no children or other dependents, (b) Family: earn ings equal t o  100% 
average earnings, cohabiting with a dependent spouse with no earnings, two children aged 7 and 12. 
The details of the construction of the index are summarized in Table 7,  and expla ined in  detail in 
Scruggs (2014).  
                                     
(25)  Although a technical matter, it is important to keep in mind that that the indices of decommodificatio n o f th e  d if feren t 
programmes are constructed using the standard deviations to the mean and assigning a score of 2 to those values with in 
one standard deviation to the mean, a score of 3 to those values over one standard deviation above the mean, and a score  
of 1 to those with standard deviation below the mean one. This metric, in the  words of Scruggs and Allen (2006, p .  5 8 ) , is  
“far from ideal”, as countries with similar values of their standard deviation, e.g. +0.9 and +1.1 will g e t q u ite  d if fere nt 
scores: 2 vs 3, while large differences in terms of standard deviation, e .g . – 0.9 and + .9 will get the  same score: 2. 
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Figure 6 reproduces the Generosity index for 2010 of the countries with data for the 3 social 
programmes (Scruggs et al., 2017). Again, the GI could be considered as a proxy of universality, as it is  
constructed with variables related to the adequacy of the benefits, in relative terms in relation with the 
previous wage, and coverage rate. In relation to the ranking, the most noticeable difference between 
the GI and DI indexes is probably Sweden. This difference is explained by the  different year of the 
analysis for the DI and GI indexes, and by the relatively intense reduction of the GI in  Sweden s ince 
1990, from 45.7 to 35.2, equivalent to a drop in the GI of 23%.  
In general terms the location of countries along the index of generosity is consistent with the 
classification of Welfare States according to the Liberal, Conservative and Social democratic  models. 
Portugal, and especially Spain, are nevertheless in positions higher up the ranking than expected , 
considering that these two countries are in the low end of the distribution of social expenditure. In th is  
regard, it is important to keep in mind that this measurement exercise only covers 3 programmes, and 
not the whole range of social expenditure. It is also worth noticing that countries with overall low social 
expenditure can have, nevertheless, high levels of decommodification in specific programmes such as 
pensions, as it happens in Spain, with one of the highest replacement rates of the EU (a net 
replacement rate of 83 % compared to 63 % for the EU, for men with average earnings according to  
the OECD, 2019b).  
Figure 6. Generosity index for 22 high income countries, 2018 
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from Scruggs et al. (2014) 
In a nutshell, both the Decommodification Index and the Generosity Index are p roposals  a imed at 
measuring the intensity of social protection which could be interpreted in terms of degree of 
universality of the programmes covered. It is out of our scope to discuss in  detail the d ifferences 
between the indices. Scruggs (2013) discusses the different results regarding replacement rates when 
using the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset and the Social Citizenship  Ind icators Project. 
Bolukbasi and Öktem (2018) concentrate on eleven key non-replacement rate indicators that SCIP and 
CWED have in common, identifying both the discrepancies and the potential source of such 
discrepancies. In any case, from the perspective of this report, the problem is  not so much in the 
details of their construction, important as they may be, but in their limitation to only three,  however 
central, social programmes. In this regard, these, or similar indices, could contribute to the development 
of an overall index of universality of social programmes, but by themselves are not enough. 
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Table 7. Construction of Scruggs and Allen’s Benefit Generosity Index, GI  
 Variables 
Programmes 
Unemployment 
insurance 
Replacement rate 
Duration limit (weeks) 
Qualifying period (weeks) 
Waiting days 
Coverage 
Sickness 
Replacement rate 
Duration (weeks) 
Qualifying period (weeks) 
Waiting days 
Coverage 
Pensions 
Minimum pension replacement  
Standard pension replacement  
Qualifying period (years) 
Benefit Duration (expected) 
Employee funding (%) 
Take-up rate 
Country standardisation method 
Country characteristic scores are based on z-scores** with 
mean and distribution computed all available observations. 
The GI for each programme is the sum of the z score 
values of each variable multiplied by the coverage rate. For 
details see Scruggs (2014). 
Overall value of the GI Sum of the values of the 3 programmes 
Coverage  
3 countries (18 in the first analysis with the CWED1) = 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,  New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Un ited Kingdom, 
and Untied States. CWED 2 includes information on f ive 
more countries: Greece, Korea, Portugal, Spain, and Taiwan.  
Data set Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED), 2 
Time period 1971-2010 
(*)  Added for the GI based on CWED2 
(**)  Extreme values -including unlimited benefit duration- are dropped and assigned a maximum or minimum z-score. Z-scores 
for several programme characteristics were based on logged values 
Source : Authors’ analysis from Scruggs and Allen (2006) and Scruggs (2014) 
  
 
29 
 
3.2 Contributions by the OECD 
This section presents three contributions made by the OECD for the measurement of adequacy for two 
monetary social benefits: unemployment and retirement pensions, and health provision. In their current 
status, they fall short of being usable as indicators of degree of universality, as they on ly cover the 
adequacy of the benefits, expressed as percentage of previous in-work income for different categories 
of workers. But they could be used, when combined with coverage information, to generate universality 
indices of these programmes.  
3.2.1 Unemployment benefits  
In the case of unemployment benefits, the OECD estimates net replacement rates in unemployment for 
different categories of workers (in terms of previous earnings), family types and duration of 
unemployment (Table 8). As an example, figure 7 reproduces the net replacement rate for a s ingle 
person without children, earning the average wage and unemployed for 6 months. 
Table 8. Net Replacement Rates in Unemployment (OECD) 
Variables  Alternatives 
Unemployment duration (months) 1-60 
Previous in work earnings 
Minimum wage, MW 
67% of the Average Wage,  
Average Wage, AW 
Family type 
Single person no children 
Single person 2 children 
Couple no children partner out of work 
Couple 2 children partner out of work 
Couple no children, partner AW 
Couple no children, partner 67% AW 
Couple no children, partner MW 
Couple 2 children, partner AW 
Couple 2 children, partner 67% AW 
Couple 2 children, partner MW 
Source : OECD.Stat 
As we can see in Figure 7, the distribution of net replacement rates of UBs among OECD countries is 
quite diverse, going from a meagre 5% in the US, to 86% in Luxemburg. In any case, the information 
supplied by the net replacement rates would have to be combined with data on levels  of coverage 
(percentage of unemployed receiving unemployment benefits) to be  able to  produce an ind icator 
susceptible of interpretation in terms of degree of universality of the programme. Periodical statistics 
regarding the coverage rate of unemployment benefits are not available, although coverage data can 
be estimated and is often available from national sources. 
According to Maquet, Maestri and Thévenot (2016) there are three possible sources to  estimate UB 
coverage rates (with simultaneous information on unemployment and benefit rec ip ients) . The f irst 
source is the EU Labour Force Survey, EU-LFS, the canonical source for estimating unemployment, but 
with only limited information regarding UB recipient population (self-declared). The second source is 
the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, EU-SILC. This survey gathers information about 
unemployment (self-declared) and UB, with the problem that the data on income  ( includ ing UB) is 
gathered for the whole (previous) year, making it impossible to estimate the duration of benefits. The  
third source is administrative data. This is probably the best source on UB recipients, with the 
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shortcoming that it does not include data on non-recipients. This implies the need to  combine two 
different sources of information: administrative registers for beneficiaries of UB, and surveyed data for 
unemployed population. The OECD, in its Social Benefit Recipients Database (SOCR), supplies 
comparable information on the number of people receiving cash benef its  for the main income  
replacement programmes in the unemployment, social assistance, disability and old-age branches . It 
currently covers eight years (2007-2016) for most OECD and EU countries. 
Figure 7. Net replacement rate for single person without children earning the average wage. 2019 (or latest 
available year*) 
 
Source: OECD.Stat 
Figure 8 reproduces the estimated coverage rates corresponding to 2012 using the three d ifferent 
sources mentioned above. It shows important differences in the resulting coverage rates of the EU 
countries included in the sample. These differences are especia lly in tense between SILC and LFS 
estimates, on one side, and the estimates produced from administrative records on the other. 
Furthermore, the figure only includes estimates of coverage rates by administrative records based. The 
results are far more diverse when the pseudo-coverage rates are calculated including unemployment 
assistance. For example, for Germany the coverage rate jumps to 302% and for Belgium to 287% (26). 
Before concluding this section, it is important to bring up the question of the differences in 
unemployment risk faced by the labour force in different countries, as it can be argued that d iffe rent 
degrees of coverage in UB (i.e. different levels of universality regarding this social p rogramme) will 
have very different social implications depending of the unemployment rate of each country. In  th is 
regard, low UB coverage rates in low unemployment countries could lead to overall lower vulnerability 
than high coverage rates in high unemployment rate countries. This possibi lity would be unnoticed 
when using coverage rates as defined above. A possible way to address this problem is to  def ine a 
new, complementary, Total non-coverage rate, TncR, defined as labour force non-cove red by UB in 
relation to the total labour force: 
Total non − coverage rate = 
Unemployment − Unemployment covered by UB
Labour Force
 
                                     
(26)  As stated by Maquet et al. (2016), rates can exceed 100% if some recipients continue to receive UB even when doing some 
work compatible  with it (and thus are not considered unemployed by ILO definition) or if they are  not working and decla re  
that they are not available for work or not searching actively for work (and again they are not considered unemployed b y 
ILO definition). For the  advantages and disadvantages of the different sources see Maquet, Maestri and Thévenot (2016).  
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Figure 8. UB coverage rates from administrative records, EU-SILC and LFS 
 
Source : Maquet, Maestri and Thévenot (2016), p. 17, 23-25. 
The aim of this indicator would be to capture the possibility that inclusive labour markets ( i .e. labour 
markets with low unemployment rates) could lead to lower degrees of overall vulnerability, even in the 
context of low UB coverage rates (and thus lower income protection when unemployed). As an 
example, Table 9 reproduces four country cases. The first one, the Nethe rlands,  combi nes high UB 
coverage rate and low unemployment rate, leading to very low total non-coverage rate of less than 2% 
(i.e., very low vulnerability due to the low probability of being unemployed and the high coverage UB 
rate in case of being so). The second case is exemplified by Portugal, with a much lower UB coverage 
rate, 40%, and higher unemployment rate. This situation leads to a higher Total non-coverage rate of 
around 7%. The third case, Spain, has a slightly higher rate of UB coverage, 45%, which combined with 
an unemployment rate almost twice as high, produces nevertheless a Total non-coverage rate of 11%, 
higher than the Portuguese one. In contrast with the Spanish case, Poland has a very low rate of UB 
coverage, 17.6%, but combined with a low unemployment rate, 6%, produces a Non -coverage rate 
which is half the Spanish rate.  
Table 9. Examples of combinations of UB coverage rate, Unemployment rate and Total non -coverage rate 
 
UB Coverage rate 
(%) 
Unemployment rate 
(%)  
Total non-coverage rate  
(%) 
Netherlands 70,2 6,0 1,8 
Portugal 40,4 11,1 6,6 
Spain 44,9 19,6 10,8 
Poland 17,6 6,2 5,1 
Source : Authors’ analysis from OECD labour Stats and SOCR (SOCial benefits Recip ients) database  
Obviously, the total non-coverage rate must be interpreted with caution. Low values of Total non -
coverage rate cannot be interpreted straightforward in terms of better overall welfare, as that would 
depend on the working conditions, including wage and working time, but not only, of the labour force. 
Suppose low unemployment rates result from workers being compelled to take low wage and working 
condition jobs due to the lack of other means of subsistence (e.g. UB). In  that case, low total non-
coverage rates cannot be interpreted in terms of good levels of social protection (adding p rotection 
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through employment and through UB). Most developing countries, with very low or null UB coverage,  
and very low unemployment rates, are a good example of this danger.  
3.2.2 Retirement pensions 
The OECD also produces estimates of retirement pensions, as well as some complementary 
information about eligibility and retirement age that can be used to gauge the level of universality of 
this important social programme. Together with this information, the SOCR (SOCial benefits Recipients) 
database offers estimates of old-age, survivors, and early retirement recipients.  
The OECD Pensions at Glance report presents estimates of the pension entitlements of a worker who 
enters the system today and retires after a full career. In this respect, the estimates are  for future 
pensioners, with today’s requirements and regulations, under the assumption that changes in rules that 
have already been legislated, but are being phased in gradually, are fully in  place. A fu ll career is  
defined as entering the labour market at age 22 and working until the standard pension-eligibility age. 
To generate the estimates, the OECD model takes into consideration all mandatory pension schemes 
for private-sector workers, regardless of whether they are public or private schemes. Complementarily, 
a second round of estimates also include voluntary, occupational, or personal pensions. The 
replacement rate is calculated for different types of workers, with earnings equal to 0.5, 1 and 1.5 of 
mean earnings. OECD Pensions at Glance estimates both gross and net pensions,  in the latter case 
after taking into consideration the taxes and social contributions paid by workers and pensioners ( 27) . 
As example, Figure 9 reproduces the gross and net replacement rates of pensioners in EU OECD 
countries plus Japan and the US. 
Figure 9. Gross and net replacement rates of pensioners (workers with average earnings) in a sample of OECD 
countries, 2018 
 
* In brackets, standard retirement age. 
Source : OECD (2019b), p . 155 
This complete information about replacement rates represents theorical replacement rates 
and not actual replacement rates of already retired cohorts of workers, and it can be 
complemented with the information provided by the SOCR (SOCial benefits Recipients) 
database, regarding recipients of old-age, survivors and early retirement benefits. This 
information can be used to estimate coverage rates when measured against total 
                                     
(27)  Pensions at Glance models produce also specific estimates for 3 family types: single average earner, single -earner co uple  
(male  average) and couple with average earnings, impact of unemployment break (5 and 10 years) and child break (5 - and 
10-years break). 
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population over 65 (28). Eurostat also supplies information about pensions’ beneficiaries (by 
type of pensions, means and non-means tested, and old age/survival/anticipated, etc.). In 
any case, looking at the last of the sources mentioned, often coverage rates are higher than 
one hundred per cent, as pensioners might have right to more than one pension. As we can 
see in Figure 10, which reproduces estimated old pension’s coverage rates for 2016, such is 
the case in more than half of the EEE countries. When survivors are included in the total 
number of pensioners, practically all countries surpass the one hundred per cent threshold,  
or come very close to it (e.g., in the Spanish case the coverage rate jumps from 65% to 
97%). 
Figure 10. Old age pension coverage rate (pensions/population >64) 
 
Source : Authors´ analysis of Eurostat data. 
3.2.3 Health care 
In 2001 the OECD launched a new yearly review of its member States’ health system. With the passing 
of time the OECD’s Health at Glance has become a very useful and updated radiography of the health 
systems of high-income countries. Although the very rich quantitative account of health systems of the 
report does not include an index of universality of the health system of member countries, it supplies 
several indicators that considered together provide information about the different degrees of 
universality of health systems of the European countries of the OECD. 
From all the information provided by the OECD’s 2019 Health at Glance, we will focus on the three 
areas than define the degree of universality of a given social programme: coverage, range or extent of 
the service provided and quality. 
Regarding coverage rates, according to the information provided in Figure 11, most OECD countries 
have universal or quasi-universal health coverage (29), in most cases provided through National Health 
Systems or Social Health Insurance systems. However, a few cases such as the Netherlands or 
                                     
(28)  For the  methodology see OECD’s Data questionnaire for the  international database on social benefit recip ients. Definitio ns 
and methodology (March revision). 
(29)  One common exception is access to health care for illegal immigrants, which in most cases is limited to lif e -th reatenin g 
situations or in case of risk to public health (Romero-Ortuño, 2004). This is the case of Austria, Bulgaria ,  Cyp rus,  Cze ch  
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg ,  M alta ,  P oland,  
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden. In Belgium, Italy and the UK, immigrants, or subgroups of immig ra nts s uch  a s 
children or pregnant women, are entitled to certain services. In the rest: France, the Netherla nds,  P ortu gal a nd S pain ,  
immigrants are  de jure entitled to the same range of health services under certain conditions.  (Karl-Trummer et al., 2010. 
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Switzerland have resorted to compulsory private health insurance (combined with public subsidies and 
laws on the scope and depth of coverage). 
One possible way to assess the universality of the health systems and to complement the information 
included in figure 11 is to look at the share of the population that have purchased a p rivate health 
insurance policy. Although there are various reasons than can explain the purchasing of private health 
insurance by people already covered by a public health system, some of them, such as the inclusion of 
therapies not covered by the public health systems or skipping waiting lists (King and Mossialos, 2005) 
can be related to the de facto lack of coverage of certain risks. It is in this regard that voluntary private 
health insurance coverage can be considered as informative regarding the degree of un iversality of 
public health systems.  
Figure 11. Coverage rate for a core set of health services 
 
Source : OECD (2019), p . 105. 
OECD data on voluntary private health insurance coverage distinguishes between complementary  
(covering all or part of the residual costs not otherwise reimbursed), supplementary  (coverage for 
additional health services) and duplicate coverage (private health insurance that offers health services 
already included under government health insurance). As we can see in Figure 12,  the generalised 
universality of health protection in Europe is compatible with quite different coverage rates of private 
health insurance. These differences also affect the type of private health insurance, complementary in  
France, Slovenia, or Belgium, supplementary in the Netherlands or Austria, and basicall y duplicate in 
Spain, Greece or the UK.  
Besides the information about the comprehensiveness of public health programmes provided by the 
above data on subscriptions of private health insurance, the OECD provides information about the level 
of financial coverage of government and mandatory health insurance over total health expenditure by 
category. This information allows to see the importance of out-of-pocket expenditures, whether due to 
cost-sharing, co-payments or due to the very limited coverage of specific services such as dental care. 
Figure 13 reproduces the percentage of total expenditure paid by public and compulsory p rivate 
insurance in European countries, and the OECD average. Although with differences among countries , 
there is a clear hierarchy of coverage, with almost full coverage in hospital care , followed by h igh 
levels of coverage in outpatient care (in this case with low shares for Greece, Hungary, Ita ly, Latvia,  
Poland, Portugal and Switzerland), then pharmaceutical spending, with coverage rates around 50%,  
and finally dental care, where only a few countries trespass the 50% threshold. 
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This analysis can be complemented by information on unmet needs for healthcare-related services due 
to financial reason, based on self-reported data. On the basis of the European Health Interview Survey 
(EHIS) it is possible to estimate the share of the population that has forgone or postponed health care 
for different reasons, including financial reasons, as well as the type of health care postponed. In  th is 
regard, as expected, there is a close inverse correlation between public coverage of health expenditure 
and forgone care (e.g. -44% in the case of dental care).  
Figure 12. Voluntary private health insurance coverage by type, 2017 
 
 
Source : Authors’ e laboration from OECD (2019), p . 105 
The last item to take into consideration when gauging the universality of public health 
systems, along with the share of people protected and the range of protection, is the 
quality and outcome of care. This is clearly the most challenging aspect for the analysis, 
due to the myriad of health interventions: in practice, the analysis has to be limited to a 
small number of interventions. Table 10 reproduces the areas of health care and the 
indicators considered by the OECD, as well as the rationale for their selection as quality 
indices. Altogether we have 10 dimensions of quality and outcomes in health care fed by 
25 indices. It is a long list that, nevertheless, is far from being exhaustive. Here, as in other  
domains of measurement, a balance between exhaustiveness and parsimony has to be 
met. 
Although the OECD, following the same criteria as in other areas, such as the measurement 
of job quality or the quality of life, stops at the level of the different areas analysed 
(coverage, range of services provided and quality and outcome of care), the information 
supplied could be further transformed, as it stands or complemented by other indicators 
and sources, into an aggregate indicator of universality of health provision.  
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Figure 13. Government and compulsory insurance spending as proportion of total health spending by type of 
care, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
Public spending on dental care is not available for France. Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK.  
Source : Authors’ e laboration from OECD (2019), p . 105 
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Table 10. Quality indexes of the OECD Health at Glance  
Quality and outcome 
dimension 
Index Rational 
Safe primary care 
prescriptions 
Overall volume of 
opioids prescribed. Daily 
doses (DDDs) per 1 000 
population/day 
Opioids are often used to treat acute pain, 
its use is now causing an alarming and 
rising epidemic 
of overdose deaths in some OECD 
countries 
 
Overall volume of 
antibiotics prescribed 
(daily doses (DDDs) per 
1 000 population/day 
Antibiotics should be prescribed only 
where there is a need that is clearly 
supported by evidence, to reduce the risk 
of resistant strains of bacteria 
Safe acute 
care 
Surgical 
complications 
and health 
care-
associated 
infections 
Foreign body left in 
during a procedure 
Related to “sentinel” or “never” events: 
events that should never or very rarely 
occur 
Percentage of hospita l 
Inpatients with 
healthcare associated 
infections (HAIs) 
HAIs are the single most deadly and costly 
adverse event, representing up to  6% of 
public hospital budgets (Slawomirski, 
Auraaen and Klazinga, 2018). This impact 
is increased by antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria, which can make HAIs difficult o r 
even impossible to treat. 
obstetric 
trauma 
Rates of obstetric 
trauma with instrument 
and without instruments 
The proportion of deliveries involving 
higher-degree lacerations is considered a 
useful indicator of the quality of obstetric 
care 
Avoidable hospital admissions 
Asthma and COPD 
hospital admission in 
adults among people 
aged 15 years and over 
per100 000 population 
Asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD) and congestive heart 
failure (CHF) are three widely p revalent 
long-term conditions. A high performing 
primary care system, where accessible 
and high-quality services are provided, 
can reduce acute deterioration in people 
living with asthma, COPD or CHF. This can 
avoid the need for hospital admissions 
Congestive Heart Failure 
(CHF) hospital admission 
in adults among people 
aged 15 years and over 
per100 000 population 
Diabetes care 
Avoidable hospital 
admissions for diabetes 
Diabetes is the cause of 3% of death in  
OECD countries 
Mortality  
Thirty-day mortality 
after admission to 
hospital for ischaemic 
stroke 
In 2016, stroke was the second largest 
cause of death globally, over three 
hundred thousand deaths in Western 
Europe (GDB Stroke Collaborators (2019) 
30-day acute 
myocardial infarction 
(AMI) case-fatality rate 
The measure reflects the processes of 
care, including timely transport of patients 
and effective medical interventions. 
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Hip and knee surgery 
Crude mean scores 
submitted by patients 
before and at 6 or 12 
months after elective 
hip replacement surgery 
for osteoarthritis (OA) 
Hip and knee replacement surgeries can 
be effective treatments for patients with 
chronic conditions such as osteoarthritis  
(OA). Surgeries to repair hip fractures are 
also common and effective. 
Hip fracture surgery 
initiation within two 
days of admission to 
hospital 
 
Time-to-surgery (TTS) is considered a 
clinically meaningful process indicator of  
the quality of acute care for patients with 
hip fracture. There is general agreement 
that surgery should occur within two days 
(48 hours) of hospital admission (National 
Clinical Guideline Centre, 2011) 
Cancer survival rates 
Breast cancer five-year 
net survival by stage of 
breast cancer at 
diagnosis 
Breast cancer is the cancer with the 
highest incidence among women in all 
OECD countries, and the second most 
common cause of cance r death among 
women 
Screening and survival 
for colorectal cancer 
Colon cancer five-year 
net survival 
Rectal cancer five-year 
net survival 
Colorectal cancer is the third most 
diagnosed cancer after breast and 
prostate cancers in OECD countries , and 
the third most common cause of death 
from cancer 
Lung cancer five-year 
net survival 
Lung cancer is the main cause of cancer 
death for both men and women in  OECD 
countries. 
Stomach cancer five-
year net survival 
Stomach cancer is another commonly 
diagnosed cancer and fifth highest cause 
of cancer death in OECD countries.  
Childhood acute 
lymphoblastic 
leukaemia five-year net 
survival 
Leukaemia is the most common cancer 
among children aged 0-14 
Vaccinations 
Vaccination coverage for 
diphtheria, tetanus and 
pertussis (DTP), measles 
and hepatitis B at 1year 
of age. 
Population aged 65 and 
over vaccinated for 
influenza 
Vaccines are an effective and cost-
effective tool for protecting against 
infectious diseases, preventing accord ing 
to the CDC 2.5 million deaths among 
children younger than age 5 every year 
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Quality and outcome dimension Index Rational 
Care for people with mental 
health disorders 
Inpatient suicide among 
patients with a psychiatric 
disorder. 
 
High-quality care for mental 
disorders in inpatient settings is 
vital, and inpatient suicide is a 
“never” event, which should be 
closely monitored as an indication of 
how well 
inpatient settings can keep patients 
safe from harm. 
Patient experiences of 
ambulatory care 
Doctor spending enough 
time with patient during 
consultation 
Doctor providing easy-to-
understand explanations 
Doctor involving patient in 
decisions about care and 
treatment 
Importance of incorporating people’s 
voices into the development of 
health systems and improving 
quality of care 
Source : OECD (2019) pp. 120-14 
3.3 The World Health Organisation´s Universal Health Coverage  
As mentioned above, although most proxy indicators of universality in soc ial p rotection focus on 
monetary social protection, such as UB or retirement pensions, there is  no  a p riori reason why the 
analysis of universality should limit itself to monetary transfers. Quite on the contrary, as we saw in  
section 2.2, health or education are basic human needs and as such candidates for universal coverage. 
In fact, universal health protection is one of the aims of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and one 
of the UN´s SDGs (target 3.8). Health expenditure is also, after pensions, the second most important 
item of social protection in terms of public social expenditure.  
But the development of an index of universality in health protection poses new challenges, as this time, 
compared to the case of unemployment benefits or old age pension, the adequacy of the provis ion 
cannot be measured against a previous situation taken as a benchmark (such as the prior earnings of 
the recipients, or a given threshold considered relevant in other programmes such as the poverty line) . 
A different approach is required, for instance a previous definition of a catalogue of services against 
which to measure the level of protection available to the population. 
For years, the WHO has been working (e.g., WHO, 2014) on the operationalisation of their concept of 
Universal Health Coverage, UHC, defined as the situation where “everyone -irrespective of their living 
standards- receive the health services they need, and that us ing health services does not cause 
financial hardship” (2017, p. xii). As we can see, the concept of UHC relies on two pillars (1) the  
availability of health services to all, (2) subject to the condition that such availability does not cause 
financial hardship. In this way, UHC is not limited, although in practise it will in most cases , to  public 
sector provision financed by specific of general taxes, as we could ideally envisage  a pure ly p rivate 
market health sector that meets the above-mentioned criteria.  
The WHO has adopted two different sets of indicators to operationalise the two p illars  of the UHC 
definition above mentioned. The first set of indicators aims at measuring service coverage, defined as 
the proportion of people in need of a service that receives it. Ideally, s ervice coverage should be 
measured in terms of effective service coverage, i.e. taking into consideration not just the availability 
of the service, but also its quality. The WHO has selected 16 tracer indicators that aim at summarising 
the myriad of health intervention produced in a given health system, based in the fo llowing guiding 
principles: (a) preference for measuring effective coverage, (b) inclusion of public health measures that 
might not be implemented by health services but that aim at improving health, (c) the index should be 
disaggregated by key inequality dimensions. The index of service coverage (or the se t of  tracer 
indicators to monitor progress towards UHC in essential health services) includes the d imensions of: 
(1), reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health, family planning, (2) infectious diseases, (3) non-
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communicable diseases and injuries (4) service capacity and access. Table 11 reproduces the 16 
indicators that conform to the above-mentioned dimensions.  
Table 11. Tracer indicators selected by the WHO to monitor progress towards UHC in essential health services  
 Area Indicator 
Reproductive, 
maternal, 
newborn and 
child health 
Family 
planning, 
RMNCH 
Family planning 
Demand satisfied with modern methods among 
women 15-49 married or in union (%) 
Pregnancy and delivery 
care 
Antenatal care, four or more visits (%) 
Child immunization 1-year children who have received DTP3 (%) 
Child treatment 
Care seeking behaviour for children with suspect 
pneumonia (%) 
Infectious 
diseases 
(Infectious) 
Tuberculosis treatment TB effective coverage (%) 
HIV treatment People living with HIV receiving ART (%) 
Malaria prevention 
Population at risk using treated bednets (%) -only in 
high risk malaria areas. 
Water and sanitation 
Households with access at least to basic sanitation  
(%) 
Non-
communicable 
diseases, NCD, 
Prevention of 
cardiovascular disease 
Prevalence of normal blood pressure regardless of 
treatment status (%) 
Management of diabetes Mean fasting plasma glucose 
Cancer detection and 
treatment 
Cervical cancer screening among women 30-49 (%) 
Tobacco control 
Adults ≥ 15 years not smoking tobacco in the last 30  
days (%) 
Service 
capacity and 
access 
Capacity 
Hospital access Hospital beds p.c. 
Health workers density Health professional p.c. 
Access to essential 
medicines 
% of health facilities with WHO recommended core 
list of essential medicines available 
Health security International Health Regulations core capacity index 
Source : WHO (2017), p. 6-10 
The overall UHC-Service is constructed in three steps. Firstly, all the tracer indicators are transformed 
into a single scale 0-100, where 0 is the lowest value and 100 the highest ( the indicators are not 
rescaled to relative values). In most cases, the scale coincides with the default scale of the indicator (in 
all the cases where the index is expressed in percentages), but few cases require  rescaling ( 30). The  
value of each dimension is then calculated by the geometrical mean of the respective indicators ( 31). 
                                     
(30)  See WHO (2019) p . 114 for the details of the rescaling procedures in those cases, such as mean fasting p lasma g lucos e ,  
hospital bed density or prevalence of tobacco, that for different reasons require  rescaling.  
(31)  The indicators of Cancer detection and treatment and Access to essential me dicin es a re  e xclu ded d ue to  lo w data  
availability. 
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Finally, the overall value of the UHC Service coverage index is defined as the geometrical value of the 
four dimensions (32). 
(2) UHC Service coverage index = (RMNCH∗ Infectious ∗ NCD ∗ Capacity )1/4 
Figure 14 reproduces the UHC Service coverage index for the European Economic Area countries. Two 
things stand out from the figure. First, the relatively high values of all the countries of the sample. 
Second, the relatively low dispersion of the index. Except for the two laggard countries: Bulgaria and 
Latvia (and Croatia, to a lesser extent), all the countries lay within a +/-10% range from the  average 
(which is 79, the position held by Austria). Probably, the  requirement of using a s ingle indicator 
worldwide reduces the capacity of the index to discriminate between countries with relatively strong 
health systems. In fact, the WHO 2017 Global Monitoring Report. Tracking universal health coverage¸ 
only reports UHC Service availability index up to 80%, as if considering that over this value the goal of 
UHC was reached. As Bergen, Ruckert and Labonté (2018) argue, the academic d iscussion on UHC 
focuses largely on developing countries, “amidst acknowledgement that the WHO proposed monitoring 
framework is largely irrelevant for high-income countries” (p. 389). 
Figure 14. UHC Service coverage index for the EU countries, Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway, 2017 
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from WHO UHC-Service coverage index (SCI) database. 
Figure 15 aims to test to what extent the WHO UHC-Service indicator is associated with health 
outcomes, with all its possible shortcomings due to the limitations of the ind icators used in the 
construction of the index and the focus on developing countries more than in high-income countries . 
The figure presents a simple biplot of Life expectancy at birth (an indicator related to the quality of the 
health system but also to many other variables, such as lifestyles) of EEA countries. As we can see, 
there is a strong correlation between the two indicators, although we can spot several outliers, due to a 
                                     
(32)  The WHO strategy of measuring universal health coverage also calculates the potentia l imp a ct th at me etin g  health  
expenditures could have on household finances. With that aim the WHO focuses on the extreme cases wh ere  a ttendin g 
health expenditures could have major financial implication using two different approaches. The first one is the  estima tio n 
of the  percentage of households that had what they called catastrophic (health) expenditure  defined in  re latio n to  two  
different thresholds: health expenditures equivalent to 10% or 25% of total household consumption or income. 
Complementarily, the  WHO estimates the poverty gap due to out-of-pocket health spending (in internatio nal $  a t 2 0 1 1  
PPP) with two different poverty lines: $1,9 and $3,10-a-day. This indicator expresses the increase in the mean shortfall (as  
a percentage of the international poverty line) of the population from the internatio nal p ov erty  lin e  a ttrib utab le  to  
household health expenditures (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall). 
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higher (Spain, France, Cyprus or Greece) or lower (e.g. Lithuania, Romania or Slovakia) life expectancy 
than granted by their UHC index (33).  
Figure 15. UHC – Service availability index and life expectancy at birth (years) 
 
 
 
Source : Authors analysis from WHO UHC Service coverage index (SCI) database and Eurostat.   
Acknowledging that the UHC index is a solid aggregate indicator of health coverage, a p ioneer in  the 
field, there are some major shortcomings that make the UHC index hardly suitable as an index of 
universality in health social protection for high-income countries: 
● The first, and most important shortcoming for the purpose of this report, is that the  UHC 
index is not, and never was meant to be, an index of universality of  the public health 
service. In fact, countries well known for the lack of a universal public health system, as 
defined in these pages -guaranteed access to health- such as the United States, have an 
index UHC-Service of 84 (and 0 in the four the indexes related to financial stress due to  
health expenditures). Thus, although the architecture of the index could be used in  the 
construction of a universal public health coverage indicator (UPHC) we consider its  use 
less than appropriate in its current format for that purpose. 
● The second shortcoming is the lack of indicators related to factual timely access, such as 
waiting lists. As we know “waiting lists” is a serious health policy issue (Siciliani and Hurst, 
2003). As argued by Viberg et al. (2013), many countries monitor national waiting times 
and have maximum national waiting time guarantees, something that implies that waiting 
time and the corresponding waiting lists are a matter of concern. Moreover, waiting times 
have been related to inefficiencies in health care delivery and d issatisfaction among 
patients (Viberg et al., 2013). 
● The third shortcoming is related to the treatment of out-of-pocket expenditures, that are 
considered to have a negative impact on UHC only when they lead to catastrophic 
expenditures or impoverishment. Doing so, the UHC normalises the resort to co-payments 
by health systems to deal with the moral hazard implications of free access to  health . 
Forgetting that co-payments have also important implications: (1) in terms of the 
efficiency of the health system (34) if co-payments reduce the degree of patients’ 
                                     
(33)  Similar results are  obtained when using life expectancy at 65, and healthy living years at birth, although in th is ca s e th e  
corre lation is much weaker (R2 = 0.257). 
(34)  According to the  lite rature review patient cost-sharing and adherence to treatments and outcome of Eaddy et al. (2012), in  
85% of the  160 papers reviewed, published from 1974 to 2008, an incre ase in patient share of me dica tion co sts  wa s 
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adherence to treatments, and (2) from a moral point of view, co-payments imply making 
people with a health condition partly responsible for it.  
3.4 The Social Protection Floor Index 
In contrast to the WHO UHC, the Social Protection Floor Index has not been developed as an indicator 
of universality of social protection, but, as we will see further down, it can be interp r eted as an 
aggregate negative indicator of the lack of universality in social protection in the area of minimum 
basic income. The Social Protection Floor Index (SPFI) is an initiative of The Global Coalition for the 
Social Protection Floor (35) that aims at capturing the degree of implementation of the  four soc ia l 
security guarantees of the ILO Recommendation No. 202 (see page 14) . The SPFI focuses on two 
dimensions: (1) access to a basic level of income for all (for children, people in active age,  and o lder  
people), (2) universal access to essential health care. The  approach fo llowed is  to estimate the 
protection gaps in income and health expressed in terms of GDP. This way, the result can be 
interpreted in terms of the percentage of GDP that would be required to close such gaps.  
Following Bierbaum et al. (2016), the first item of the SFPI, the shortfall in income security, is defined 
as the Income Gap, IG, or amount of income required to guarantee that every individual has access to  
a defined minimum level of income (the poverty line). The SFPI uses three different poverty rates to  
take into consideration the different socio-economic context of the countries of the world: poverty lines 
(1) and (2) are the absolute international poverty lines developed by the World Bank, and customarily 
used worldwide, of $1.90/day and $3.10/day in $2011 PPP.  In contrast, the third option (3) follows a 
relative concept of poverty and sets the poverty line at 50% of current median income of each country 
of analysis.  
To measure the degree of access to essential health care, and the corresponding gaps in  health 
security, the SFPI uses a two-stage partial indicator that looks at the adequacy of resources allocated 
to health and at the adequacy of the allocation of such resources within the health delivery system. To 
test the adequacy of public resources devoted to health care, the SFPI compares the national public 
health expenditure of countries with a normative benchmark. This comparison allows to estimate the 
public health expenditure gap, HGej. A similar method is used to investigate if there is an allocation gap, 
HGaj. Whichever gap is larger is taken as the health gap, HG j, of the country. 
The benchmark in health expenditure allocation is empirically estimated by “considering which share of 
GDP countries with an average medical staffing ratio spent on average on public health, based on the 
rationale that labour costs constitute a substantial share of public health expenditure” (Birbaum et al.,  
2016; p. 11). For 2013 the benchmark corresponded to 4.3% of GDP (Bierbaum et al. 2017).  
The benchmark in terms of adequacy of the distribution of expenditure within the public system aims 
at gauging whether the distribution among different populations groups – with different health needs- 
is adequate. To do that, the SFPI/health focuses on maternity, and specifically on births attended by 
skilled health personnel. Correspondingly, the birth attendance shortfall, BAS,  is calculated as the 
percentage of births below the BAS benchmark (95%). The corresponding gap is then multiplied by the 
benchmark for public expenditure to determine the health gap in allocation, HGa.  
As both elements of the SPFI are expressed in GDP terms, both indicators are simply added to  obtain  
the overall (income + health) SPFI.  
As the authors of the index acknowledged, the SPFI faces several limitations. First, the use of the GDP 
as denominator of the index can lead to strange results when the economy fluctuates ( increasing in 
case of bust, and decreasing in case of boom), changes that are not related with the implementation 
of SPF policies. Second, the use of the 50% of the mean income poverty line is subject to  the well -
known criticisms of a relative poverty measure. For example, an increase in mean income could lead to 
an increase in the poverty rate even if the income of the people at poverty risk remains stable, or even 
when it increases, as long as the increase is lower than the increase in mean income. Third, the health 
gap, probably the weakest part of the SPFI, is subject to a high degree of discretion. 
                                                                                                            
significantly associated with a decrease in adherence. This reduction in adherence led, in most of the studies reviewed, to a  
deterioration of health outcomes. 
(35)  The Global Coalition for Social Protection Flo ors was created in summer 2012. The Coalition consists of more than 80 NGOs 
and Trade Unions from all parts of the world. 
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Figure 16 reproduces the SPFI for the EEE countries (except for Malta and Cyprus for data problems) 
and the United States for comparison. In all the cases but Bulgaria and Latvia, the SPFI coincides with 
the Poverty Gap, as the rest of countries have zero Health Gaps. The  Health Gap for Bulgaria and 
Latvia corresponds, in both cases, to a resource gap, of 0.2% and 0.8% respectively. 
Figure 16. SPFI for EEE countries and the United States 
 
Source : Birbaum 2017, p .34-38. 
As mentioned in the introductory paragraph of this section, the SPFI does not aim to measure 
universality of any kind, just the existence of a minimum social floor regarding income and health. 
Nevertheless, the income part of it can be considered as a negative measure of universality in income 
protection. In fact, in a country with universal income protection set at 50% of median income,  the  
SPFI- IG would be zero, while it would grow with the increase in people at poverty risk and with their 
average distance to the poverty line. Obviously, as the income gap depends on both the inclus iveness 
of the labour market in terms of employment and wages and social protection, a small SPFI–IG cannot 
be fully attributed to social protection.  
3.5 Universal social protection according to the International Labour 
Organisation 
Any analysis of the different initiatives regarding the measurement of universal social protection would 
be incomplete without a reference to the gargantuan effort made by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) to improve our knowledge regarding the level of universal social protection from a 
worldwide quantitative perspective . The 2017-19 edition of one of the flagship reports of the 
organization, the World Social Protection Report, (ILO; 2017), with the subtitle: Universal social 
protection to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, “provides a comprehensive assessment of 
the current state of social protection systems around the globe, their coverage, benefits, and 
expenditures” (ILO, 2017, p. v). As we can see, it includes items that recurrently have been considered 
in the different approaches to the measurement of universality reviewed above.  
Table 12 reproduces a selection of the indexes used by the ILO to monitor progress towards 
universality in social protection for five different areas: Child and family benefits, Social protection for 
people of working age, Social protection for older people, Health and Long Term Care. 
 
0.1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.3
1.4
1.8
1.9
2 2
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Ro
m
an
ia
Cz
ec
h
 R
ep
ub
lic
H
u
n
ga
ry
Fi
nl
an
d
Ic
e
la
n
d
Lu
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
Cr
oa
ti
a
D
e
n
m
a
rk
G
er
m
an
y
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Be
lg
iu
m
Fr
an
ce
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
Sw
ed
en
S
w
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
A
us
tr
ia
Ir
el
an
d
N
o
rw
ay
Sl
ov
ak
 R
ep
ub
lic
P
o
la
n
d
Sl
ov
en
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
U
n
ite
d
 K
in
gd
om
E
st
o
n
ia
Po
rt
u
ga
l
G
re
ec
e
It
al
y
La
tv
ia
Sp
ai
n
U
S
A
 
45 
 
Table 12. Selection of indicators used by the ILO to monitor progress towards universal social protection in the 
World Social P rotection Report 2017-2019* 
Area Programme 
Coverage 
Adequac
y 
Legal Effective 
Child and family cash benefit 
schemes 
child and family cash benefit 
x 
(100%) 
x (100%)  
Social protection expenditure 
(excluding health) on people of 
working age 
maternity protection x  x 
unemployment protection x x (46,2%) x 
employment injury protection x  x 
disability benefits x x (92,4%) x 
Social protection 
for older women 
and men 
Old-age pensions x x (97,7%) x 
Health coverage 
 x x  
Five indicators reflecting the affordability, availability and 
financial protection of quality health services complemented by 
information on health outputs based on maternal mortality rates. 
Legal coverage deficit: % of population without legal coverage 
Out of pocket expenditure % total health expenditure 
Financial deficit: % of population not covered due to  f inanc ia l 
resource deficit (threshold US$ 239) 
Staff access deficit: % of population not covered due to  health 
professional staff deficit (threshold 41,1per 10 000 population) 
Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 10 000 live birth) 
Long term care, LTC 
 x x  
Coverage gap due to financial resources def ic it def ined as the 
percentage of the population 65 years and over that is excluded 
from access to LTC services due to a lack of financia l resources 
(threshold of 1,461.8 PPP$ per person 65 years and over in 
2013). 
The percentage of the population experiencing out -of-pocket 
expenditure for LTC. 
Coverage gap due to staff access deficit o insufficient numbers of 
formal LTC workers (threshold of 4.2 formal long-term care 
workers -full-time equivalent, FTE- per 100 persons 65 years and 
over in 2013). 
(*) Between brackets the average values for Northern, Southern and Western Europe, NSWE.  
Source : Authors’ e laboration from ILO (2017) 
The above table includes two different types of approach to universality of social protection. For those 
programmes mainly based on monetary transfers, the ILO follows the standard approach that we have 
seen in previous pages of this chapter, with indicators regarding coverage and ind icator s regard ing 
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adequacy. In the case of coverage, the ILO provides indicators on both legal and effective coverage, in 
terms of the share of the population covered by the programme. Regarding adequacy, the ILO 
subscribes the standard approach of comparing the benefit received with previous earnings. As for the 
two areas dealing with service provision included, health and long-term care, the ILO adopts a different 
approach based on different indices- In both cases,  the analysis  emphasises the  estimation of 
coverage gaps (a negative indicator of universality) whether due to financial reasons (lack of financia l 
resources to provide the service, as measured against a defined threshold) or to lack of sufficient staff 
Along with the coverage gap index due to financial or staff reasons, we find an indicator of out-of-
pocket expenditure, and for the area of health, an indicator of legal coverage and an indicator of  
output (maternal mortality rate). The ILO does not include an aggregate index for either of the areas 
covered, opting for the presentation of a vector of the indicator above reviewed to approach the degree 
of universal coverage in the different areas. 
It is important to highlight the enormous effort made by the ILO to produce indicators for 186 
countries, albeit with different levels of detail, in order to extend the analysis of coverage and 
adequacy of social protection to developing countries too.  
3.6 Two pragmatic academic proposals to operationalise the concept of 
universal social protection 
Contrasting with the previously reviewed indicators, quasi indicators and potentia l indicators of 
universality, other authors have proposed relatively simpler indexes that can be constructed from the 
already available social protection data. One alternative is the index used by Brady and Bostic (2015) . 
In their analysis of the relationship between welfare transfers, relative poverty and redistribution 
preferences for a relatively large number of countries (up to 37 in one of the empirical e xercises) , 
Brady and Bostic propose a simple indicator resulting from their definition of universality as 
“homogeneity across the population in benefits, coverage, and eligibility” (p. 274 ) . The ind icator is  
defined as the inverse of the coefficient of variation in the amount of transfers received by the 
population. As the coefficient of variation is a relative measure of dispersion, its inverse value would 
be a direct measure of the similarity of the transfers received among the population.  
In their paper updating and revaluating Korpi and Palme’s paradox (see section 4.2), Jacques and Noël 
(2018) approach the measurement of universality with the help of two different indicators. The first is 
a measure of the percentage of social benefits (cash transfers) that are means or income tested , and 
the second a measure of the proportion of private spending on social protection  in re lation  to total 
expenditure (public and private). As the authors highlight,  the second is  a more comprehensive 
indicator of social expenditure, as it includes all types of social expenditure provided by the Welfare 
State. The two indicators are then combined into an aggregate index of un iversality using factor 
analysis. The resulting Universalism Index (36) (UI) is operationalised by the authors negatively, i.e., the 
index reflects the absence of means tested benefits or a large share of private social expenditure.  
Before presenting the results, it is interesting to see how the two indicators relate to  each other. In  
Figure 17 we can see a scatter plot of the two indicators used in the construction of the UI, the role of 
means-tested benefits in overall public social expenditure,  and the importance of p rivate soc ia l 
expenditure in over social expenditure. If we take the average of both indices as a reference, there is a 
large group of European countries, all but the Netherlands, United Kingdom Ireland and,  to a le sser  
extent Denmark, with low levels of means tested programmes’ use and private social expenditure. On 
the other end, the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia show greater recourse to both means-tested and 
private social expenditure, even if with large differences among them exemplified by the cases of US 
and Australia. The remaining countries show different behaviours compared to the core EU countries 
either in terms of the role of private social expenditure (Switzerland and the Netherlands) or according 
to their recourse to means tested programmes (Ireland and New Zealand).  
 
 
                                     
(36)  We respect the  terminology proposed by Jacques and Noël, but we would instead use “universality” when referring to s uch 
a descrip tive measure. 
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Figure 17. Index of Means testing and P rivate social expenditure, 2011 
 
Source : Authors´ analysis from data provided by A. Noël from Jacques and Noël (2018) 
With this background regarding the values of the two components of the  Un iversalism Index (UI) , 
Figure 18 reproduces the UI itself for the 20 countries analysed by Jacques and Noël (2018) for 2011. 
Considering the parsimoniousness of the index, the results, in terms of the ranking of the countries, f it 
rather well with the general qualitative idea of the role played by universal soc ia l provis ions in the 
Welfare States of the countries of the sample. However, as the authors recognize, the index is far from 
perfect, as it only captures the dimension of eligibility.  
Jacques and Noël draw the attention to the fact that the indicator leads to an unusual ranking in terms 
of countries such as Italy or Spain holding top positions, while others, usually high in the rankings of 
welfare state, such as Denmark, are placed in lower than usual positions. In  the Spanish case, the 
result is explained by the very low reliance on private social services, often substituted by se rvices 
provided within the family, while in the Italian, our Austrian case, the result is explained by the low role 
played by means tested social programmes. On the other side, countries re lying more on targeted 
programmes, such as the United States or the United Kingdom are clearly located by the index in  the  
lower part of the table. 
To complete the review of the index, Figure 19 reproduces the evolution of the value of the UI from 
2000 to 2011 for five European countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom,  Ita ly and Spain ),  
representing the Corporate, Liberal and so called “Mediterranean” welfare states, plus Sweden, in order 
to have a representation of the Socialdemocratic welfare state model. Regarding this figure, it is worth 
noticing the stability of the UI during the decade of analysis, with the notable exception  of Denmark, 
with an important drop in the UI explained by the increase in both the share of means-tested benefits  
and by the role of private social expenditure from 8 to 14 per cent from 2006 to 2011, p robably 
related with the changes introduced by the Danish Welfare Agreement approved in 2006.  
In section 4.2 we will have the chance to explore the uses given by these authors to their 
operationalisation. But at this point we can conclude that both are valuable proposals,  if partia l, for 
measuring universality, as they focus on the condition of homogeneity of social provision, the first one, 
and on the eligibility requisite, the second. 
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Figure 18. Jacques and Noël´s Index of Universalism (IU) for 20 OECD countries, 2011 
 
Source : data provided by A. Noël from Jacques and Noël (2018) 
Figure 19. Universalism in 8 EU countries and the United States, 2000 -2011 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Jacques and Noël (2018), p . 77 
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3.7 The European Pillar of Social Rights as a starting point to assess 
universality of social protection in the EU 
Since the late 1990s the EU has been closely monitoring the employment and social performance of 
its Member States in the context of the European Employment Strategy and the Open Method of 
Coordination. In the employment and social domains, this monitoring is done on the basis of the Joint 
Assessment Framework (JAF), an analytical tool based on a set of commonly agreed ind icators 
showing good and bad performance towards the main Europe 2020 targets. In the social realm,  the 
Social Protection Performance Monitor (SPPM) monitors social developments in the EU on an 
annual basis.  
The SPPM was developed in 2012 by the Social Protection Committee and identifies on an annual basis 
the main social trends in the EU on the basis of a dashboard of indicators. The objective of the SPPM 
dashboard is to track annual social trends in the EU. The focus is on both most recent changes and 
changes in comparison to 2008, as the base year for monitoring progress for the social aspects of the 
European 2020 Strategy. The SPPM makes use of the EU portfolio of social indicators, which includes 
an overarching portfolio as well as specific portfolios for social inclusion, pensions, health and long-
term care and investment in children (European Union, 2015). The overarching portfolio,  with 13 key 
dimensions and commonly agreed indicators, is the summary set of indicators to be used for 
monitoring the major social trends in EU countries across the relevant social policy areas. 
In the area of healthcare, the recurring State of Health in the EU cycle gathers the latest evidence on 
health through a joint OECD-European Commission Health at a Glance:  Europe report followed by 
country profiles. The last overarching report was produced in 2018. It inc luded a comprehensive 
overview of indicators along the following dimensions: health status, risk factors, health expenditure  
and financing, effectiveness (with a focus on quality of care and patient experience ),  accessibi lity 
(along the dimensions of affordability, availability and use of se rvices) , and res ilience ( inc luding 
analysis on innovation, efficiency and fiscal sustainability). The overall analytical framework builds on 
the OECD analysis of healthcare systems presented in section 3.2.3. 
A detailed description of the indicators contained in the Joint Assessment Framework,  the Social 
Protection Performance Monitor and the State of Health in the EU cycle is outside the scope of th is 
paper. Combined, they provide a very comprehensive overview of the employment and social situation 
in the Member States.  
Significant additional monitoring efforts have been made in the last few years in conjunction with the 
strong reinforcement of the employment and social dimension of the European Semester  of  
economic policy coordination. A 2013 Communication from the Commission on ‘Strengthening the 
Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union’ paved the way for an enhanced employment 
and social surveillance. In 2015, the ‘Five Presidents’ report’  (Juncker e t a l.2015)  confirmed the  
strategic importance of a stronger social side in the Semester: “For EMU to succeed , labour markets 
and welfare systems need to function well and in a fair manner in all euro area Member States. Hence, 
employment and social concerns must feature highly in the European Semester” (p. 8). The report also  
called for a process of benchmarking to achieve upwards social convergence,  thereby supporting a 
good functioning of EMU. 
The key step in this process was however the proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights , 
with its ambition to promote upward social convergence in the EU (European Commission, 2017) . The 
Pillar has been widely acknowledged as a window of opportunity for relaunching the debate and 
advancing towards the objective of a stronger ‘Social Europe’ and, in particular, towards a more soc ia l 
EMU (Sabato et. al., 2019). The Pillar builds strongly on the Treaty but also the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Social Charte r 
as well as the relevant Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation. It 
proposes 20 principles, structured around three categories: Equal opportun ities and access to the 
labour market, Fair working conditions and Social protection and inclusion. Chapter III is  particu larly 
relevant for universality of social protection (see Box 1).  
The European Pillar of Social Rights clearly acknowledges the right to  soc ia l protection , detailing 
principles in relation to several branches. Summing up its provisions, it sets a high level of ambition in  
requiring the universality of protection in the sense of adequately protecting everyone against a broad 
set of risks. However, it does not sketch out how, and with what means, the existing welfare systems 
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can make these rights effective and address the challenges of the future. The European Pillar of Social 
Rights is therefore a key starting point to further develop universal social protection in  the  EU, as it 
clearly set out the range of benefits and services that should be offered in the EU.  
Box 1. European P illar of Social Rights. Chapter III: Social protection and inclusion  
11. Childcare and support to children  
Children have the right to affordable early childhood education and care of good quality. 
Children have the right to protection from poverty. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds have the  
right to specific measures to enhance equal opportunities. 
12. Social protection 
Regardless of the type and duration of their employment relationship, workers, and, under comparable 
conditions, the self-employed, have the right to adequate social protection. 
13. Unemployment benefits  
The unemployed have the right to adequate activation support from public employment services to 
(re)integrate in the labour market and adequate unemployment benefits of reasonable duration, in line 
with their contributions and national eligibility rules. Such benefits shall not constitute a d isincentive 
for a quick return to employment. 
14. Minimum income 
Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum income benefits ensuring a 
life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services. For those who 
can work, minimum income benefits should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the labour 
market. 
15. Old age income and pensions 
Workers and the self-employed in retirement have the right to  a pension commensurate  to their 
contributions and ensuring an adequate income. Women and men shall have equal opportunities to  
acquire pension rights. 
Everyone in old age has the right to resources that ensure living in dignity. 
16. Health care  
Everyone has the right to timely access to affordable, preventive and curati ve health care of good 
quality. 
17. Inclusion of people with disabilities  
People with disabilities have the right to income support that ensures living in dignity, services that 
enable them to participate in the labour market and in society, and a work envi ronment adapted to 
their needs. 
18. Long-term care  
Everyone has the right to affordable long-term care services of good quality, in particular home-care 
and community-based services. 
19. Housing and assistance for the homeless 
a) Access to social housing or housing assistance of good quality shall be provided for those in need. 
b) Vulnerable people have the right to appropriate assistance and protection against forced eviction.  
c) Adequate shelter and services shall be provided to the homeless in order to promote their social inclusion. 
20. Access to essential services 
Everyone has the right to access essential services of good quality, including water, sanitation, energy, 
transport, financial services and digital communications. Support for access to such services shall be 
available for those in need. 
Source : European Pillar of Social Rights 
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One of the first steps to implement the Pillar principles concerns princ ip le 12, and is  of  particular 
relevance for progress towards universality of social protection. Following a Commission p roposal  
adopted in March 2018, the Council Recommendation on access to  social p rotection for 
workers and the self-employed was formally adopted on 8 November 2019. This Recommendation 
applies to workers and the self-employed, including people transitioning from one status to the other 
or having both statuses, as well as people whose work is interrupted due to the occurrence of one of 
the risks covered by social protection. 
The Council Recommendation represents a first response to the structural changes that have  l eft a 
large segment of EU citizens without adequate social protection, notably among non-standard workers 
(those without open-ended full-time contract with a single employe r) and the self-employed . The 
Recommendation covers the following branches of social protection:  
(a) unemployment benefits;  
(b) sickness and healthcare benefits;  
(c) maternity and equivalent paternity benefits;  
(d) invalidity benefits;  
(e) old-age benefits and survivors’ benefits;  
(f) benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases. 
The Recommendation encourages Member States to:  
(a) Close formal coverage gaps: ensuring that legislation and collective agreement allow 
everyone in employment or self-employment to participate in  the  social security 
schemes; 
(b) Ensure effective and adequate coverage and facilitate transferability of social 
security rights: ensuring that rules governing contributions and entitlements ensure 
the adequacy of protection and do not limit the accrual of entitlements and the 
access to benefits on the basis of employment status or type of employment 
relationship. This represents an important challenge, especially in the countries in  
which non-standard forms of employment are more common, but also for those with 
social protection systems of a contributory nature, in which the benefits obtained by 
citizens throughout their life course are associated to the contributions made in the 
labour market. Consequently, these systems end up benefiting the most to those that 
have had more stable careers and thus are more likely to compromise universality. 
(c) Increase transparency on corresponding systems and rights: ensuring access to user-
friendly information on rights and obligations to social security, irrespective of the 
employment relationship or employment status. 
Implementing the Recommendation and its monitoring framework will thus be  an important step  
towards increasing the degree of universality of current systems, albeit insufficient given the lim ited 
scope of the Recommendation.   
In terms of monitoring, the European Pillar of Social Rights was accompanied by a Social Scoreboard to 
monitor performances and track trends across Member States. The  last Jo int Employment Report 
(European Commission, 2019) explains that the scoreboard provides a number of indicators (headline 
and secondary) to screen the employment and social performance of Member States on selected 
indicators.  
This is done along three dimensions, identified in the context of the Pillar:  
4. equal opportunities and access to the labour market,  
5. dynamic labour markets and fair working conditions, and  
6. public support / social protection and inclusion.  
Since the 2018 edition, the Joint Employment Report includes the social scoreboard. Table 13 
summarises the 14 headline indicators that assess employment and social trends in  support of  the 
EPSR. 
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Table 13. Employment and social headline indicators in the Social Scoreboard  
Equal opportunities and access to the labour market: 
● Share of early leavers from education and training, age 18-24 
● Gender gap in employment rate, age 20-64 
● Income inequality measured as quintile share ratio - S80/S20 
● At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate (AROPE) 
● Young people neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET rate), age 15-24 
Dynamic labour markets and fair working conditions: 
● Employment rate, age 20-64 
● Unemployment rate, age 15-74 
● Long-term unemployment rate, age 15-74 
● Gross disposable income of households in real terms, per capita  
● Net earnings of a full-time single worker without children earning an average wage  
Public support / Social protection and inclusion: 
● Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction  
● Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare  
● Self-reported unmet needs for medical care  
● Share of population with basic overall digital skills or above. 
Source : Joint Employment Report 2020 
Although definitely a step forward in terms of monitoring of social performance, the Scoreboard also 
falls short of providing useful elements to assess universality of soc ial p rotection in the Member 
States. The Pillar, however, has represented an important breakthrough in this direction through the 
reinforcement of benchmarking efforts. Following on the Five Presidents’ Report, the Communication of 
26 April 2017 establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights (European Commission, 2017a) identified 
benchmarking as a key tool to support structural reforms and foster upward convergence in the 
employment and social fields within the European Semester.  
As explained in the Joint Employment Report: “Since then,  benchmarking frameworks have been 
developed and discussed with Member States in several areas, in line with the common approach 
agreed by the Employment Committee (EMCO) and the Social Protection Committee (SPC), focusing on 
the identification of policy levers, which are accompanied by general principles for policy guidance and, 
when available, specific indicators” (p. 28).  
The benchmarking framework on unemployment benefits and active labour market policies  
was first used in the 2018 European Semester, and it does come closer to  the type of analysis  of  
universality that this report proposes. The framework includes indicators on the generosity and 
coverage of unemployment benefits and related activation policies, thereby representing a f irst step 
towards assessing universality of the programme in the Member States. In particular, the framework 
uses the following indicators (European Commission, 2017c): 
● three outcome indicators (unemployment rate, long-term unemployment and at-risk-of-poverty rate 
of the unemployed),  
● two performance indicators (share of people wanting to work participating in regular activation 
measures and coverage of unemployed with unemployment duration shorter than 12 months by 
unemployment benefits);  
● and three policy lever indicators, notably in the domain of unemployment benefits (replacement 
rate, eligibility conditions and benefit duration).  
This allows a comprehensive assessment of both coverage and adequacy, as well as duration (see 
figure 20), which sets the basis to define the degree of universality of Member States’ unemployment 
benefits systems on the basis of the proposal we present in the last chapter of this report. 
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The benchmarking framework on minimum income , covering the adequacy, coverage and 
activation components of minimum income schemes, also goes in this direction. It was fully integrated 
in the 2019 Semester, together with the benchmarking framework on adult skills  and learning . The 
framework covers adequacy, coverage and activation components of minimum i ncome schemes, 
including as concerns their relation with in-kind services (healthcare, education and housing).  
This benchmarking framework focuses on minimum income benefits for the working age population 
with working ability not in employment and not entitled, nor eligible or having exhausted entitlements 
to social insurance benefits. It includes:  
● Three outcome indicators: the relative at-risk-of-poverty gap for the working-age popula tion  (16 -
64), the material and social deprivation rate of the working age population (18-64) and the at-risk-
of-poverty rate of the population living in quasi jobless households (18-59).  
● Six performance indicators: the impact of social transfers on the at -risk-of-poverty rate, the 
persistent poverty rate, the benefit recipiency rate. The other three concern se l f -r e po r te d unme t  
needs for medical examination, housing cost overburden rate, and  non-participation in training 
related to professional activity.  
● As far as policy levers, then main areas identified were the adequacy of the benefit level, eligib il it y 
rules and take-up, as well as activation and access to services. Concerning adequacy of benefits, 
two indicators were agreed: 1) the income of a minimum income beneficiary as a share of the 
poverty threshold (smoothed over three years) and 2) the income of a minimum income beneficiary 
as a share of the income of a low wage earner (a person earning 50 % of the average  wage ).  No  
indicators were agreed for eligibility and take-up and for activation and access to services in the 
benchmarking framework.  
Work is currently ongoing on additional benchmarking frameworks for possible use in future Semester 
cycles, notably within EMCO on minimum wages and on mapping collective bargaining, and within SPC 
on pension adequacy and on childcare and support to children. Significant efforts are also being made 
for the development of indicators on long-term care. Finally, it is worth noticing that in the area of 
pensions the EU has wide-ranging and sophisticated monitoring mechanisms that go a long way in  
defining the key dimensions of universality. In particular, the triennial Pension Adequacy Reports  
analyse how current and future pensions help prevent old-age poverty and maintain the income of 
men and women for the duration of their retirement. This report will not analyse the area in detail. 
To conclude, the EU efforts to monitor the employment and social performance of its Member States 
outlined above are becoming more ambitious and comprehensive. However, they continue to fall short 
of providing adequate metrics to assess the degree of universality of any given social programme or 
Welfare State. This underlines the importance of developing approaches like the one presented in 
chapter 5 of this report.  
Figure 20. Dimensions of analysis of unemployment benefits benchmarking according to the JER  
(a) Coverage of unemployment benefits for the short-term unemployed 
 
Source : Eurostat, LFS data. Note: data not available  for IE and NL. Data for IT and MT refers to 2017.  
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(b) Length of the required qualifying period, 2016 and 2018 (in weeks) 
 
Source : MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection) database, and national legislation.  
Note : In Malta (2018), the minimum qualifying crite ria are 50 weeks of paid contributions of which at least 20 paid or credited in 
the  previous 2 calendar years; in Ireland (2016 and 2018), at least 104 weekly contributions must have been paid since the 
person first started work. 
(c) Maximum duration (weeks) of benefits with a 1-year work record, 2017, and 2018 
 
Source : MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection) database and national legislation (January 2017 and January 
2018).  
Note : In Belgium, there is no limit on the duration of benefits. In Cyprus, weeks are  calculated on the basis of 6 working days per 
week. In Ire land, benefit is paid for 39 weeks (234 days) only for people with 260 or more weekly PRSI contributions paid .  
In Slovakia, a person with a one-year record cannot qualify for unemployment benefits (at least 2 years of unemployment 
insurance contributions during the last 4 years are re quired. In Poland, duration varies d epending o n th e  le v e l o f th e  
unemployment rate  of the region re lative to the national average. 
(d) Net replacement rate of unemployment benefits at 67% of the average wage, at the 
2nd and 12th month of unemployment (2019) 
 
Source : European Commission based on OECD Tax-Benefit Model.  
Note : The indicator is calculated for the  case of a single person without children with a short work history (1 year) and aged 2 0 .  
Further methodological details in footnote.  
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3.8 Summary and conclusions 
As we have seen in this chapter, the lack of a single, generally accepted measure of universal 
protection does not mean that we are orphan of proposals to measure the degree of un iversality of  
different social programmes, with different levels of ambition and from different perspectives . That 
being said, it has to be acknowledged that in these times of increasing interest on the measurement of 
socio-economic concepts, from sustainable development to  job quality,  f rom soc ia l exclus ion to  
economic wellbeing, the literature and proposals of indicators of universal socia l protection are not 
precisely abundant.  
To recapitulate, table 14 summarises the key proposals of measurement of different social protection  
programmes that directly or indirectly can be used to assess their level of universality. As we can see, 
the areas of pensions and UBs are probably the ones already equipped with better instruments to 
estimate their degree of universality, including at EU level. In contrast, the measurement of universality 
in sick pay faces the problem of determining the potentially e ligible population , as the availab le 
information focuses on those with a certified sickness or disability and e ligible for p rotection. The  
measurement of universal protection of health has also been explored in detail by the WHO and the 
OCDE, among others. The main problem to overcome here is the definition of adequacy as well as the 
role played by private provision. The rest of the areas included in the table have been subject, to  our 
knowledge, to less intensive measurement analysis. Other areas of social intervention, such as housing 
and virtually the entire realm of social services, have been left out of the table and out of the review 
of this chapter, since we could not find proposals of indicators to measure their degree of universality 
of social provision. In spite of that, as we have seen in section 2.1, housing is  an area where public  
intervention has relatively high citizen support, although traditionally the debate on universal soc ia l 
protection has focused on other areas such as those mentioned in table 14. In fact, there are several 
publications aiming at placing the different existing housing policies within the map of Welfare State  
models (e.g. Kemeny, 1995, 2006, Lennartz, 2011, Malpass, 2008). Nevertheless, we  have not been 
able to find specific proposals of indicators trying to measure to what extent housing is  subject to 
universal, as opposed to selective (37), interventions in the different Welfare States. Potential indicators 
of universality for this area of intervention could include affordability indices, overcrowding and under-
housing indicators, homelessness, etc.  
Another area excluded from the table due to its traditional consideration as out of the scope of social 
protection is education. However, there are several proposals of indicators of universality that 
approximate what in our terminology would be coverage and adequacy. Coverage in term of the share 
of children and youngsters attending school and getting the corresponding degrees, and adequacy in 
terms of the acquisition of the required knowledge. In relation to the first domain, there are p lenty of 
indicators that could be used, such as percentage of children attending childcare from 0 -3 and early 
childhood education from 3 to the age for starting compulsory primary education, early school leaving 
rates, etc. For the second domain, adequacy, other indicators would have to be used combining results  
in terms of literacy, mathematics, etc., and their distribution among students, to address the issue of 
homogeneity of the service provided. A detailed account of the indicators candidate for measuring 
universal learning can be found in LMTF (2013). 
To wrap up this chapter, we believe that the cases discussed in these  pages are  rich enough, and 
sufficiently coherent, to allow us to present a number of conclusions, as key elements to be 
considered for the development of an index of universal of social protection , to  be furthe r 
developed in chapter 5.  
● The first conclusion is that although universal social protection is a difficult concept to 
operationalise, universality is susceptible to measurement , with all the standard caveats.  
● The second conclusion is that progress in the measurement of universality requires to  advance  in  
two different areas: coverage and adequacy.  
● The third one is that the area of adequacy is more straightforward in the case of monetary 
transfers than in the case of services.  
                                     
(37)  Following Bengtsson (2001) a selective housing policy could be defined by intervention aimed at p rotectin g “ minimu m 
rights for households of lesser means”, to “those in need of ‘our’ support”, while universal housing policy would imp ly  t h e 
assumption of housing as a social right, leading to the recognition of “obligation of the state towards socie ty as a whole” in 
terms of housing, adjusting the housing market “so that demands of all types of households” can be met in that market.  
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● The fourth one is that the measurement of universal social protection should cover all 
public social programmes, and not only those relying on monetary transfers.  
Table 14. Summary of indicators of universal social protection 
Area Author/s Elements considered 
Problems/Commen
ts 
Unemployment 
Esping-Andersen, 
Scrugg & Allen, 
OECD, ILO, EU 
Coverage * and Replacement rates  
Pensions 
Esping-Andersen, 
Scrugg & Allen, 
OECD, ILO, EU 
Coverage* and Replacement rates  
Sick Pay 
Esping-Andersen, 
Scrugg & Allen, 
ILO 
Replacement rates, qualifying period, and benefit 
duration 
No coverage rate 
(lack of info on 
target population) 
Health Care 
OCDE, EU 
Coverage for core health services 
Share of public spending of total health 
spending 
Quality indicators 
Definition of 
adequacy 
 
The role of private 
provision  
WHO 
Effective coverage = f (availability + quality) 
Impact on household finances (financia l stress 
indicators) 
Global Coalition 
for the Social 
Protection Floor 
Gaps in health security = public health 
expenditure gap & allocation gap 
ILO 
Deficit in terms of legal coverage, staff, financial 
resources; out of pocket expenditure, and 
maternal mortality ratio 
Social Assistance 
Global Coalition 
for the Social 
Protection Floor, 
EU 
Social Protection Floor Index, SPFI = % of GDP 
required to lift all people at poverty risk above 
the poverty line 
Adequacy, coverage, and activation components 
Measurement of 
universality 
(coverage & 
adequacy) in 
terms of results.  
Child and family ILO Coverage 
Measurement of 
adequacy 
Long term care ILO 
Coverage gap due to financia l resources and 
staff deficit; Out of pocket expenditure  
Measurement of 
adequacy 
(*) Plus other indicators (duration, qualifying period, e tc.)  that have an impact on coverage .  
Source : Authors’ own elaboration 
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A final comment to be made is that some of the proposals reviewed in the previous pages incorporate  
private-market provision in the measures of universal social protection. In this regard, hypothetically 
there are two different ways in which the market could affect the effective level of universal socia l 
protection: by making public social programmes less necessary (in the case, for example,  of  a very 
inclusive labour market where unemployment risks are lower), and by making social needs easy to  
cover privately (for instance, if private insurance is affordable for the majority of the population). 
Indeed, markets can affect the distribution and levels of risks and social needs. However, we  are  not 
discussing the level of risks faced by individuals, but the universality of social protection, and thus the 
focus should be on the protection that people have if everything (including the market) fa ils . In  th is 
regard the questions of vulnerability and distribution of risks, although interesting, should be c learly 
differentiated from the question of how encompassing and universal is the system of social protection 
for the protection of a given social contingency (unemployment, sickness, disability, etc.). As we already 
mentioned several times, our proposal focuses on the measurement of universality i n public s ocial 
protection. 
But before further developing our proposal, the following chapter will review some of the items that 
conform to the debate about the pros and cons of universal social p rotection compared to other 
approaches to social needs.  
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4 The debate regarding the pros and cons of universal social 
protection 
The debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of universal social p rotection vis  a vis  
alternative strategies of social protection, such as targeted programmes aimed at specific groups and 
social risk, is as old as the Welfare State. In this regard, in the early 20th Century, the British h istorian  
R.H. Tawney (1880-1962) argued in what he referred to as "the strategy of equality"  that a society 
should involve "the pooling of its surplus resources by means of taxation, and the use of the funds thus 
obtained to make accessible to all, irrespective of their income, occupation,  or social position , the 
conditions of civilization which, in the absence of such measures, can be en joyed only by the rich"  
(Tawney 1952:130, as quoted in Korpi and Palme, 1998 ).  
As argued in the first part of this report, universal social programmes are underpinned by the premise 
that access to certain services or goods should be guaranteed to every person regardless of his or her 
situation in the labour market or his or her financial situation, and the idea that everybody should be 
protected from certain risks. From this perspective, we could say that universalism of social protection 
is a matter of values and beliefs on what makes a good society, more than an operational question,  
regarding the best way to reach a certain level of social protection. Nevertheless,  the debate about 
universalism comprises many side issues. In what follows we will focus on three of them: f irst, the 
question of the take-up rates; second, the implications of universalist versus targeted social 
programmes in the fight against poverty, and third, the issue of work incentives. 
The reader will notice that this section directly tackles the issue of universalism as an aspiration  and 
policy principle, rather than universality as a way of characterising socia l programmes or systems. 
Thus, the discussion will be more policy-oriented than the rest of the paper. 
4.1 The question of the take-up rates 
By the question of the take-up rates, we mean the possibility that not all the people eligible for a 
given social programme will end up being covered by it. The issue of take-up rates is  mostly 
relevant for non-universal programmes, as in the case of universal programmes the delivery of the 
service or transfer can be taken as granted. In principle, as we will see further down, this should reduce 
the impact of the factors considered in the literature of non-take up rates of social benefits. 
The estimation of non-take up rates (NTU) is a complex process, as it requires to  compare the total 
number of people receiving a given social benefit (whether in cash or kind) with the number of people 
eligible according to the requisites of the programme. The first part is usually not problematic,  as the 
administration has records regarding the number of recipients. A different question is the estimation of 
the people eligible, because it requires a detailed knowledge of the spec ific c ircumstances of the 
would-be recipients in order to evaluate whether they meet the requirements set by the p rogramme. 
Fortunately, there is a growing literature, carefully surveyed in Eurofound (2015),  that a llows us to  
present estimates of the NTU rates of many social programmes in different countries of the European 
Union. Table 15, taken from Eurofound (2015) with few additions and updates, shows that NTU rates 
are an important, non-marginal, issue, with NTU rates higher than 50% for many programmes.  
Table 15a. Conservative estimates non take-up, NTU, rates identified in literature, 2003-2017*   
Country Benefit 
Year 
(latest) 
NTU Reference 
Austria 
Subsistance support (Hilfe zur Sicherung des 
Lebensunterhalts) 
2003 56% Fuchs, 2007 
Minimum income benefit  30% Fuch et al. 2019 
Belgium 
Guaranteed income (Leefloon/Revenu 
d’intégration) 
2005 57% 
Bouckaert & 
Schokakert, 2011 
Unemployment benefit for 18-24-year-o ld 2007 13% Van Hemel et al., 2009 
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with low 
education (Wachtuitkering) 
Bulgaria 
Heating allowance 
2007 
 
Over 60% 
Tasseva, 2013 
Child allowance 39% 
Benefit for young children Over 60% 
Guaranteed minimum income Over 60% 
Czech Republic 
Housing allowance 2010 70% 
Jahoda & Špalková, 
2012 
Material need benefit (sociální dávky hmotné 
nouze) 
2010/11 72% Horáková et al. 2013 
Finland 
Social assistance for people with low incomes 
and high 
costs 
2003 40% Bargain et al. 2007 
France Minimum guaranteed income (RSA) 2010 64% Domingo & Pucci, 2014 
Germany 
Social assistance (Grundsicherung) for the 
employable (benefits for long term 
unemployed as well as for employed person 
with income below the minimum subsistence 
level), for persons beyond the legal retirement 
age (65+) and in cases of permanent earning 
incapacity, and for some specia l cases , for 
example for long-term disabled persons 
younger than 
18 (disabled since birth). 
2007 
41%* 
 
 
 
46%** 
*Becker, 2012 
 
 
**Bruckmeier & 
Wiemers, 2012 
Unemployment Benet II (Arbeitslosengeld II ). 2005/14 56% Harnish, 2019 
Greece 
Minimum pension supplement (ΕΚΑΣ) 2004 60% Matsaganis et al.2010 
Pension benefit to uninsured elderly (Σvνταξη 
ανασϕαλÍστων υπερηλÍκων) 
2004 29% Matsaganis et al. 2010 
Hungary 
Regular social assistance (rendszeres szociális 
sagely) 
2003 43% Firle & Szabo, 2007 
Ireland Family Income Supplement 2005 70% Callan& Keane, 2008 
Luxembourg 
Minimum guaranteed income (revenu 
minimum garanti) 
2007 65% Amétépé, 2012 
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Table 15b. Conservative estimates non take-up, NTU, rates identified in literature, 2004-2014*                                                                                                                                                     
Country Benefit 
Year 
(latest) 
NTU Reference 
Netherlands 
Special subsistence benefit for participation  
of school- going children (Categoriale 
bijzondere bijstand voor de participatie van 
schoolgaande kinderen) 
2008 47% 
Tempelman et al. 
2011 
Law on contribution to education and school 
costs (wet tegemoetkoming 
onderwijsbijdrage en schoolkosten, WTOS) 
2003 34 % 
Wildeboer Schut 
and 
Hoff, 2007 
Housing benefit (Huurtoeslag) 
Mid- 2008 
until mid-2009 
18% 
Tempelman et al. 
2011 
Health-Care allowance (Zorgtoeslag) 2008 17% 
Tempelman et al. 
2011 
Special subsistance benefit (Individuele 
bijzondere bijstand) 
2008 43% 
Tempelman et al. 
2011 
Long-term supplement 
(Langdurigheidstoeslag) 
2008 59% 
Tempelman et al. 
2011 
 
2003 54% 
Tempelman 
and Houkes 2012 
Portugal Minimum guaranteed income (RMG) 2001 72% Rodrigues, 2008 
Slovakia 
Benefit in Material Need (pomoc v hmotnej 
núdzi 
2009 79% World Bank, 2011 
Spain 
Minimum pension supplement 
(complementos por mínimos) 2004 
 
20% 
Matsaganis et al. 
2010 
Pension benefit to uninsured elderly (pensión 
de jubilación no contributiva) 40% 
UK 
Income support/Employment & support 
allowance 
2016/17 
12% 
DWP, 2018 
Jobseeker’s allowance 39% 
Housing benefit 20% 
Pension credit 40% 
Income Support/ related Employment and 
Support Allowance 
20% 
Basic state pension 2009/10 3% Baumberg et al. 
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Child benefit 2009/10 4% 
2012 
 
Tax credits for families with children 2009/10 6% 
Tax credits for people without children 2009/10 71% 
Family Credit and Working Families’ Tax 
Credit 
2002 47% 
Adam & Brewer, 
2005 
* Gaps between entitlements and take -up; the most conservative estimates for each study have been reported.  
Source : Eurofound (2015), p. 12-13, Harnisch (2019), Fuch et al. 2019, and DWP (2018). 
The table also shows how, for a given country, NTU rates are very different across programmes. In this 
regard, according to the UK Department of Work and Pensions (DWP, 2018) NTU rates were as “low” as 
12% in the case of Income support/Employment & support allowance, while as high as 40% for the 
families entitled to pension credit and not receiving it. In the case of the Netherlands the range of NTU 
for different programmes goes from 17% (Care benefit-Zorgtoeslag) to 59% (Long-term supplement-
Langdurigheidstoeslag). For comparison, the US Department of Health and Human Services estimates 
a NTU rate for the major social assistance cash programme in the USA, the Temporary Ais to  Needy 
Families, TANF, of 34% (DHHS, 2014). 
The literature points to three different drivers of NTU rates (Hernanz et al., 2004, Van Mechelen 
and Janssens, 2017): lack of information or information costs, process costs and 
psychological and social cost. Access to information regarding social programmes is obviously the  
first requisite to avert NTU. Information is important not only in terms of knowing about the existence 
of a programme, but also in terms of the feelings of the potential beneficiarie s in  relation to  the ir 
chances of being awarded the benefit. In this regard, accord ing to  the study of Tempelman and 
Houkes-Hommes (2012) of NTU rates of the Dutch Health-Care Allowance, those likely to believe they 
are not entitled to the benefit have much lower take-up rates. In this regard , Currie  (2004) or Van 
Oorschot (2002) show that lack of information is a more significant issue for small, marginal soc ia l 
programmes than for large programmes. Therefore, this requisite would be more easily met in the case 
of universal programmes, which are by definition larger programmes where  everybody is,  a lso by 
definition, likely to be eligible.  
The second driver of NTU is high transaction costs related to the administrative application procedure 
and the gathering of all the required information. In the te rms used by Tempelman and Houkes -
Hommes (2012), the most common explanation of NTU “is that people make a rational choice between 
the utility they expect from the benefit and the effort required for take-up (transaction costs).” (p.703). 
For example, according to the survey of Currie (2002) of take-up rates of social programmes in the UK 
and the USA, NTU rates are lower in those programmes with automatic or de fault enrolment and 
higher when administrative barriers are imposed. In this regard, although there is debate about the role 
played by the improvement of economic conditions and the increase in the cost in the dramatic drop in 
recipients of TANF after its reform in the 1990s, there seems to be an agreement that “at least a third  
and probably as much as two thirds of the decline is due to `reforms´ which increased the cost of 
using the programme” (Currie, 2002, p. 13). 
Together with the above-mentioned drivers, stigma is also an important element to  consider when 
explaining low NTU rates. Stigma operates in three different spheres. Firstly, there might be a private 
or intimate stigma, related to the shame that the beneficiary would feel in the case of receiving the 
benefit. Secondly, there might be a social stigma explained by what “other people” will th ink of the 
recipient of a given social programme, and the corresponding fear of losing social status. And th i rdly, 
there might be an institutional stigma, related to the process of claiming benefits and product of  the 
lack of privacy and the need to expose private information to the case workers, long waiting lines, and 
the feeling of being looked down by the staff in charge of administering the benefits (Baumberg et al., 
2012). As argued by Van Mechelen and Janssens (2017), stigma draws from many sources, going from 
a wish not to be associated with the group of claimants (Besley and Coate, 1992) to the fear of losing 
the respect of peers or being humiliated by social workers.  
For example, regarding the last-mentioned item, according to a Ipsos MORI survey on the stigma 
attached to claiming benefits in the UK conducted in May 2012 and analysed by Baumberg et al. 
(2012) up to 46% of respondents strongly disagreed with the statement “People are generally treated 
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with respect when they claim benefits” (p. 20). The important role played by stigma/psychological costs 
– estimated to be four times larger than the time cost of applying for the programme - is underlined 
by Manchester and Munford (2012) after analysing the two US food assistance programmes: the food 
stamp programme and the Special Supplemental Nutrition  Programme for Women, Infants , and 
Children.   
Looking at table 14 and at the high NTU it is difficult to understand why the debate regarding many 
social assistance programmes is dominated by the idea that there is a large percentage of fraud , and 
by the need to improve control mechanisms, when the data seems to  point prec isely in the other 
direction. This emphasis on fraud control is probably behind the last source of NTU, wrong denials of  
the benefits to eligible claimants (see, e.g., Eubank, 2017).  
The existence of non-marginal NTU, together with the high managing cost of many of the programmes, 
can be considered as an argument in favour of universal programmes, although clearly not the most 
important one.   
4.2 Poverty rates under universal and targeted social assistance 
In 1998, the Swedish sociologists Walter Korpi and Joaquim Palme published a paper titled “The 
Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions , Inequality and 
Poverty in the Western Countries”, reviewing the existing evidence regard ing the e ffectiveness of 
universal social programmes versus programmes targeted to low-income groups in f ighting poverty 
and inequality. Among other things, Korpi and Palme produced new estimates of income redistribution 
and concentration of transfer incomes for a sample of eleven high-income countries in order to  test, 
paraphrasing Titmuss (1974), the capacity of “different models of social policy to reduce inequality and 
poverty in the capitalist democracies” (p. 664). From a purely theoretical and caeteris paribus 
perspective, a given amount of money targeted to the population at risk of poverty and with lower 
income would necessarily have a higher impact on inequality and poverty rates than the same amount 
of money allocated to a larger group of people, including many citizens with higher incomes. But Korpi 
and Palme’s results challenged this conclusion, as according to the authors , “ the more we target 
benefits at the poor only (…) the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality ” (p. 681-
682).  
This section will present the arguments put forward by the authors to  explain what they call the 
“Paradox of Redistribution” and review to what extent their conclusion is  still valid more than two 
decades after its formulation. This debate is relevant as often universality has been criticized for its  
lack of success in fighting poverty, precisely for distributing the available scarce resources among the 
whole population instead of concentrating them on those most in need. For example,  as quoted by 
Korpi and Palme (1998), Goodin and Le Grand (1987) argue that “the beneficial involvement of the 
non-poor in the welfare state is not merely wasteful -it is actually counterproductive” (p. 215) . But 
before doing that, we will briefly present a radiography of the importance of targeted programmes in 
European welfare states versus those of universal or quasi-universal nature, addressed to  a wider 
constituency.  
The available information produced by Eurostat does not include detailed statistics on targeted socia l 
programmes. The closer we can get to a measure of the relative importance in  the EU of targeted 
social programmes using available secondary data is the data on means-tested benefit. “Although for 
many targeting and means-testing are virtually synonymous” (Smolensky, Reilly and Evenhouse, 1995, 
p. 4), targeting is a broader term, as there are other possible variables, apart from income, to select the 
population eligible for a given programme (e.g. rural versus urban population) . Furthermore,  even 
universal programmes can be targeted, as in the case of the demographic groups such as ch ildren 
under x age, or pregnant women. In any case, excluding these specific programmes (often un iversal 
within a given demographic group), means-testing or income-targeting is generally the most re levant 
targeting mechanism. Therefore, in this section we will rely on the index of means -tested soc ia l 
expenditure as share of total expenditure as a primer to the importance of means-tested programmes 
in the EU.     
Starting with the overall role of means-tested social expenditure, Figure 21 reproduces the share of 
expenditure in means-tested programmes over total social expenditure for the EU plus the UK, Norway, 
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Switzerland and Iceland. As we can see, with the exception of Denmark (38), Ireland,  Ice land and the 
United Kingdom, most of the countries analysed have a share of means -tested social e xpenditure 
below the 12% EU-28 average. 
Figure 21. Means-tested social expenditure as percentage of total social expenditure, EEE, 2017.  
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from Eurostat 
In any case, means-testing has very different incidence by area of social protection. As shown in Figure 
22, it is dominant in Social Assistance and Housing, 83% and 100% respectively, common in  Family,  
Disability and Unemployment (from ¼ to 1/3) and marginal in Old age and Sickness. 
Figure 22. Share of means-tested programmes by area of social protection, EU-28, 2017. 
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from Eurostat 
 
                                     
(38)  And only since 2007, as before  this date Denmark had a share of expenditure on means-tested socia l p rogramme  well 
be low the EU (15) average (3% vs 11%). 
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In fact, as we can see in Figure 23, social programmes that rely in means-testing usually belong to  
areas of social intervention with lower incidence in terms of expenditure.  
Figure 23. Means tested programmes and social expenditure by area of social protection. EU-28, 2017 
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from Eurostat 
The last figure in this overview offers a first approach to the relationship between poverty rates and 
the share of cash means-tested social expenditure over total cash social programmes. As we can see 
in Figure 24, which reproduces a biplot of the two variables, the apparent inverse relation between the 
variables disappears completely when we exclude from the data the two obvious outlie rs:  Denmark,  
and especially, Iceland, leaving a R2 of 0.01. Further down, we will review in more detail the 
relationship between these two variables with a less coarse empirical approach. 
Figure 24. Share of cash means tested social benefits of total cash social benefits  and poverty rate, EEE, 2017. 
 
Source : Authors’ analysis from Eurostat. 
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Table 16. The Paradox of Redistribution revisited: summary of literature  
 Sample, data, and methodology Results 
(a) At the level of the whole welfare state 
Nelson (2007) 
Analysis of the vulnerability of social insurance vs 
means tested benefits to cutbacks in 18 OECD 
countries 1990-2002 
Targeted benefits are not more resistant to cutbacks and retrenchment than 
universal provisions. The later are slightly resilient as socia l insurance stands a 
better chance of surviving periods of retrenchment 
Kenworthy (2011) 
Same 10 countries than in K&P. but for longer period 
1980-2005 and methodology: index of concentration 
for targeting/universalism and difference market and 
post-tax and transfers Gini for redistribution. 
For 1980,1985, 1995 same results than K&P, but the positive re lation between 
universalism and redistribution disappears for 2000 and is very weak for 2005. “The 
relationship between targeting-universalism and the size of the redistributive budget 
weakens considerably over time, until by the mid-2000s the positive association has 
disappeared” (p.56).  
Brady & Bosnic (2015) 
Survey data (LIS) and ISSP data for redistribution 
preferences. 37 countries (20 rich democracies) for the 
analysis of the impact of universality vs targeting on 
poverty and 25 countries for the analysis of 
preferences. Same index than K&P for targeting, and a 
new indicator of universality 
K&P paradox is not robust to the increase in the number of countries Poverty is  
negatively associated with transfer share and unive rsalism and universalism is  
positively associated with transfer share. But redistribution p references are not 
related to transfer share or universalism and low-income targeting is neither 
positively associated with poverty nor negatively associated with transfer share 
McKnight (2015) 
UK, Sweden, France and Italy, from 1970’s to  2000’s 
depending of the country. 
The within country across time evidence presented does not support the case that 
greater targeting is more effective at reducing poverty or inequality 
Mark, Salanauskaite & 
Verbist (2016) 
Aggregate and disaggregate analysis (old-age pensions, 
family benefits,and a residual category of other 
active age benefits) of 24 countries circa 2005. 
The overall relationship between pro-poor targeting and income inequality reduction 
is very weak, but targeting is an important tool of redistribution within most 
redistributive systems perspective 
Jacques & Noël (2017) 
20 OECD countries, 2000-2011. Direct test using a 
Universalism Index. Panel data. 
Universalism matters for redistribution, the size of the redistributive budget, poverty 
reduction and inequality levels. “When placed in a macro -institutional, where i t 
belongs, the paradox of redistributionstill seems relevant”. (p. 81). 
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Table 16. The Paradox of Redistribution revisited: summary of literature (continued) 
 Sample, data, and methodology Results 
(b) At the level of specific areas of social policy 
Corak, Lietz & 
Sutherland (2005) 
Age incidence of government taxes and transfers in  
2001 in 15 EU countries using EUROMOD, a static 
microsimulation model designed for the purposes of 
comparative fiscal analysis in the European Union  
 
Countries with the lowest poverty rates are those in which children large ly benefit 
from other transfers not necessarily directed to them. These countries mainly make 
use of universal benefits and tax concessions. This is  in  contrast with countries 
targeting income to children in poverty, where levels of spending may be 
comparable, but child poverty rates are higher. 
Van Lancker, Ghysels 
& Cantillon (2015) 
The impact of child benefits on single mother poverty in 
15 European countries for 2008 
Although spending on child benefits is strongly associated with poverty reduction 
among single mothers, targeting child benefit towards single mothers might be a 
good strategy as well, especially if benefit levels are sufficiently generous. The best 
results are found in countries that combine a universal system of child benefits with 
generous benefits targeted specifically towards single mothers (Norway,  Denmark,  
Finland) or in countries with generous benefits for all (Ireland and to a lesser degree  
UK 
Van Lancker & Van 
Mechelen (2015): 
 
EU (25) + Norway, with SILC 2009 and CSB MIPI 
database, with an indicator of targeting that captures 
the design of child benefit systems instead of the 
outcomes  
Targeting towards lower incomes is associated with higher levels  of ch ild poverty 
reduction, conditional on the direction of targeting and the characteristics  of the 
benefit system. The best performing countries are actually countries with a system 
of targeting within universalism. In these countries, two channels of poverty 
reduction are simultaneously at play: they combine high redistributive budgets with 
higher benefit levels for low income families 
Source : Author’s e laboration from cited references. 
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As mentioned in the introductory paragraphs to this section, in their 1998 paper, Korpi and Palme argued that 
social models based on universalism, by “having the most favourable outcomes in terms of the formation of 
cross-class coalitions” (p. 672), will allow a larger redistributive budget, compensating the lack of targe ting 
with a larger redistributive pie. This would lead to better outcomes in te rms of poverty and inequality, 
compared to targeted systems where, although the money is directed to the needy, the smaller s ide of the 
redistributive budget will lead to weaker redistribution (“the greater the degree of low-income targe ting, the 
smaller the budget tends to be”, p. 672). 
Korpi and Palme show, for a sample of 11 high-income OECD countries, that universalist Welfare States have 
better results in terms of reduction of income inequality and poverty that low-profile Welfare States focused 
on targeted social programmes. They reach this conclusion using data on the size of the redistributive budget, 
the difference between the Gini Index of market and disposable income (as a measure of the redistributive 
impact of taxes and transfers) and an indicator of the degree of targeting of transfers (a concentration  
coefficient, CC, that takes negative values when income is targeted to individuals with low income, pos itive 
values when transfers are concentrated on those with higher income and zero when transfers have no impact 
on income distribution (39)). 
This result is the product of the existence of trade-offs (through the level of support of redistributive policies 
of the population) between the size of the redistributive budget (the most relevant variable in explaining the 
redistribution effort) and the intensity of targeting, whereby highly targeted systems have small redistributive 
budgets, resulting in higher poverty and inequality compare to universalist welfare states. This is the origin of 
the so-called Paradox of Redistribution: “the more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned 
we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to  reduce poverty and 
inequality” (p. 681-2). 
Korpi and Palme’s paper, with more than seventeen thousand citations up today (Google scholar, May 2020) , 
remained largely unchallenged for a long time, while other studies (Nelson, 2007) added arguments in favour 
of universalism based on the higher level of resilience of universal social programmes in periods of 
retrenchment of social provisions. Their approach has however been challenged by different papers published 
in the last decade which questioned both the arguments put forward by Korpi and Palme and their 
conclusions. The publication of these papers, a selection of which are summarised in Table 16 , sparked a 
revival of the debate regarding the merits of universal vs targeted programmes in terms of 
inequality and poverty reduction.  
The criticism of the Redistribution Paradox followed different venues. Several authors argued that Korpi and 
Palme’s result was contingent on the relatively small sample of countries used in  the  analysis  and/or the  
period considered. In this regard, the replication of Korpi and Palme’s analysis made by Kenworthy (2011) 
for the same sample of countries, but a longer period of time (1980-2005), concluded that the paradox holds 
for 1980, 1985 and 1995 but the positive relationship between universalism and redistribution disappears for 
2000 and is very weak for 2005: “The relationship between targe ting-universalism and the s ize of the 
redistributive budget weakens considerably over time, until by the mid-2000s the positive association has 
disappeared” (p.56). 
In turn, Brady and Bosnic (2015) put Korpi and Palme’s results to the test of  inc reasing the number of 
countries to a total 37 (including 20 rich democracies), including in the analysis a new indicator of universality 
(see section 3.6) that complements the concentration index used to measure low-income targeting. According 
to their results, Korpi and Palme’s paradox is not robust to the increase in the number of countries. Although 
as argued by Korpi and Palme, poverty is negatively associated with the transfer share, and un iversalism is 
positively associated with it, low-income targeting is neither positively associated with poverty nor negatively 
associated with the transfer share. The authors conclude that differences in results between their analys is  
and Korpi and Palme’s “mostly result” from a combination of narrowness of their sample of countries and the 
changing of the relationship of the variable through time.  
In addition, Brady and Bosnic expand the analysis of Korpi and Palme in order to  test,  us ing data for 25 
countries from the ISSP2006, the argument put forward by the authors to explain the paradox: the existence 
of higher preference towards redistribution in Welfare States with universal social systems,  as universality 
affects “the definitions of interests and coalition formation among citizens (…) which in turn  will have 
consequences for the size of budgets available for redistribution and the final degree of redistribution  that 
allow higher redistributive budgets” (Korpi and Palme, 1998, p. 682). In this regard, accord ing to  Brady and 
                                     
(39)  This index, also known as the Kakwani index (Kakwani, 1977), ranges from -1, when the poorest person receives all transfers, to +1, 
when the richest person receives all transfers  
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Bosnic’s analysis, while low-income targeting is negatively correlated with support for redistribution, 
universalism is not positively correlated with support for redistribution, and neither is the transfer share.  
Brady and Bosnic conclude their paper by presenting two new paradoxes suggested by their results:  (1) the 
non-complementarity paradox, that emphasizes the mismatch between what matters for poverty reduction 
(the size of the transfer budget) and what matters for redistribution preferences, and (2) the undermining 
paradox related to the fact that the dimension (transfer share) that most reduces poverty is  posi tively 
correlated with the one dimension (low-income targeting) that reduces support for redistribution. 
The third paper that questions Korpi and Palme’s paradox, the analysis of Marx et al. (2016),  covers 24  
OECD countries and presents both aggregate and disaggregated (Old-age, family,  and other active-age 
benefit) (40) perspectives on the impact of different arrangements of social transfers (universal vs targe ted) 
on poverty and inequality following Korpi and Palme’s methodology. Contrary to Korpi and Palm e’s results , 
Marx and associates conclude that “the overall relationship between pro-poor targeting and income inequality 
reduction is very weak”, that “the most redistributive systems do contain  subsystems that are strongly 
targeted to the poor by intent and by design”, and that, in what they consider their key contribution, “means -
tested systems play a crucial role in bringing about redistributive effectiveness, even if their re lative s ize is  
small” (p. 1). However, according to the authors these results should not be interpreted as a dismissal of Korpi 
and Palme’s theoretical implications, because the Welfare State has to address to large parts of the 
population in order to produce strong redistribute results, “but once it does so, there is  scope for e ffe ctive 
redistribution toward the poor by means of systems that purposefully target the poorest” (p. 22). 
The last paper that we will comment in this review, Jacques and Noël (2018) , is  a lso,  so far,  the most 
recent contribution to the debate on the Redistribution Paradox that we know of. This time, contrary to  the 
other papers reviewed, the results obtained by the authors support the validity of the paradox in p resent 
times. The main novelty of their paper is that instead of measuring universality indirectly by income effects of 
its interventions on different groups of the population - as Korpi and Palme and the rest of the papers 
reviewed above do, where a lower concentration index is interpreted in term of more targeted systems - 
Jacques and Noël develop an universalism index, UI, (see section 3.6), a imed at measuring universalism 
directly. According to their analysis with panel data of 20 OECD countries for 2000-2011, after controlling for 
GDP, unemployment and dependency ratios, universalism is a significant predictor of socia l expenditure, 
inequality levels, redistribution and poverty. The positive role of universalism -as measured by UI- on 
redistribution also holds when we control for the size of social expenditure, although its  impact on poverty 
and inequality disappears, suggesting that the effect of universalism on inequality and poverty reduction is  
indirect through its impact on social expenditure (the correlation between UI and social expenditure is  0.73) . 
The authors also test the relation between the UI and support for redistribution according to the ISSP2006. 
The result shows a weak correlation (0.1) when we use the whole sample of countries but increases to  0.7 
when we exclude Denmark, a clear outlier with the highest UI index in 2006, and the second lower (after the 
US) share of population supporting redistribution. These results allow the authors to conclude that “the 
paradox of redistribution still operates in the 21st century” (p.82), and that the reports of its death, 
paraphrasing Mark Twain, are greatly exaggerated. 
From a different perspective, the work of Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003) on the d ifferent impact of 
inequality on support for welfare spending according to the nature of the social programmes suggests that 
the analysis of the inequality and poverty implications of universalism vs targeted social programmes has to  
be done at the level of the different social programmes, and not at the overall level of social expenditure. In  
this regard, the references included in table 15 on specific social programmes (child  poverty and pove rty 
among single mothers) present different conclusions regarding the issue at stake.  
The microsimulation exercise regarding child poverty of Corak et al. (2005) concludes that countries with the 
lowest poverty rates are those in which children largely benefit from other transfers not necessarily directed 
to them. In contrast, the papers of van Van Lancher and associates p resent a ros ier picture of targeted 
systems, especially when targeting is embedded in universal programmes. Th is is  what Skocpol (1991) 
denominated as “targeting within universalism”, referring to the situations in which “room has been made 
within certain universal policy frameworks for extra benefits and services that disproportionately help  less 
privileged people without stigmatizing them” (p. 414).  
                                     
(40)  The paper of Korp i and Palme also considers old age social expenditure as a test case, concluding, in line with their overall re s ults ,  
that earnings-related universal public pensions tend to generate lower gross income inequality among the e lderly than targeted o r 
basic security pensions.  
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According to Van Lancher et al. (2015) and Van Lancher and Van Mechelen (2015),  the  best pe rforming 
countries in terms of lower single mothers’ poverty as well as lower children poverty are actua lly countries 
with a system of targeting within universalism, where the two channels of poverty reduction are 
simultaneously at play, as they are able to combine high redistributive budgets with higher benefit levels  for 
low income families. 
Summing up, according to the brief literature survey presented in these pages, most of the participants in the 
debate agree on the existence of a positive relationship between universalism (whether measure in 
terms of output, by the concentration coefficient of social expenditure or by the UI) and h igher 
welfare spending. At the same time, there is disagreement regarding the role played by universalism 
in the fight against inequality and poverty after the turn of the century . One way to  explain such 
disagreement is to consider that universalism and targeting are not antithetic concepts . The opposite  of 
universalism would be residualism, not targeting. In a context of targeting within universalism, universalism 
allows for a large social budget, while targeting can improve the effectiveness of redistribution to  specif ic  
demographic groups at lower cost for the Welfare State (Jacques and Noël, 2020).  
In any case, although it is obviously important, this debate about the virtues of universalism vs targeted or 
means-tested social programmes should not make us forget that the Welfare State was not in p rinciple 
developed to fight poverty, but to protect people, and specially workers, of certain risks such as inadequate 
income in all age, bad health or disabilities. Thus, it could be argued that it is against these risks that the 
Welfare State’s success or failure must be measured. A different question is  to  what extent, the policies 
implemented to address these risks are also the appropriate policies to fight poverty.  
4.3 Universal social protection and incentives 
Another important element in the debate regarding the pros and cons of universal socia l protection  is  the 
question of incentives. As is well known, economists often argue that the functioning of the market rests on 
the existence of incentives, which through the price system act as guides for economic  agents in their 
decisions related to the demand and supply of goods, services, labour and capital. In the standard analysis of  
the labour market, for example, the incentive behind the supply of labour, considered in itself as a disutility, is 
obtaining income that can be used for consumption, a source of utility (either now or in the future, in the case 
of savings). According to this logic, the intervention of the State can alter market incentives in two ways. On 
one side, taxes affect incentives to supply labour by reducing the net reward of work. On the other s ide, the 
provision of services outside the market reduces the incentive to work, as they reduce the need to  go to  the 
labour market for obtaining income for consumption purposes. This is, in fact,  the explicit or implicit a im 
behind the decommodification of certain goods or services: to develop,  under certa in c ircumstances,  an 
alternative means of accessing such goods or services to their acquisition through the market (41).  
Although it could be argued that all public services (whether in kind or cash) have implications in te rms of 
incentives, the analysis of this issue has largely focused on the impact on the supply of labour of monetary 
transfers, either through some kind of social assistance or, more specifically, through unemployment benefits. 
In fact, nowadays social assistance often aims to be - and is designed as - a system of labour activation 
rather than a passive permanent subsidy for those out of the labour market and at risk of poverty (Kananen,  
2012, Peck, 2003, Mascini et al. 2012, Deeming, 2015, Rueda, 2015). Such redesign of socia l assistance 
proves, by itself, the importance given to the potential (dis)incentives linked to some programmes of soc ial 
protection. In what follows, we will use the impact of unemployment benefits on incentives to work to discuss 
to what extent universality of social protection can delay the reincorporation of the unemployed to  gainful 
employment.  
This is in fact one of the traditional lines of attack against progressive socioeconomic policies, what Albe rt O. 
Hirschman denominated, in his seminal book The Rhetoric of Reaction, the “Thesis of  the  Pe rve rse Effect” 
(Hirschman, 1991). According to this thesis, certain well-intentioned socioeconomic policies might have  
unintended negative consequences that would lead precisely to  the exact opposite result that the one 
intended. For Hirschman, “the contemporary critique of the Welfare State and the attempts to  roll back or 
“reform” some of its provisions” (p.6) was an example of such a thesis. In the same essay, Hirschman also 
discussed another interesting (more moderate) argument often used along with it, “the Jeopardy Thesis”:  the  
                                     
(41)  A different question, that we will not analyse in this section, concerns the implications of the universal a nd  f ree  p rov ision  o f  a  
service  on the (increasing) demand for such a service . In some cases, the increase in demand resulting from the free supply o f th e  
good or service  in question can be one of the aims of the policy (for example in education or vaccinations campaigns). Wh en that is  
not the  main aim of the policy, usually the provision of the good or service is managed through different systems to d is crimi n ate  
between legitimate and illegitimate demands: gatekeepers in the health systems, user´s fees, administrative processes, etc. 
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idea that a move in one direction in social policy, e.g. protecting the unemployed, might lead to unacceptable 
costs of one sort or another, e.g. lower employment levels. 
In this regard it is worthwhile quoting Hirschman in length, as an example of how the perversity thesis has 
been a traditional argument against redistributive policies: “The economic argument on the ensuing perverse 
effects was first put forward during the debates about the Poor Laws in England. The critics of  these laws, 
from Defoe to Burke, and from Malthus to Tocqueville, scoffed at the notion that the Poor Laws were merely 
a “safety net,” to use a current term, for those who had fallen behind, through no fault of their own , in  the  
race for a livelihood. Given the human “proclivity to idleness,” to use Mandeville’s phrase,  th is  “naive” view 
neglected the supply reactions, the incentives built into the arrangement: the availability of the assistance, so  
it was argued, acts as a positive encouragement to “sloth” and “depravity,” and thus produces poverty instead 
of relieving it” (pp. 28-29). 
Before proceeding with the discussion of the implications for some universal socia l pro grammes of the 
alleged effects they may have on incentives and economic activity, it is  useful to  review the counter -
arguments made by Hirschman to this perversity thesis. First (argues Hirschman), the perversity thesis is just 
a variant of the concept of unintended consequences, that pretended to introduce a margin of uncertainty to 
social analysis which paradoxically eliminates the possibility of uncertain results by arguing that the result is  
the opposite as intended. A second counter-argument relates to the intensity of the effect, as one thing is  to 
argue that there might be some perverse effects, on some individuals or specific groups of population, and a 
completely different thing is to argue that such effects are predominant, i .e .,  that they occur wi th “the 
frequency that is claimed”(p. 35). The third counter-argument focuses on the possibility of learning from the 
experience in the design of social programme to minimize their perverse effects, should they exist. The design 
of income subsidies to allow the reception of at least part of the social benefit and labour income to avoid the 
creation of a poverty trap is one example of such process of learn ing. Summing up , as we will see, the 
question is not so much whether such “perverse” effects exit, but their intensity and importance vis-a-vis  the  
intended effects of the policy. 
Theoretically, unemployment benefits, UB, might have a negative impact on employment levels by d ifferent 
means. First, by offering an alternative source of income, UB might reduce the intensity of job search (Krueger 
and Mueller, 2010, 2008). Second, unemployed workers might be more selective in accepting a job , i .e . UB 
could increase their reservation wage. Obviously, these implications are contingent on the way the UB system 
is built, and the requirements in terms of job search and job acceptance of the programmes. Moreover,  the 
potential negative implications of UB on employment also depend on the level of coverage. If not all workers 
are covered - as is usually the case for those entering the labour market or without long enough labour 
trajectories - the potential negative impact on access to employment of UB beneficiaries would be 
compensated by the shorter time of those unemployed without UB, who would face now lower competition  
from other unemployed workers (those with UB and more “relaxed” in terms of job search). In this regard, the 
universality of UB could increase the negative impact of the programme in terms of delaying re -entering 
employment as this unexpected positive effect of the ineligible for UB would disappear. 
To get a flavour of the type of results obtained when analysing the impact of UB on the duration of 
unemployment on the individual level, Table 17 summarises the results of a selection of studies that estimate 
the impact of UB duration and the replacement rate (percentage of previous wage) on the duration of non -
employment. The table focuses on research produced in the last 10-15 years. Most of the papers take 
advantage of the existing discontinuities of the UB systems or changes produced in UB, either of duration  or 
replacement rates, often with different implications for different kind of workers, to explore the impact of UB 
in terms of time span until being back in employment. In general, these empirical studies tend to  f ind small 
negative effects of UB on the duration of unemployment. 
According to a relatively recent survey of this literature by Schmieder and von Watcher (2016), the last round 
of empirical analysis of the impact on employment of the increase in the duration  of UB during the Great 
Recession in the US suggests that there is a negative but moderate impact, smaller than the one estimated in 
earlier studies. For the eight studies of EU countries reviewed in the paper, the marginal effect of inc reasi ng 
the duration of UB is 0.13, which means that an increase in the duration of benefits of one month would lead 
to an increase of the duration in non-employment by four days. Different studies for Spain  reviewed by 
Muñoz de Bustillo (2019) also point at the existence of a negative, but relatively small, delay in 
reemployment, often related to the lower probability of accepting jobs with requiring lower qualifications than 
the one the job seeker has. In this regard, the analysis of Tatsiramos (2009) of the e ffect of UB on 
unemployment and subsequent employment duration for the EU suggests that receiving benef its has an 
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adverse effect, in the sense of increasing unemployment duration, but there  is a lso  a pos itive e ffect 
associated with the increased duration of subsequent employment due to better job matches. 
Overall, the delayed reincorporation of the unemployed to employment due to UB should not come as a 
surprise, as the maintenance of income allowed the UB reduces the urgency of finding a job. Should the 
workers have no other source of income (either UB or personal or family savings) the urgency of finding a job 
would certainly be higher, lowering the reservation wage. This effect, known as liqu idity constra int in the 
literature, is of a different nature from the impact of UB on job search, resulting from the lower net benefit of 
finding a job (wage – UB) when receiving UB, and the corresponding alteration of the incentives to find a job 
known as moral hazard (Chetty, 2008).  
To reduce such negative effect on incentives, the architecture of UB usually includes decreasing replacement 
rates with the duration of unemployment, limited duration, and different requirements in terms of job search 
and availability (Asenjo and Pignatti, 2019, Moffit, 2014). On the other side, other elements, such as the level 
of unemployment and the probability of finding a job in the near future (should the unemployed refuse a job 
today for lack of urgency), or the consideration of having a job as a wellbeing enhancing mechanism by itse lf 
(on top of its role as source of income), are elements that would counteract, totally or partially, the 
(dis)incentives produced by UB.  
The recent evaluation of the so-called Finnish Basic Income Experiment, FBIE (Kangas et al., 2019), offers an 
interesting perspective on the effects on incentives of programmes of income support for the unemployed . 
The FBIE, aimed at investigating “whether a social security model based on a basic income could p romote 
more active participation and provide a stronger incentive to work than the present system” (p. 7) ,  was a 
partial basic income, in the sense that its recipients were chosen among persons aged 25 -58 receiving 
unemployment benefits from Kela, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland.  
That means that the experiment did not aim to study the impact of a universal basic income, UBI, but to study 
the impact on employment and income of substituting the current unemployment benefit for a basic income 
of a similar amount (560€ corresponding to the monthly net amount of the basic unemployment allowance 
and the labour market subsidy provided by Kela). According to the preliminary results, basic income recipients 
were no better or worse at finding employment than those in the control group during the f irst year of the  
experiment. In this regard, the substitution of a conditional UB by an unconditional basic income had no 
impact on employment or income. In contrast, the researchers found important d ifferences in  terms of 
wellbeing. According to survey data, the recipients of basic income had, vis-a-vis the control group of people  
receiving standard UB: (a) better wellbeing, (b) fewer problems related to health, stress and ability to 
concentrate, (c) more confidence in their future and in their employment p rospects , among other th ings. 
Beyond the Finnish experience, other studies of UBI experiments in  other countries point out to  s imilar 
conclusions (Marinescu, 2017, Bastagli, 2020). 
Summing up, income programmes alter incentives, and traditionally universal programmes “are  believed to 
undermine work ethic as they are not individually specified so that they would activate people to participate” 
(Anttonen et al. 2012, p. 193). In this regard, the condition of sufficiency together with its  unive rsal nature 
could generate tensions between the aim of social protection and the need to guarantee h igh labour force 
participation rates to allow the high level of income required to finance high levels of social protection for all.  
However, the potential negative impact of such programmes on incentives and labour force participation rates 
has been limited by three main factors: first, the conditionality attached to  many of the most common 
transfer social programmes; second, the preferences for market work even when other sources of income are 
available; and third, the incentives of having a long labour trajectory in order to qualify for d ifferent socia l 
transfers such as pensions. In fact, highly developed Welfare States are known for their high level of labour 
force participation rates, and not the opposite.  
Nevertheless, it cannot be taken for granted that such containment of the negative incentives to work would 
be maintained in other scenarios of full universal social protection, especially when the low-paid segments of 
the labour market are growing, and thus many of the available jobs are less rewarding in terms of in trinsic 
job quality and attractiveness as a means of social integration and source of self-esteem. 
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Table 17. Selection of studies on the impact of UB on employment. 
 Results 
Figura & 
Barnichon 
(2014), USA 
EEB increased the unemployment rate by about one-third percentage point in  the 
most recent recession but did not affect the participation rate. In previous 
recessions, the effect of EEB on the unemployment rate was even smaller. 
Chodorow-
Reichour& 
Karabarbounis  
(2016), USA 
The unprecedented increase of benefits during the Great Recession contributed at 
most 0.3 percentage point to the increase in the unemployment rate. our results  
simply suggest that concerns about large negative macroeconomic  effects of UI 
are not warranted 
Rothstein 
(2011), USA 
UI extensions had significant but small negative effects on the probability that the 
eligible unemployed would exit unemployment, concentrated among the long-term 
unemployed. The estimates imply that UI benefit extensions raised the 
unemployment rate in early 2011 by only about 0.1-0.5 percentage points , much 
less than is implied by previous analyses, with at least half of this effect 
attributable to reduced labour force exit among the unemployed rather than to the 
changes in reemployment rates that are of greater policy concern. 
Uusitalo & 
Verho (2010),  
Finland 
In January 2003, the unemployment benefits in Finland were increased for workers 
with long employment histories. The average benefit increase was 15% for the  
first 150 days of the unemployment spell. the change in the benefit structure 
reduced the re-employment hazards by on average 17% 
Bennmarker 
et al (2007), 
Sweden 
In 2001 and 2002, Sweden introduced several unemployment insurances reforms. 
A major innovation in the first reform was the introduction of a two‐tiered benefit 
structure for some unemployed individuals. This system involved supp lementary 
compensation during the first 20 weeks of unemployment. The  2002 reform 
retained the two‐tiered benefit structure but involved also substantial benefit hikes 
for spells exceeding 20 weeks. the reforms had strikingly different effects on job 
finding among men and women. The two reforms in conjunction are estimated to  
have increased the expected duration of unemployment among men but to have 
decreased the duration of unemployment among women. The overall effect on the 
duration of unemployment is not statistically different from zero. 
Lalive et al. 
(2006), 
Austria 
The impact on unemployment duration is higher the higher the extension of UB: 9  
weeks => 0,45 weeks increase; 22 weeks: 2,3 weeks increase 
Schmieder & 
von Wachter 
(2012) 
The increase in duration of UB has a marginal impact of unemployment duration 
(one additional month of eligibility for UB increase the period of unemployment by 
3 days) 
Schmieder & 
von Watcher 
(2016) US & 
different 
European 
countries 
The overall finding of the US studies reviewed is  that there is  a negative but 
moderate effect of UI benefit increases in duration during the Great Recession on 
unemployment duration. Studies from Europe also point to moderate labour supply 
effects from UI benefit durations. The median elasticity of the duration of benefits 
on non-employment for the EU countries is 0.40 (ranging is  from 0 .1 to 1) . The  
range of variation is smaller in the United States (0.1 – 0.4)  
Source : Authors’ own elaboration  
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5 An initial proposal for the construction of a system of indicators of 
universal social provision 
Our journey through the meaning and measurement of universal social protection started with the discussion 
of the polysemic meaning of universality in social protection in chapter two. With this background, in chapter 
three we reviewed a good number of different proposals that have been developed to measure the level of 
universality in different areas of social protection. In chapter four we adopted a policy perspective, reflecting,  
selectively, on some of the issues that characterise the debate about the rationale and convenience of social 
protection programmes addressed to the whole population (or demographic groups), such as their efficiency 
in fighting poverty, the question of the take-up rates or their impact on incentives. It is time now, as a way to  
wrap up this study, to discuss the characteristics that an index of universal public social protection for Europe  
should have, according to our own assessment of the literature and problems reviewed in previous chapters. 
5.1 Implementing indicators of universality in social protection: a proposal 
regarding dimensions and indicators    
The starting point of any measurement exercise is to define what is to be measured. In our case, that implie s 
defining what we mean by a universal social protection programme, what are their defining characteristics. 
According to the review of the literature conducted in chapter two, universality in a  socia l p rotection 
programme can be defined by two major dimensions (42):  
● The first one is the degree of coverage of the population :  the higher the share of the 
population protected, the higher the degree of universality of the programme. This general ru le 
has exceptions, as the specificity of some social programmes, such as those focused on specif ic  
groups (parents, people over or under a threshold rate, people with special needs) might limit 
their maximum coverage rate (to the share of the specific demographic group). 
● The second element to be considered is the adequacy o f the coverage. In  contrast with 
coverage, which can be measured in a more or less straightforward way, adequacy is a much 
more subtle aspect of a programme, due to its more normative and qualitative nature.  
As shown in Box 2, regardless of the strategy followed to aggregate our two dimensions of universality, the 
way they interplay with each other also supplies relevant information about the nature of universalism of a 
given Welfare State. It is important to note that, when we refer to the universality of  a social system or 
Welfare state rather than a specific programme, we have to include an additional element which is the range 
of needs to be covered or social protection programmes. However, for simplicity in  box 2 we assume that 
such a range of needs is given so that we can focus the discussion on coverage and adequacy.  
Box 2: Combinations of coverage and adequacy 
If we consider that both coverage and adequacy can go from very low (for instance, if only a small share of 
population is eligible for a given programme, and if those who are eligible enjoy a low level of protection) to  
very high levels, then we could graphically represent different social p rotection p rogrammes or 
systems in a continuum from low to high levels in both dimensions. This exercise would a llow 
defining four basic combinations that could contribute to  the defin ition of different social 
protection branches and/or Welfare State models regarding universality . 
This representation is shown in Figure 24. At the upper right corner, we would have welfare states or branches 
that we could call fully universal, that combine high levels of coverage and adequacy. On the opposite end,  
lower left corner, we would have welfare states with low levels of coverage of social protection programmes 
as well as low adequacy, that we could denominate as residual welfare states or branches. The other two 
categories would mix models, with high levels of one of the dimensions, whether adequacy or coverage, and a 
low level in the other. Welfare states located in the lower right corner would be characterised by having social 
programmes with a high level of adequacy, but only benefiting a small share of population , in  a kind of 
segmented model. In the opposite corner, we would have countries where social programmes reach most of 
the population, but with a low  
                                     
(42)  One must keep in mind, however, the consideration made in section 2.3 with regard to exclusion of certain groups, particula rl y  b ut 
not only women, from social programmes. In these cases the assessment of the coverage and adequacy angles could p rof it f ro m 
the use of other complementary indicators focusing on the specific characteristics (if any) of the population excluded f rom s ocia l 
protection. 
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level of adequacy, in a kind of testimonial universalism. 
While movements from the left to the right and from bottom to top can be interpreted in terms of growing 
universality, nothing can be said, a priori, from movements from the upper le ft to  the lower right,  as the 
choice between better adequacy at the cost of lower coverage, or vice versa, is clearly normative. 
Figure 25. Combinations of adequacy and coverage as defining elements of social protection branches and/or Welfare 
State models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Authors’ own elaboration  
The question of adequacy also brings up a complementary issue, related to the role played by equal provision  
for all people in defining universality, and the possibility of having differentiated benefits within a unive rsal 
protection system. In this regard, we believe that in some specific areas of social protection, such as health, 
homogeneity of provision must be a constituting element of universality, while in others, such as pensions or 
unemployment benefits there is room for differentiation of provision without breaching the p rinciples of 
universalism. This possibility must be justified by the aims of the programme.  
Those programmes whose aim is to maintain the relative standard of living of the people protected in case of 
interruption of labour income due to unemployment, sickness, or retirement, will typically need to  provide 
different benefits to different people. As we have seen, this differentiation is not only compatible  with the 
principles of universalism, but it might play an important role in generating the necessary political support 
(coalitions) to maintain the programme. In other cases, diversity within universality might be justified by the 
different specific needs of people facing the same problem. For example, old age dependency might requ ire , 
for some people, provision of in-home services, while for others it might mean access to a nursery home.  
A corollary of the previously discussed element is that, considering the wide range of in terventions of the 
Welfare State in terms of social policy, and the different characteristics of those programmes, the 
measurement of universality will have to be tailored to the characteristics and aims of the d ifferent social 
policies. Thus, with the same governing principles, the specific operationalisation of such p rinciples will 
necessarily differ from one programme to the other. In a way, the aim would be to make true the dic tum e  
pluribus unum. 
Another issue to address is which elements of social protection should be considered as candidates for 
measurement from the perspective of universality. As we saw in chapter two , these e lements can be 
identified democratically, according to people´s preferences, or axiomatically, on the basis of the Theory of 
Human Needs. However, in practice both approaches lead to relatively similar results in te rms of the main  
areas that could be guided by the principle of universal provision. In a European context, our p roposal for a 
tentative list of elements would include at least the following: health,  unemployment benef its,  sickness 
benefits, old-age pensions, social assistance, housing, and education.  
In fact, the above list can be interpreted as interventions to protect people against four basic  risks:  (1) 
Sickness -Health, (2) Lack of sufficient income – Unemployment benefits, pensions, social assistance, family 
Low                                                               High 
Adequacy 
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benefits, (3) Lack of affordable housing, (4) Ignorance -Education (43). Risks that would probably remind the 
reader of the 'five giants on the road to post-war reconstruction '  – Want, Disease,  Ignorance,  
Squalor and Idleness - mentioned in the Beveridge Report published almost 80 years ago. 
Table 18 reproduces the areas preliminarily selected for measurement of social protection, as well as a very 
first approach to the indicators that could be used for the measurement of the dimensions of cove rage  and 
adequacy, central to our understanding of universality. As we can see, coverage is straightforward in  most 
areas, with the exceptions of social assistance, sickness benefits and housing . Th is straightforwardness , 
nevertheless, hides the fact that table 18 uses two different measures of coverage. In the case of health, for 
example, it uses legal coverage, as we are just considering whether a person is entitled to health provision in 
the case of needing it. In contrast, in the cases of unemployment benefits or old age pensions, the table uses 
measures of the share of the population unemployed, or passed retirement age and not working , re ceiving 
unemployment benefits or an old age pension, respectively. In the former case we are measuring de iure 
coverage, while in the later we are measuring de facto coverage. 
In order to fine-tune the first approach to measuring coverage we would have to  complement the de iure 
coverage rate with indicators of promptness or effectiveness of the service, items that are also re lated to  
adequacy. The case of education is a good example of the d ifferences between the iure and de facto 
coverage, as the right to education, a fundamental human right  enshrined in the Univer sal Dec laration of 
Human Rights (1948) and included in almost all constitutions,  can be frustrated, even in  high income 
countries, if for different reasons students quit their studies before the comple tion of h igh secondary 
education. In this regard, a candidate indicator for a measure of coverage in this domain would be (1 -) early 
school leaving rate. 
Looking now at the “difficult” cases, for sickness benefits the problem is the lack of information on people 
with sickness affecting their capacity to work, as what we normally have is information on health condition in  
general on one side, and information on people who have been recognised as unable to  temporary or 
permanently work due to health issues on the other, but not on those with health issues that have not been 
considered for different reasons (rejection, non-application, etc.) by the sickness benefit system.  
In the case of social assistance, an indicator of coverage could be constructed by comparing the number of 
beneficiaries of social assistance with the total population at risk of poverty before social assistance.  
As we mentioned in the summary section of chapter 3, housing is probably the area of social policy currently 
more devoid of indicators of coverage. It is also an area of low social expenditure in most countries. In  any 
case, considering the importance for wellbeing of access to decent housing at a reasonable cost, especially in 
big cities, this would be an area worth exploring in more detail in a specific study. The cost and quality of  
housing are generally understood as a key determinant of living standards and wellbeing, especially for the 
disadvantaged. In 2018, according to Eurostat, in the EU (28), 10% of population spent more than 40% of 
their income in housing.  As many as 1/3 of Europeans consider that they face “d isproportionate housing 
costs” (Pittini, 2012).  
Regarding the measurement of adequacy, the obvious problem is the normative-subjective nature of the 
concept. What is adequate for one person might not be adequate for other. Yet, common sense (and other 
considerations such as the question of incentives, in the case of UBI)  might a llow agree ing on what an 
adequate level of benefits is for a given social programme.  
Regarding unemployment benefits and pensions, adequacy is usually defined in relation to previous earnings. 
Even in those cases where public pensions are minimum flat pensions, the understanding normally is  that 
most people will complement the public flat pension with other sources of income from occupational pensions 
or, less importantly, private pensions.  
In the case of social assistance, considering that the aim of these programmes is  to  f ight poverty risk,  
adequacy could be defined in terms of the contribution of the programme to eliminate the poverty gap (the  
difference between earnings before transfers and the risk of poverty threshold) . In  fact, a  universal fully 
adequate social assistance programme would lead to a null rate of risk of poverty. Thus, the reduction in the 
poverty rate before and after social assistance transfers could be used as a proxy variable of the combined 
effect of coverage and adequacy.  
                                     
(43)   In case of restricting ourselves to the standard range of social policies in a European context, then education would be le ft o ut o f  
the  analysis since it is generally considered as an investment rather than an aspect of social protection.  
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Table 18. A selection of areas and potential indicators for the measurement of the degree of universal social protection.  
 
Universe 
Indicator 1: 
coverage 
Indicator 2:  
adequacy 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Unemployed 
population 
Coverage 
rate 
Replacement rate 
Old age pensions 
People over 
retirement age 
Coverage 
rate 
Replacement rate 
Family benefits: a) 
financial support for 
families, b) Childcare  
support, c) Parental 
leave) 
Households with 
children underage  
 
Coverage 
rate of each 
programme 
Reduction of child poverty rates 
achieved by financial support for 
families, % of childcare costs publicly 
provided, duration and replacement 
rates of parental leave 
Health Total population 
Coverage 
rate 
Range of health issues covered  
Set of tracer indicators of quality of 
health service 
Life expectance and disability-free 
life expectancy (DFLE) 
Social assistance 
Population at 
poverty risk 
before social 
assistance 
Coverage 
rate 
Reduction of risk of poverty rate (and 
poverty gap) of those receiving social 
assistance 
Housing Total population 
Coverage 
rate 
% substandard housing 
% housing deprivation 
Education  
Total population/ 
Population at 
school age 
% of 
population 
that 
completes 
secondary 
education 
indicators of performance of students 
in secondary education (PISA, etc.) 
Source : Authors’ own elaboration 
In relation to family benefits, adequacy would have to be measured differently for each of the three broad 
types of family benefits. For financial support for families (including child-related cash transfers),  a good 
indicator of adequacy could be the reduction of child poverty rates achieved by the programme. For childcare 
support, an indicator of adequacy could be the percentage reduction in childcare costs for the average family. 
For parental leave, an indicator of adequacy could be based on measures of the duration  and replacement 
rates of the programme. 
The definition of adequacy in the area of health poses different problems, as there are myriads of 
pathologies, health conditions and thus therapies and interventions. There are two different approaches to 
this issue, that can complement each other or be used alternatively depending on the availability of data for 
the elaboration of the indicator. The first one is to focus on the range of available treatments/therapies in 
different fields within the health system. The second is to focus on the results of the health system in te rms 
of survival and quality of life related to different pathologies. Other items, such as promptness of medical 
attention or out of pocket expenditure through private provision could be used to complement the 
measurement. The indicators developed by the WHO and the OECD reviewed in chapter three are a good 
starting point to develop this dimension of adequacy. 
Regarding education, the measure of adequacy could be approached by the use of ind icators,  such as the 
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA, measuring “15-year-olds’ ability to  use their 
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reading, mathematics and science knowledge and skills to meet real-life challenges”. In  any case, o the r 
alternatives such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study,  TIMMS,  the Progress in  
International Reading Literacy Study, PIRLS (both of the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement, IEA), etc. could be explored, as we should be aware of the limitations of using PISA 
as a yardstick for adequacy (44). 
To conclude this section is important to stress that the ideal way to address the question of the selec tion of 
indicators is by focusing on objective indicators of results,  i .e. how far the objectives of coverage and 
adequacy are met. Unfortunately, sometimes the lack of suitable indicators of results makes it necessary to 
rely on indicators of means as a second-best solution (e.g. expenditure per pupil as an indicator of adequacy 
if there are no suitable indicators of results per se). 
5.2 Implementing indicators of universality in social protection: some technical 
considerations 
In the previous pages, we have sketched the main structure  and contents of a system of ind icators of 
universality of social protection for Europe. To complete the discussion, it is useful to add some technical 
considerations of how such a system of indicators could be practically implemented. 
First, it is important to discuss the standardisation of measures ,  in particular for the dimension of 
adequacy. The main purpose of any indicator or system of indicators is  to be able  to compare d ifferent 
measures, in this case of universality of social protection, across areas (degree of universality of  different 
programmes), time (change in the degree of universality of a given social system) or space (differences in the 
degree of universality of different social systems). Thus, the different measures have to be standardised, with 
the values reflecting a comparable metric of the underlying phenomena. In the case of coverage, the concept 
itself facilitates standardisation because it is more or less the same across different areas of social 
protection: coverage refers to the percentage of the applicable population that receives the benefit or service.  
But in the case of adequacy, standardisation is very problematic because it is  a qualitative concept that 
depends very strongly on the specific area of social protection being measured. Adequacy of health provis ion 
can be measured by the range of treatments covered and the quality of the service, whereas adequacy of 
unemployment benefits can be measured by the extent to which it replaces forgone earnings. These are not 
only difficult to compare, but they can even be difficult to express in a standard metric of 0-100 as would be  
most desirable.  
How to do this? Since social protection tries in general to hedge against risks, in  most cases there is  an 
implicit “desired” or "minimum" state that they want to protect, although it varies by area. For instance, in the 
case of health, it tries to provide protection against health risks and thus it tries to bring the health of citizens 
back to a "normal" state. In the case of unemployment benefits, it provides insurance against the loss  of 
income that results from unemployment, and thus it tries to replace the labour income to  a more or le ss 
"adequate" level. And so on. This can be used as a general criterion for standardising measures of adequacy: 
first, we should define the level (of income, health, education) that each social programme tries to  protect,  
and then we can use measures of actual levels achieved for defining a standard 0-100 measure of adequacy.  
In the case of unemployment benefits, adequacy can be expressed as % of pre -unemployment income 
provided (assuming that income support is the main purpose of UB) ; in the case of health p rotection, 
adequacy can be expressed in terms of % of treatments needed which are provided by the system; in  the 
case of education, adequacy can be expressed as % of population that reaches the desirable performance in 
terms of PISA-style competences; etcetera. Although the operationalisation of this criterion will necessarily be 
different across different areas of social protection, the fact that the underlying logic is  the same should 
allow to compare across them. Then, for each area of social protection, the operationalisation should remain  
as similar as possible over time and space, even though differences in data availability or social systems may 
require some flexibility that should nevertheless remain consistent with the underlying logic previously stated. 
A second consideration for the implementation of our proposal into a set of indicators concerns the 
differentiation of subgroups in the population. As we have also mentioned on several occasions, not a ll 
social protection systems are provided homogeneously throughout the population covered. In some cases, the 
                                     
(44)  For example, a first limitation concerns the areas of knowledge measured - reading, science and mathematics - , whose choice ,  a s  
the  OECD recognises “reflects the basic purpose of OECD; the concern for economic competitiveness in a global, high-tech ma rke t 
economy” (OECD, 2013), and does not have to coincide with the goal of the different national education  s ys tems.  Fo r a  critica l 
review of PISA see Zhao (2020), Sjoberg (2015), or Hopfenbeck (2018).  
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social protection benefits or services are provided differently for different subgroups  of the population,  
normally on the basis of different identified levels of need. For instance,  family benefits  typically vary 
depending on family size (especially, number of dependent children or adults), or social assistance according 
to income levels, etc. This creates a technical problem for the measurement of adequacy, because d ifferent 
groups of the population may de facto have different levels of adequacy however we define it.  
How to solve this problem? If the necessary data is available, our proposal for those cases would be the 
following: 1) identify the relevant subgroups for the social programme in question; 2) compile  measures of 
adequacy for each of those subgroups according to the log ic explained in the p revious paragraphs;  3) 
compute an aggregate measure of adequacy by making an average of the subgroup values, weighted by their 
relative share of the population. If the necessary data is not available, an alternative option would be to  use  
one or two representative profiles and compute a measure of adequacy for them, using it as a proxy for the 
overall adequacy of the programme. 
A third technical issue to consider is how to aggregate the two dimensions of universality for each 
programme, namely coverage and adequacy . If following the logic of  the  previous paragraphs we 
managed to construct standardised measures of coverage and adequacy that range from 0  to 100,  their 
combination in a single indicator of universality can be as simple as an arithmetic average of both. However, 
we would propose to use a geometric average instead, which penalises combinations of coverage and 
adequacy that are unbalanced (assuming that coverage and adequacy cannot compensate each other,  and 
that a balanced combination of both is desirable). 
Fourth, how to aggregate the measures of universality of the different areas or social protection programmes 
identified into a single index? Again, if the values have been properly standardised and are comparable across 
programmes, the aggregation into a single index can be done by simple averaging. As in the previous case, we 
would propose to use geometric rather than arithmetic averaging, for the same reasons previously discussed. 
It is important to note as well that, although the aggregation of universality indices across different areas into 
a single index can be very useful for comparisons over time and space, in some cases it can be preferable to  
keep the different measures separate as part of a system of indicators. As we have argued in the past,  
however (Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011), the aggregation into a single index does not preclude in any way the 
use of the full complexity of sub-indicators for understanding better any interesting pattern or result that may 
emerge from the analysis. 
A fifth consideration refers to the level of measurement. What are the relevant units of analysis for the  
measurement of universality of social protection? In principle, the relevant units should be those de fined by 
the social protection systems themselves: in Europe, that means in most cases th e Member State level,  
although in some federal or decentralised social systems,  it could be the region . However, the use of 
standardised measures allows also to aggregate indicators at higher levels, weighting by size of the 
population. That way, for instance, we could construct an index of universality of social protection at the EU 
level. 
A final consideration concerns the periodicity of the measures. Considering that social protection systems 
(thankfully) do not change overnight, and instead tend to change slowly because of their massive complexity 
and costs, in our opinion it would not be necessary to update the measures of universality of social protection 
very often, but only in the medium term. Quarterly or even yearly measures would probably be unnecessari ly 
frequent because they would remain unchanged over many measurements. Updating a system of ind icators 
of universality of social protection every 5 or 10 years seems like a much more sensible option. 
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6 Conclusions and future work 
We started chapter two of this report discussing the difficulties of making an operational defin ition  of 
universality. Against this background, we tried to unpack the meaning of universal social protection in order to 
identify its essential elements. From our perspective, the two key elements of universality are the extent to  
which a given programme covers the relevant population, i.e. coverage, and the quality of the benefit provided 
in terms of protecting adequately against the relevant risk(s),  i .e.,  adequacy. A review of the d ifferent 
exercises that directly or indirectly can be, or have been, used to measure universality in different areas of 
social protection showed that there are many alternatives and data sources already available that can be 
used as proxies - specially, but not only, regarding monetary social benefits. Nevertheless,  in most of the 
cases the proposals reviewed fall a step short of actually presenting the result obtained as a measure of the  
degree of universality of the analysed social protection programme(s). 
The report continued by reviewing, in a non-exhaustive manner, some of the topics related to  the debate  
about the advantages and disadvantages on universal social protection, compared to more selective (targeted 
or means-tested) approaches to social protection. The issue of the take-up rates, the question of incentives 
and the effectiveness of universal versus selective social protection in addressing poverty risk were the three 
topics reviewed, out of the many that could have been addressed in the chapter.  
Among the issues not discussed explicitly in this paper, the elephant in  the  room is the question of the 
financing of universal social protection. Although we are well aware of the importance of that top ic  for 
the subject discussed in this report, it is a distinct issue that merits its own separate and careful analysis. But 
in any case, we would like to stress that having a selective and thus less onerous soc ia l system would not 
resolve the economic problem of financing social protection, as it only changes the weight of the  financ ia l 
burden from the public sector (and the tax system) to the individuals not eligib le for the targeted social 
program, excluded now from the system. People that, orphan of public soc ia l protection , woul d have to  
address by themselves the needs of social protection, regarding health, old age pensions, etc.  
It is from this perspective that we can say that turning from universal to selective programmes only shifts the 
problem of financing from one agent, the State, to another, the population excluded. From a purely economic 
perspective (as a bookkeeping exercise), only if the overall cost of a selective public social provision p lus the 
general private provision of the people not covered is lower for the same level of protection , we could say 
that the selective-residual option would be cheaper than an option based on universal provision. For instance, 
it is widely acknowledged that the selective plus private American health system is -all things considered- 
significantly more expensive than the mostly universal health systems of most European countries. And even 
then, we would have to also consider the distributive implications, because of the different financial capac ity 
of people for protecting themselves against social risks.  
In any case, it is important to stress that the choice between a selective or a universal social p rotection 
system is not only a technical issue related to the efficiency and political feasibility of one approach versus 
the other. As a matter of fact, this crucial choice is mainly informed by the different visions of what a good 
society is, in terms of allocation of responsibilities between the market and the state, and as such it is largely 
driven by ideological factors which cannot be fully solved by economic analysis.  
In the final chapter of this report, we presented a set of guidelines for a hypothetical indicator or system of 
indicators of universality of social protection for the main programmes that could be, if desired, also used to  
construct an aggregate indicator of the universality of the different Welfare States. It is our hope that such 
guidelines could be of help for the construction a future indicator or set of indicators of universality in social 
protection in Europe. 
Such an effort appears relevant for the analysis and benchmarking of European social protection systems and 
for the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Our approach for the further development of 
these indicators would entail the testing and validation of the approach by applying it on a pilot basis for one 
or more specific Member States as well as for a selection of the relevant social p rotection branches , as 
discussed in this report. 
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